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ABSTRACT.
Politics and the Indian Community in West Malaysia and Singapore 
19^5 " 1957. Rajeswary Ampalavanar.
This dissertation examines the political development of the 
Indian community in West Malaysia and Singapore in the period 
19^5 to 1957« It traces its transition from an essentially 
India-oriented community immediately after the Occupation to a 
more permanently-settled community in 1957* with a secure place 
in the Government of Independent Malaya* After an opening chapter 
outlining the main political features of the Malayan Indian 
community prior to 19 +^5* the succeeding chapters, covering the 
period 19^5-1957* are arranged thematically. They consider the 
impact of Indian nationalism on the local Malayan community, the 
politicization of Indian labour, the Indian response to the 
Malayan Union and the Federation Agreement, the participation of 
the Indians in formal politics, factionalism within the Indian 
community, and finally the alignment of the Malayan Indian 
Congress with the Alliance in the mid-1950,s.
PREFACE
The political history of Malaya in the period 19^5-1957 Has 
received considerable attention from historians and political 
scientists in recent years* There have been two general surveys 
covering this period, Gordon P* Means, Malaysian Politics, (London,
1970) and R*S. Milne, Government and Politics in Malaysia, (Boston,
1967). In addition, K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political 
Process in Malaya, (Kuala Lumpur, 1965) and R.K. Vasil, Politics in 
a Plural Society: A study of non-communal political parties in 
Malaysia (London, 1971) have sought to assess the impact of race and 
communalism on Malayan political developments in the post-war era*
Mohamed Nordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation:
Political Unification in the Malaysia Region, 19^5-1965 (Kuala Lumpur,
197^) has analysed each of the major political and constitutional 
developments in that period, whilst J.V. de Allen, The Malayan Union,
(New Havent1967) and A.J. Stockwell, 'The Development of Malay 
Politics during the Course of the Malayan Union Experiment, 19^-2-19^ 8' 
(Ph.D. thesis, London, 1973) have examined in considerable detail the 
Malayan Union Scheme, and in particular the Malay response to it.
Finally, left-wing movements in post-19^5 Malaya have been the focus of 
numerous .studies, though perhaps the most noteworthy are, Anthony Short,
The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 19^5-60, (London, 1975) and Richard 
Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 19^-5-1963*
(London,1973)* ^  ^
(1) Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs: how Malaya defeated the 
Communist guerrillas, 19/t6-1960, London, 1971; G. Hanrahan,
The Communist Struggle in Malaya, New York, 195^* J*M. van der Kroef, 
Communism in Malaysia and Singapore - a contemporary survey. The 
Hague, 1967; Harry Miller, Menace in Malaya, London, 195^* Lucian 
Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its social and political meaning, 
Princeton, 1956. '
To a greater or lesser extent all these works pay less attention 
to the Indian community than its importance would merit. For a fuller 
account of the political evolution:: of the Malayan Indian community in 
the post-19*l-5 period it has hitherto been necessary to turn first to the 
general works on the Malayan Indians, most notably Kernial Singh Sandhu, 
Indians in Malaya: some aspects of their immigration and settlement, 
1786-1957 (Cambridge, 1969)* S. Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia and 
Singapore (London, 1970)* and Usha Mahajani, The Role of Indian Minorities 
in Burma and Malaya, (Bombay, i960). However, as is almost inevitable, 
Arasaratnam and Mahajani provide merely general surveys of the political 
development of the Indian community for the brief period 19*+5-1957 and 
in addition make little reference to the wider political and 
constitutional changes affecting the country as a whole, whilst the 
main emphasis of Sandhu is on Indian immigration and settlement. To 
some extent the gaps have been filled by R.K. Jain, South Indians on the 
Plantation Frontier in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, 1970) and S. Subramaniam, 
'Politics of the Indians in Malaysia, 19^ +5-1955* (M.A. Thesis,
University of Malaya, 197*0 though Subramaniam concentrates almost 
solely on the MIC, and even then essentially on the Party's organization 
and structure, whilst Jain, in an anthropological study, makes only a 
brief reference to the political movements on the estates.
In contrast this study attempts to consider the political evolution ..of 
the Indian community as a whole in the period 19*+5-1957. In particular 
it: emphasizes the class and ethnic divisions of the community and the 
way in which they determined the political development of the Malayan 
Indians in these years. More importantly the study attempts to consider 
the political evolution of the Indian community in the context of wider 
political changes as Malaya moved from Occupation to Independence, and 
in the context of Malay and Chinese response to those political and 
constitutional changes.
It would be useful at this point to outline briefly the 
organization of this study for the subject is treated thematically 
rather than chronologically. The opening chapter considers the 
evolution of the Malayan Indian community prior to 19*+5* Chapter II 
analyses the influence of Indian Nationalism on the Malayan Indians 
in the period 19*+5-1957. The following two chapters concentrate on 
the late 19*+0s, and examine Indian labour movements in the immediate 
post-war years (chapter III), and then the Indian response to the 
Constitutional changes of 19*+6~1950 (chapter IV). This second 
aspect is then developed further in chapter V which examines the 
Indian response to the political reforms of the 1950s. Therefore 
chapters II - V are concerned with what may be called the 'external 
relations' of the Indian community, the response of the community to 
its changing political environment. Chapter VI looks within the 
Indian community and considers the intra-communal divisions which 
arose throughout the whole period 19*+5-57. The following chapter 
(chapter VII) returns to the theme of the Indian community's 'external 
relations' and considers the community's move towards political 
alignment with the other two major races in the 1950s through the 
Alliance.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AMCJA All Malaya Council of Joint Action.
AMICC All Malayan Indian Congress Committee.
ANC Alliance National Council.
API Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (Organization of Youth
for Justice).
BMA British Military Administration.
CCAO Chief Civil Affairs Officer.
CFM Ceylon Federation of Malaya.
CIAM Central Indian Association of Malaya.
CJA Council of Joint Action.
CLC Communities Liaison Committee*
C. for L. Commissioner for Labour.
CO Colonial Office.
Cmd Command.
DCCAO Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer.
DK Dravida Kalagam (Dravidian Federation)•
FIO Federation of Indian Organizations.
FMS Federated Malay States*
GLU General Labour Union.
GSI s General Staff of Intelligence.
IIL Indian Independence League.
IMP Independence of Malaya Party.
INA Indian National Army.
INC Indian National Congress.
I.S.E.A.S. Institute of South East Asian Studies.
JMBEAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society,
Malayan Branch.
JSEAH Journal of &outh East Asian History
JSEAS Journal of South East Asian Studies
KMM Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Malay Youth Association)*
KMS Kesatuan Melayu Singapura (Singapore Malay
Association)•
KMT Kuomintang.
MCA Malayan Chinese Association.
MCP Malayan Communist Party.
MCS Malayan Civil Service.
MDU Malayan Democratic Union.
MIA Malayan Indian Association.
MIC Malayan Indian Congress.
MLP Malayan Labour Party.
MNP Malay Nationalist Party.
MPAJA Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army.
MPIEA Malayan Planting Industries Employers’ Association.
MSS Malayan Security Service.
MTUC Malayan Trade Union Congress.
MU Malayan Union.
N.A. National Archives.
NDYL New Democratic Youth League
NIDYL New Indian Democratic Youth League
NUPW National Union of Plantation Workers.
OCPD Officer in Charge of Police Depot.
PAP Peoples Action Party.
PEEU Perak Estate Employees Union.
PETA Pembela Tanah Ayer (Avengers of the Country).
PMDF Pan-Malayan Dravidian Federation.
PMFTU Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions.
PMIP Pan-Malayan Islamic Party.
PMU Peninsula Malays Union.
PPP Perak Progressive Party, later Peoples'
Progressive Party.
Putera Pusat Tenaga Raayat (Nucleus of Peoples Force).
R.G.A. Rubber Growers Association.
SAC Supreme Allied Commander.
SCAO Senior Civil Affairs Officer.
SCTA Selangor Ceylon Tamils Association.
SIA Singapore Indian Association.
SLP Selangor Labour Party.
SRIC Singapore Regional Indian Congress.
SS Straits Settlements.
TRA Tamil Reform Association.
TRC Tamils Representative Council.
UMNO United Malays National Organization.
UPAM United Planters Association of Malaya.
WC Working Committee.
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IThe Setting: The Indian Community In Malaya Prior To 19^5
Large-scale migration of Indians from the sub-continent to
Malaya followed the extension of British formal rule to the west
(1)coast Malay states in the 1870s. As early as 1901, the Indian
population in the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay
States was approximately 120,000, and by 19^7 it had grown to
(2)almost 600,000 for Malaya and Singapore. On Independence in
1957 it stood at a little over 820,000. In this last year, Indians
accounted for approximately eleven per cent of the total population
(3)of Malaya and Singapore.
The overwhelming majority of migrants from India were Tamil- 
speakers from the south of the sub-continent. In 19^7 they 
represented approximately seventy-seven per cent of the total
(M
Indian population in Malaya and Singapore. Other South Indians, 
mainly Malayalee and Telegus, formed a further fourteen per cent 
in 19^7i and the remainder of the Indian community was accounted
(1) The standard work on British intervention from 187^ is,
G.D. Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya: the origins of British 
political control, London, 1961.
(2) S» Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, London, 1970, 
p. 28; M.V. Del Tufo, Malaya, A Report on the 19^7 Census of 
Population, London, 19^9, p . 4 o . Therefore two standard general 
works on the Indian community in Malaya, K.S. Sandhu, Indians in 
Malaya: some aspects of their immigration and settlement, 1786-1957% 
Cambridge, 1 9 6 9 ; Arasaratnam, op.cit.
(3) Federation of Malaya, The 1957 Census - A Preliminary Report 
Based on 'First Count Total* Returns, Jtuala Lumpur, 19571 p*^.
Del Tufo, op.cit., p. 78#
for by North Indians, principally Punjabis, Bengalis, Gujeratis 
(5)and Sindhis. These ethnic divisions corresponded closely to 
occupational specialization. For example, the South Indian Tamils 
were predominantly labourers; the majority were employed on 
rubber estates, though a significant minority worked in Government 
public works departments*^^ The Telegus were also mainly labourers 
on the estates. However the Malayalee community was divided into 
those who occupied relatively more skilled labouring positions on
(7)the estates and those who were white-collar workers or professionals.
The North Indians with the exception of the Sikhs were mainly 
merchants and businessmen; for example, the Gujeratis and Sindhis 
owned some of the most important textile firms in Malaya and
/ox
Singapore. The Sikhs were either in the police or employed as 
(9)watchmen. There were, in addition, three further ethnic and
religious groups, whose political and economic importance in Malaya
far exceeded their numerical strength. Two were important business
communities - the Chettiars, a money-lending caste from Madras,
and the South Indian Muslims (Moplahs and Marakkayars) who were
mainly wholesalers.^0  ^ The third group were the Ceylonese Tamils
who were employed principally in the lower levels of the Civil
(11)Service and in the professions.
Ibid.
Sandhu, op.cit., p. 159»
Ibid.
Amarjit Kaur, 'North Indians in Malaya: A Study of their Economic, 
Social and Political Activities with Special Reference to Selangor, 
l870s-19^0s*t M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, 1973* P- 75-80.
Ibid., pp. 63-70.
Arasaratnam, op.cit., pp. 35-37.
Ibid., pp. 33-3^*
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
The close correspondence between the ethnic and occupational
divisions of the Indian community was inevitably reflected in the
community's geographical distribution in Malaya. The South Indian
Tamils were concentrated mainly in Perak, Selangor and Negri
Sembilan, on the rubber estates and railv/ays, though a significant
(12)proportion found employment on the docks in Penang and Singapore.
The Telegus were mainly on the rubber estates of Lower Perak and
parts of Selangor, while the Malayalees were located predominantly
in Lower Perak, Kuala Lumpur, parts of Negri Sembilan and Johore 
(13)Bharu. The business communities - the Gujeratis, Sindhis,
Chettiars and South Indian Muslims, were naturally, concentrated
in the urban areas, principally Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Ipoh and 
(14)Singapore. The Ceylon Tamils were also mainly an urban community,
though some were found in rural areas working as subordinate staff 
(15)on the estates.
One further characteristic of the Indian community in Malaya
should be noted, that is, its caste divisions. Over one-third of
the immigrants from Madras were untouchables, the remainder being
(16)agricultural caste groups and a very tiny group were Brahmins.
As in India, caste provided an important basis for social identity, 
particularly in marriage, and it also affected political alignments 
within the community. For example, in the l$)40s and 1950s left-wing
Del Tufo, op.cit., p. 79. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 81.
Arasaratnam, op.cit., p. 26.
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
organizations and militant Tamil groups were able to exploit the 
caste grievances of the estate workers to challenge the higher caste 
Indian elite.
Compared with the period after 19^5, the Indian community in 
Malaya in the inter-war years was politically quiescent, and the 
relatively few occasions when it was aroused to political action was 
usually in response to initiatives from India rather than to events 
in Malaya. The sporadic nature of Indian political activity can be 
easily explained. First, in this period, the Indians in Malaya were 
still essentially a transitory community. It was common for Indians 
of all classes, particularly the merchants, to return frequently 
to India for short periods. Inevitably, this continually reinforced 
the India-orientation of the Malayan Indian community, particularly 
as the British authorities in Malaya did little to encourage Indians 
to evolve a local identity. The frequent visits to India also 
exposed the community to political movements on the sub-continent. 
Second, the diverse nature of the Indian 'community' in Malaya, divided 
along class, caste and ethnic lines, prevented the development of a 
cohesive Indian political force in Malaya. Moreover, these divisions 
ensured that political impulses from the varying regions of India 
affected only the corresponding ethnic and religious group in Malaya, 
and not the Indian community as a whole.
It would appear that the first Indian political movement to
affect the community in Malaya was the Ghadr Party, though in fact
(17)the Party had its base in North America. The Ghadr Party
concentrated its propaganda on North Indians, in particular, the police 
and sepoys, in an attempt to instigate a rising against the Raj. This 
propaganda bore fruit in the Singapore Mutiny of February 1915 when
(17) For details on the Ghadr Party propaganda in Malaya, see Khoo 
Kay Kim, 'The Beginnings of Political Extremism in Malaya, 
1915-1935*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
1973, pp. 18-19; Amarjit Kaur, op.cit., pp. 265-265*
Pathan, Rajput, Sikh and Punjabi soldiers led a violent, though
quickly crushed, revolt against their British o f f i c e r s . T h e
outbreak of the mutiny was due mainly to anger amongst the Muslim
soldiers at Britain's actions in Turkey (a fellow Muslim state), and
at the British authorities ill-treatment of a group of 'revolutionary'
(19)Sikhs who, at one point, had attempted to land in Singapore.
The Ghadrites were able to play on these grievances.
The Malayan Sikhs remained a focus of Indian propaganda after
the First World War. First, subversive groups were able to exploit
that community's bitter anger over the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre
- (20)m  Amritsar m  April 1919- Second, the Akali movement in India
between 1919-1924, which aimed to wrest control of the Sikh temples
(gurudwaras) from the Sikh priests supported by the British
authorities, provoked considerable anti-British sentiments among
(21)both the local Sikhs and those in Malaya. Finally, the Sikh
community in Malaya was seriously affected by a division which
occurred in the community in India between the Majha and Malwa 
(22)Sikhs. The rift was along regional lines. It caused
considerable concern to the authorities in Malaya for it threatened
the unity of the Sikh-dominated Federated Malay States and Straits
(23)Settlements Police force.
/ ijO\
Khoo Kay Kim, op.cit., pp. 9-29. Amarjit Kaur, op.cit., 
pp. 173-204; Donald and Joanna Moore, The First 130 Years 
of Singapore, Singapore, 1969» pp. 549-56l• "
See Khuswant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, New Jersey, 1966, 
vol. II, p. 178.
Ibid., p. 166; Amarjit Kaur, op.cit., p. 268.
Amarjit Kaur, op.cit., pp. 269-270.
Ibid., pp. 244-245.
(23) ibid; for more details on the Federated Malay States and Straits 
Settlements Police -^ orce see, Abdul Karim bin Bagoo, 'The Origin 
and Growth of the Malay States Guides', B.A. (hons) Academic 
Exercise, University of Malaya in Singapore, 1954; A.E. Young,
The Federation of Malaya and Its Police, 1786-1952, Kuala Lumpur, 
1952.
(19)
(20) 
(21)
A further major Indian political movement which had an impact on
(2*0the Malayan community m  the early 1920s was the Khilafat movement.
The movement was founded by two brothers, Shaukat and Mohammed Ali,
in response to the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire following the
end of the Firs^ World War. Three features of the movement's influence
in Malaya should be noted. First, it produced a brief period of
(25)Muslim-Hindu cooperation. Second, Khilafat sympathizers in
Singapore attempted to enlist the support of Jawi Pernakans and
Arabs, though this failed because of the firm Anglophile sentiments 
(of.)
of these groups. Third, as the majority of bookshops in
Malaya and Singapore were owned by Indian Muslims, the Khilafat
(27)movement produced a wave of seditious literature m  the country.
The movement collapsed in the mid~1920s following the abolition of the 
Caliphate.
With regard to the South Indian Tamils In this period, Indian
influence came mainly from the 'Self-Respect' and Dravida Munnetra
Kalagam (D M K ) movements of Madras. The visit to Malaya of
E.V. Ramasamy Naicker, a leader of the 'Self-Respect' movement,
in 1929 led to a proliferation of Tamil associations, dedicated to
(
moral, religious and social reform. These associations led
mainly by journalists, school-teachers and kanganies, achieved
some measure of success in eradicating kavadi bearing, self-immolation,
(29)and in popularizing monogamous marriages. Towards the end of this
Khoo Kay Kim, op.cit., pp. 55-56 
Ibid., p. 56 
Ibid., p. 55 
Ibid., p. 56
R. Ampalavanar, 'Social and Political Developments in the Indian 
Community of Malaya, 1920-41', M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, 
1969, pp. 46-58, 64.
Ibid.
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
period, the influences from Madras became increasingly political in 
character, and began to penetrate the Indian labouring classes on the
(30)
estates and m  the public services. There were three particularly
serious outbreaks of labour militancy in the later 1930s - a
railway strike in Kuala Lumpur in 193&, a strike in the Batu Arang
Collieries, also in 1936, and in the Singapore Traction Company two 
(31)years later. The principal instigators in each case were left-wing
organizations, most notably the Chinese-dominated MCP, though the
influence of left-wing Indian Nationalist groups was also evident,
particularly in the Batu Arang Collieries and in the Singapore
Traction Company.
Indeed, it can be argued that Indian Nationalism was more
effective in arousing Indian working class militancy, principally
because Indian workers were suspicious of the Chinese-led MCP. At
first Indian workers associations were led by better educated Indians,
(32)prominent among whom were Tamil journalists. However by 1940 a
new group of Indian working class leaders had emerged, young and 
(33)radical labourers. This new group came into prominence in 1941
when strikes occurred on the Klang estates. Labour unrest had been
common on the Klang estates from the late 1930s1 mainly as a result of
the activities of the Klang Indian Association led by R.H. Nathan,
the sub-editor of the Tamil Nesan, and Y.K. Menon, who worked for a
( 34)European company in Port Swettenham. The 1941 strikes began in
Ibid., pp. 156-161.
(31) Ibid; M.R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the 
Communist Revolt of 1948, London, 1970* pp. 19-26.
J Ampalavanar, op.cit., pp. 113-118.
(33) Stenson, op.cit., p. 27*
^  Ibid., pp. 29-33.
January and soon spread throughout Selangor and Negri Sembilan, The
workers demanded not simply an increase in wages and an improvement
in living conditions, but also questioned the treatment of Asian
workers on the estates, European control of the industry, and indeed
(35)the British presence m  Malaya. Nathan was arrested and charged
(36)
with being a Communist and attempting to subvert the Indian workers.
These charges were never substantiated though this did not prevent
Nathan from being banished to India. The strikes, though quickly
crushed by vigorous police action, lasted long enough to establish
a clear political consciousness among the hitherto rather apathetic
estate workers. Vernacular educated radicals, working with kanganies
and the Tamil teachers in the estate schools, successfully encouraged
the tappers to question the basic causes of their depressed economic
and social position. This was to be of considerable importance in the
immediate postwar years.
The political movements so far described affected only working
class or lower middle-class Indians - the Tamil labourer, Muslim
petty trader and the Sikh policeman. At thejbther end of the social
spectrum of the Indian community, two principal factions can be
observed. First, there was a conservative faction, the wealthy,
English-educated professionals, separated from the Indian masses by
(37)class, ethnic, caste and cultural distinctions. The great
majority were Ceylon Tamils, Bengalis or Malayalees. These Indians 
preferred to petition the authorities on issues relevant solely to 
their own interests, rather than to use their position to mobilize
Ibid., p. 29.
Malaya Tribune, 26 May 1941.
(37) R. Ampalavanar, 'Class, Caste and Ethnicisra Among Urban Indians in 
Malaya, 1920-4'!', Nusantara, No. 2 July 1972, pp. 211-213.
the Indian community as a whole. It was from this group that the
British drew for Indian representation on official councils and
committees,and this widened still further the gap between the Indian
masses and this Indian elite. Indeed, service on such councils
proved, for the majority, so mentally debilitating, that when an
important issue arose where their voice may have been important,
they rarely responded. As a result they came to be ignored by
their own community. For example, in 1933 when the Chettiars were
concerned about the implications for their money-lending business of
a Malay Reservations Amendment Act, they appealed to Tan Cheng Lock
and E.D. Shearne rather than to Indian representatives to secure
(39)repeal of the legislation.
Typical of the political activity of this elite was a campaign it
mounted in the 1930s to secure greater employment opportunities for non-
Malays in the government service. These opportunities had been
threatened by the policies pursued by the High Commissioners for the
(VI)
Federated Malay States, Laurence Guillemard and Cecil Clementi.
The only part of the Indian community affected by this issue was
of course the English-educated elite themselves. During the Japanese
Occupation, the intense pro-British loyalties of this elite prevented 
them from aligning themselves with the nationalist radicals in the 
Indian Independence League. By the post-war period they had become 
a political anachronism.
Arasaratnam, op.cit., pp. 86-87*
Proceedings of the Federal C o u n c i l , 1933, B132, l6l-l64.
Ampalavanar, 'Social and Political Developments in the Indian
Community of Malaya, 1920-41', pp. 307-318.
(41)
W.R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, Kuala Lumpur, 1967, 
pp. 114-118.
20.
was
The second elite faction^composed of radical nationalists. The
majority were lawyers, heavily influenced by the ideology of the Indian 
(Zf2)
National Congress. In the 1920s and 1930s they dominated Indian
Associations throughout Malaya and Singapore, but it was not until 
the formation of the Central Indian Association of Malaya (CIAM) in
(if3)
1936 that they became an effective political force. The CIAM
concentrated its activities on the labourers in an attempt to establish 
strong trade-union organizations on the estates and in public service
(44)industries* It met with limited success, partly because of
government restrictions on trade union activity, and partly because
the Indian workers regarded the CIAM leaders with some suspicion.
However the CIAM involved itself in the Klang Strikes of 1941, giving
legal aid to labourers who had been victimized by the authorities and 
(if5)
employers* It could be argued that the CIAM found it easier to
secure improvements for the Indian labourers by putting pressure on
the Government of India rather than on the authorities in Malaya
itself* For example, in 1938 it persuaded the Indian Government to
( Af6)impose a ban on further immigration to Malaya. This threatened
the supply of labour to the estates and was in response to an attempt
(1+7)by the United Planters Association of Malaya to cut estate wages.
Arasaratnam, op.cit., p. 98. 
Ibid., pp. 99-102.
Stenson, op.cit., pp. 26-30. 
Ibid., pp. 28-30, 122-123.
(44)
(45)
(46)
(47)
J.N. Parmer, Colonial Labour Policy and Administration; a history 
of Labour in the rubber plantation industry in Malaya, c. 1910-1941, 
New York, I960, p. 213• "
Ibid.
The CIAM leaders inevitably became involved in the Indian
i (wIndependence League on its formation in 1942. The League, formed
by an exiled Indian extremist, Rash Behari Bose, was sponsored by the
Japanese, and fought from Malaya for Indian independence# The military
wing of the Indian Independence League was the Indian National Army,
under Mohan Singh. The League was strongly influenced by the Indian
National Congress and this was reflected in their choice of flag, their
national anthem (Bande Mataram), and in the general tenor of their 
(49)propaganda. Though the League was strongly opposed to communaHisra,
and indeed forced the closure of a number of communal organizations
in Malaya, the dominating influence of the Indian National Congress,
inevitably alienated the Indian Muslims. The deterioration of
Hindu-Muslim relations during the Japanese Occupation continued into 
(51)the postwar years.
The most important legacy of the League was the politicization of
the Indian working classes in Malaya. Through public meetings, radio
broadcasts, books, mass processions and politically-motivated strikes,
(52)the Indian community was mobilized. By July 1944 well over half
(53)the Indian population belonged to the Indian Independence League.
Dr. Lukshemeyah (Selangor), B.K. Das (Perak), Dr. Majumdar (Negri 
Sembilan), S. Shanmugam (Malacca), N. Raghavan (Penang), S.C. Goho 
(Singapore) were CIAM Presidents of the separate states in 193& and 
were made Indian Independence League Presidents of these respective 
states in 1942.
G.P. Ramachandra, 'The Indian Independence Movement in Malaya, 
1942-45'i M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, 1970, p. 93»
Ibid., pp. 91-92.
See chapter II, pp. 49“53
Ramachandra, op.cit., p. 263.
Ibid.
(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
There were branches in every state, even in outlying rural areas.
The arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose in Malaya in July 1943 as leader
of the League had an electrifying effect, not only on the Indian
community but also on sections of the Malay and Chinese* Bose's
birthday was celebrated by mass processions and propaganda displays:
(54)he-became a cult figure.
During this time, Bose established a Provisional Independent
(55)Government of India, which gave the League an aura of authority*
He also began recruiting civilian volunteers into the Indian National 
Army and though most were driven by nationalist fervour, many were
/ c-/T\
also forced by poverty to join the army* Large sums of money were
collected in Malaya for the independence campaign, though donations
were not always given voluntarily. There was, in particular, strong
resistance from Indian Muslims against contributing to the League*
Even so, it is estimated that Malaya contributed about $30 million
to the League's coffers, though Burma, where the Chettiars were
(57)prominent provided $50 million.
The defeat of thelndian National Army at Imphal in Burma in
June 19*14, and the withdrawal of the Japanese from Malaya in August
19*+5» broke the Indian Independence League. Many of the Indian
Independence League leaders faced charges of collaboration when the
(59)British returned to Malaya. They were all acquitted, whereupon
Syonan Shimbun, 24 January 19*1-5; M. Sivaram, The Road to Delhi, 
Tokyo, 1966, pp. 133-134.
(55) J.C. Lebra, 'Japanese Policy and the Indian National Army*, Paper 
submitted to the International Conference of Asian History in 
Kuala Lumpur, 1968, p. 10.
(
Ramachandra, op.cit., p. 219*
(57) K.S. Giani, Indian Independence Movement in East Asia, Lahore, 
1947, p. 102.
Ramachandra, op.cit., pp. 249-50.
-^*9) gee chapter II, pp. Si-33.
the newly-independent Government in India, recognising their
contributions to the independence movement, rewarded them with
senior diplomatic posts, This left a serious leadership vacuum
amongst the community in Malaya. However, as has been shown earlier,
the Occupation had produced a new group of Indian leaders from
among the workers themselves. Kanganies and youog’labourers, who
had joined the Indian National Army, had become imbued with a
(61)strong commitment to radical economic and political change.
This group formed the core of the post-war non-communal Pan 
Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU).
In addition, ex-Indian National Army members formed purely 
Indian trade unions amongst the estate workers in Negri Sembilan, 
Perak, Kedah and Johore; the group later formed the core of the 
National Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW).^*^ Moreover, ex­
members of the Indian National Army were prominent in the emergence 
of the Thondar Padai, a movement dedicated to improving working 
conditions on the estates and to defying the European paternalism, 
which, they argued, had inhibited the development of workers' 
political consciousness before 1941.^^ The authoritarianism
See chapter II, pp. 32-33,
Stenson, op.cit., p. 57-
( £2^
S. Ganapathy, ex-Indian National Army Instructor and 
P. Veerasenan, another activist in the Indian Independence 
League, became President of the PMFTU and Vice-President 
of the Singapore PMFTU respectively.
/ \
Important here were P.P. Narayanan, K.K. Choudhuri, S. Pillai, 
S.P.S. Nathan and S.V.K. Murthi.
See chapter III, pp. 74"”76*
inherited from the Indian National Army, suited well the rather 
dictatorial character of the Thondar Padai. The final legacy of 
the League was a strong commitment to continue the independence 
struggle, not only for India but also for Malaya itself. For many 
Indian National Army members, notably &. Ganapathy and P. Veerasenan, 
this eventually led them into the MCP.^8^  However even the MIC, 
certainly a less militant organization, was heavily influenced by an 
anti-colonial ideology inherited from the League. The contrast with 
the attitudes of the Indian political elite of the pre-war years 
could not have been more obvious.
The other major immigrant community in Malaya - the Chinese
were also strongly influenced by political developments overseas in
the pre-war period. It would appear that the first major political
impulse from China which affected the local Chinese community was
the anti-Manchu movement of the first decade of this century. In
1906, anti-Manchu associations were found in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur
(66)Penang and Seremban. Following the fall of the Manchu dynasty
in 1911, Kuomintang (KMT) branches were formed in the Straits 
Settlements in 1912, and on the mainland, from 1913.^^ These 
branches were dominated by rich merchants. In 1925 the KMT was 
banned in Malaya because the authorities feared that it might become 
an anti-British movement, though the ban was lifted five years later
( 65) See chapter III, pp.
(66) ^  Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, London, 1948, p. 209.
(C.n\
For an account of the Kuomintang organization in Malaya, see 
Png Poh Seng, 'The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1912-1941', JSEAH 
Vol. 2, No.l, March 1961, pp. 1-32.
Ibid., pp. 12, 29.
(68)
25.
With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937 the Kuomintang* s
activities in Malaya expanded greatly,^^) authorities
tolerated KMT demonstrations, the collection of funds, and the
formation of the Chinese Anti-Enemy Backing Societies, because they
favoured the virulent anti-Japanese stance of the Party,
The second major political influence from China in this period
was that of the Chinese Communist Party, The earliest Communist
influence appears to have been introduced into Malaya in the late
1920s by left-wing refugees from Java, who had fled the East Indies
(71)following the unsuccessful revolt of 1925. These were, without
exception, non-Chinese speakers, who therefore had little impact
(72)on the local Chinese community. However, at almost the same time,
agents of the Chinese Communist Party arrived in Malaya and soon
(73)formed Communist groups among the Chinese coolies and servants.
As a result the split of the KMT in 1927 was reflected in Malaya,
and 1931 saw the formation of the MCP, with the avowed intention of
(7*0 rnestablishing the Soviet Republic of Malaya. The MCP was soon
active among the labourers, and was deeply involved in the mass
demonstrations and strikes which occurred in the Batu Arang
(7 ci)
Collieries in 1936* As with the KMT,the MCP expanded
Ibid,, p, 29.
V. Purcell, The Chinese in South East Asia, London 19^5» P- 302;
Yuen Choy Leng, 'Expansion of Japanese Interests in Malaya,
1900-19^11 , M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, 1973i PP* 1371 1*1-6, 
I63-I65. It was reported that between July 1937 and November 19*1-0 
Malaya sent $l*f6 million towards China Relief. Here the KMT, the 
MCP, the Chinese guilds and associations made heavy contributions.
G, Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle in Malaya, New York, 195*1-1 p.6.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 7-10.
Ibid., p. 10.
Stenson, op.cit., pp. 15, 19*
(69)
(70)
(71)
(72)
(73) 
(7*1-) 
(75)
considerably after 1937 as an anti-Japanese movement and by the
outbreak of the Pacific War could present itself as the most
(76)
powerful indigenous political force in Malaya.
With regard to the Malay community in the pre-war period, three
(77)distinct political factions can be discerned. First, there were
the religious reformists, mainly Jawi-Pernakans and Arabs in the 
Straits Settlements. These groups controlled the Malay Press,
(78)through which they propagated their ideas of Islamic modernization.
They had little influence on the rural Malay community, for they
were urbanized sophisticates who maintained close links with the
Middle-East, wrote mainly for urban non-Malay Muslims, and rejected
the annimistic accretions of rural Malay religion. The second
faction comprised vernacular educated, radical Malays. The majority
had rural, working-class origins, and had been educated at Sultan
Idris Training College and, in some cases, in seminaries in the 
(79)Middle-East. They used Islam to propagate a radical form of
Malay Nationalism. In the 193°s they were strongly influenced by 
the Indonesian Nationalist movement, and in 1938 formed the 
Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM), which aimed at an Independent Malaya 
through union with I n d o n e s i a . B u t  as with the religious
Wang Gung Wu, 'Chinese Politics in Malaya', The China 
Quarterly, No. 43, July-September 1970, p.11.
(77) The pioneering work on Malay Nationalism m  the pre-war 
period is W.R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism,
Kuala Lumpur, 1967, which contains the best account of these 
Malay political elites.
Ibid., Chapter 2.
(79) Ibid., Chapter 5-
G.P. Means, Malaysian Politics, London, 1970, p. 88; A.J. Stock- 
well, 'The Development of Malay Politics during the Course of 
the Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-48', Ph.D. Thesis,
University of London, 1973» PP* 35, 211, 221.
reformists this faction also failed to have any significant impact
on the rural Malay population, whilst its republicanism alienated
(21 1
the third faction, the Malay aristocrats. This latter faction,
which was predominantly English-educated, was employed mainly in the
government service, and was essentially pro-British. Their
political objectives concentrated on ensuring the survival of the
Malay community in the face of non-Malay encroachments. They
too failed to build mass support among the rural community, for this
was effectively ruled out by their western education and their
elitist political philosophy.
The Japanese Occupation had three principal effects on Malay
society. First, the Malay aristocracy, almost without exception,
(
collaborated with the occupying forces. Second, the Malay
radicals, essentially the Kesatuan Melayu Muda, vacillated between 
'collaboration* with the Japanese in the early 19^ +Os and working 
with the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) after 1 9 ^ . ^ ^  
Third, when it became evident that the Japanese were losing the war, 
the MPAJA, a Chinese-dominated organization, mounted a terror 
campaign against the rural Malay population, partly to revenge
(85)earlier Malay support for the Japanese. The village Malays,
abandoned by both the conservative and radical Malay elites, turned 
for protection to the penghulu, the village Ulama, and to 
invulnerability cults.
Ibid., p. 89.
Roff, op.cit., Chapter 4.
M.N. Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: 
Political Unification in the Malaysia Region, 19^5-19^t 
Kuala Lumpur, 197^, pp. 1*S 22, 27.
Stockwell, op.cit., pp. 213-232.
Ibid., p. 263«
Ibid., pp. 262-279.
(81)
(82)
(83)
(8*0
(85)
(86)
In short, in 19^ +5» the political characters of the three main 
communities in Malaya were substantially different. The MCP had 
radicalized the young working-class Chinese, and in so doing had 
become a major political force. The Indian Independence League had 
performed a similar function with young working-class Indians, but 
the collapse of the League had left its followers without leadership 
and consequently they were easily attracted into the MCP. For both 
the Chinese and Indian conservative elites, the success of these 
left-wing movements had left them politically isolated. The 
politicization of the rural Malay community had proceeded along 
different lines and at a slower pace. Physically threatened by 
the Japanese and then by the MPAJA, it had turned to traditional 
village modes of protection. It had few links with urban Malay 
society.
For the first seven months of re-imposed British rule 
(September 1945 - March 1946), Malaya was under the British 
Military Administration (BMA).^^ The BMA was highly authori­
tarian, as its essential aim was to restore law and order in 
preparation for the return of civilian rule. Though the BMA 
established Advisory Councils, these were packed with local
aristocrats and businessmen, and in any case they were granted no 
(88)effective power. More seriously, the new administration was,
(89)in general, inefficient, ill-disciplined and frequently corrupt.
For a sketch of the structure of the British Military 
Administration, see Martin Rudner, 'The Organization of the 
British Military Administration in Malaya', JSEAH, vol. 9»
No.1, March 1968, pp. 95-106.
(88) In a letter to his subordinates, the Senior Civil Affairs 
Officer (SCAO) wrote of the Penang Advisory Council, 'we are in 
a state of authoritative Military Government and we do not 
delegate our authorities or power to anyone else*. M.U. 
(Secretariat)Fil© 170/46, letter dated 10 January 1946 (N.A.
Kuala Lumpur).
(^9) K.U.CSecretariat) File 114/46, private letter of BMA official
dated 24 October 1945 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur); Rudner, op.cit., p.102 
Malayan Post, 21 January 1946, in M.U.(Secretariat)File 364/46 
(N.A. KualaLumpur).
BMA officials engaged in rehabilitation work were frequently-
frustrated by bureaucratic delays. Moreover, many of the BMA
officials lacked commitment in their work, for they were fully
(90)aware that they would soon be posted out of Malaya. The
officials were also confused by the attitude taken by their
(91)superiors towards Malayan 'collaborators'. Frequent raping
and looting by troops, particularly Indian sepoys, did little to ,
salvage morale.^92)
At the same time it must be acknowledged that the BMA was
faced with appalling conditions. Not only was there considerable
economic dislocation as a result of the war, but from late 1945 the
(93)MCP embarked on a campaign of severe industrial unrest. The
Communist's call for the introduction of democratic rights and
social welfare programmes found an immediate response among a
population suffering from widespread unemployment and soaring food 
(94)prices. The BMA dealt with labour unrest harshly. The police
and troops were frequently in action and a Trade Union Bill of 1940 was
(95)used to prevent strikes in essential services. Though the BMA
admitted that 'the strikers' demands were first and foremost for an 
increased rice ration', the administration was prone to diagnose all too 
quickly agitation and subversion and to pay less heed to legitimate
^90) Malaya Tribune, 6 September 1946.
Malayan Post, 17 January 1946; Straits Times, 10 September 1945*
^9^) New Democracy, 3 November 1945, Min Sheng Pao, l8 October 19451 
22 October 1945, in BMA (Information Department) File 32A/45*
Press Summaries, 3/6 Part III and IV (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(93) Stenson, op.cit., Chapter VI.
^9^ piie C/1/1/4, Telegram 31 October 1945 from BMA (Malaya) to
BMA (tjqrs.), (N.A. Kuala Lumpur). Sin Chiew Jit Poh, 19 February 
1946 (MPD, February 1946); Hanrahan, op.cit., pp. 94-95*
^9-^ Straits Times, 1 November 1945? BMA Advisory Council Proceedings, 
14 November 1945*
(96)economic grievances. Such heavy-handed methods and clumsy
analysis did little to secure working class support for the
. . (97)administration.
In brief, the failure of the BMA, to deal effectively with
deteriorating economic conditions in the immediate post-war
period, and diffuse labour unrest, gave a further stimulus to the
radical working class movements which had arisen during the late
1930s and the Japanese Occupation. In 1946 the returning civilian
authorities were faced by a militant, extreme Indian community,
particularly the Indian labouring community, which had clear
left-wing sympathies, and was committed to industrial and political
action.
BMA monthly report, December 1945, p. 16. BMA (Malaya) File 
G/1/1/2, Fortnightly report, 31 October 1945, p. 5 (N.A. Kuala 
Lumpur); Malaya Tribune, 11 January 1946, 28 March 1946,
20 April 1947.
(97) c /1 /1 /2 ,  25th Indian Division Weekly Intelligence
Review, week ending 28 November 1945, P* 6 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
India, Indian Nationalism, And The Indian Community In Malaya,
1945-1957
(i)
During the Japanese Occupation a significant proportion of the
Indian community had been involved to some degree with the Indian
Independence League, or its military wing, the Indian National Army
(INA). Consequently in the immediate post-war period, the community
was deeply concerned over possible actions which the British would
take with 'collaborators'. Indeed in late 1945, the BMA arrested
many League officials, including the Chairman of all the state
branches in Malaya and those who had held important positions in 
(1)Bose's Cabinet. However the British soon decided to deal leniently
(2)with suspected 'collaborators'. In part this was due to the fact
that.the INA trials in India itself had caused a major uproar, and
also that in Malaya, most Malayans, except members of the MCP, had
cooperated and often collaborated with the Japanese. Yet the
authorities felt bound to take some action against 'collaborators'
and therefore decided to punish those who had been found guilty of
criminal offences.^ ^
In the case of the Indian community this meant that in the
majority of cases, severe action was taken against only rank and file
(4)members of the League. This was essentially because the lower 
Ml
BMA File 506/38, 'Collaboration'; BMA (Publicity/Propaganda)
File 32/45 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(?)
Malaya Tribune, 18 January 1946.
BMA File 506/38, 'Collaboration' (N.A. Kuala Lumpur)-#-
(it)
M.U. (Secretariat) File 43/46 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
levels of the League had been composed mainly of Indiah troops, police 
and labourers who had been easily subverted by Indiah terrorist
(5)organizations such as the Ghadr Party and extremist Congress elements.
The League elite not having engaged in terrorist activities, was dealt 
with leniently. Even so many members of the Indian elite were sufficiently 
tainted by charges of collaboration to cause them to withdraw from 
local politics or return to India, confident of their earlier role in 
the Indian Independence c a m p a i g n . I n  this way the Indian Government 
absorbed many of the League's intellectuals, such as N. Raghavan, who 
had been Minister for Finance in the Provisional Government under
(7)Bose. Raghavan was despatched as Indian Ambassador to Russia in 1947*
In the same period Kannampillay became Indian Ambassador to 
Indonesia, K.P.K. Menon (former Minister for Information in the League) 
was appointed High Commissioner to Ceylon, and John Thivy, ex-Chairman
/ O \
of the League, later became Ambassador to Mauritius. Of those
who remained in Malaya, Dr. Lukshemeyah, B.K. Das and Dr. N.K. Menon
withdrew from local politics, though in 1949 Dr. Menon was drawn into
(9)local affairs by his appointment to the Penang Settlement Council.
S.C. Goho, who had been head of the League in Singapore during the 
war underwent several changes of fortune in the postwar years. Initially 
the BMA accused him of sedition and treason but the charges were later 
w i t h d r a w n . H o w e v e r  this did not deter Phillip Hoalim and 
L.B. Banerjee of the Malayan Democratic Union from accusing Goho of
(5) G.P. Ramachandra, 'The Indian Independence Movement in Malaya, 
1942-1945S M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1970,
PP. 55-37.
Tamil Nesan, 7 December 1945.
(n)
Malaya Tribune, 8 August 1947.
/ O \
Ramachandra, op.cit., p. 259*
9^^  Tamil Nesan, 10 October 1949.
Straits Times, 24 March 1946.
(1 "1)having been a Japanese agent from as early as February 19^2. They
cited incidents such as a broadcast he had made from Saigon in 19^ +2
in which he had supported the Japanese war effort, and also an interview
(12)which he had had with Premier Tojo in Tokyo the same year. However
there was also evidence that Goho had supported the British in the early
months of the war. Indeed he had set up refugee camps and had sent to
(13)India for ships to repatriate destitute Indians. Later he had been
drawn into the League by the,opportunity it offered to participate
in the Indian Independence campaign. Goho, eventually cleared of all
(1M
charges, was elected to the Singapore Legislative Council in 19^8.
The British authorities were particularly quick to take action 
against Indian journalists. In December 19^5 there were large scale 
arrests of those journalists who, it was alleged, had disseminated 
Japanese propaganda. The detainees included Francis Cooray, editor 
of the Malay Mail before the war, and editor of the Malai Sinpo, a 
Japanese sponsored English language paper during the Japanese
(15)
Occupation. Also arrested were C.V. Kuppusamy, Director of the
Indian Press Association in Malaya, V. Saravanamuthu, editor of the 
Straits Echo, Subramanyam Iyer, editor of the Jananayagam and 
G. Sarangapany, manager of the Star Press in Singapore and editor of 
the League's Suraj, all of whom had been forced to publish by the 
J a p a n e s e . M o r e  seriously, allegations of treason were brought
M.U. (Secretariat) File ^63/^6, enclosure, 'Political Criminals of 
Malaya' by L.M. Banerjee and Phillip Hoalim, 15 September 19^5 
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
S.C. Goho's personal statement to the Indian National Army Historical 
Committee, n.d. (Netaji Bose Research Bureau, Calcutta).
Malaya Tribune, 26 July 19^8.
Ibid., 3 February 19^6.
Ibid. See also M.U. (Secretariat) File 3^9/^6, enclosure,
'Political Affairs' (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(1 1)
(12)
(13)
(1*f)
(15)
(16)
against Anwari, a Muslim editor who had assisted the Japanese in
(17)the publication of anti-British works. Even after the war he had
continued to work for an underground organization spreading anti-
British propaganda. It can perhaps be argued that all the arrested
journalists, except Anwari, were not particularly anti-British though
each had been manipulated by the Japanese.
In the same period several Indian merchants were arrested on
charges of 'profiteering', indulging in trade malpractices and giving
(19)
financial support to the League. For example, a prominent textile
merchant, Gian Singh from Kuala Lumpur, was accused of smuggling yen
on a large scale into Malaya and British Intelligence described him as
being of 'wavering loyalty'.^2^  A Gujerati textile merchant from
Singapore, Maganlal Nagindas, was accused of 'treasonable' involvement
(21)with Japanese businessmen m  the late 1930s. As noted in British
Intelligence records, the major part of Japanese espionage in Malaya
in the period 1933-19^1 had been conducted through Japanese private 
(22)firms. It should be noted however that despite the detaining
of many important Indians, the total number of Indians arrested on 
collaboration charges was only 11 *4*, and of these only three were 
accused of treason.
The voluntary or forced withdrawal of a significant proportion
(17}
M.U. (Secretariat) File 3^ +9/^ 6, enclosure, M.S.S.Penang,
23 March 19^6. See also Malayan Press Digest, No. 19, 3 - 9  
March 19^9 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
M.U. (Secretariat.) File 3^9/^6, enclosure, M.S.S. Penang,
23 March 19^ +6 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(19) (Confidential) File 335/^6, Vol. I, Intelligence Review, 
week ending 28 November 19^ +5 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(20) Ibid.
^21  ^ Ibid.
(22) Ibid. See also Yuen Choy Leng, 'Expansion of Japanese Interests 
in Malaya, 1900-19^1*, M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1973, P« 150.
^2-^  M.U. (Confidential) File 335/^6, Vol. I, Intelligence Review,
29 November 19^5 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
of the Indian political elite from local politics in the immediate
post-war years, left the Indian masses without effective leadership.
In any event, by the end off the war, a majority of the Indian workers
had become disillusioned with the League, essentially because the
League had failed to prevent Japanese conscription of Indian labour to
(2*0work on the Thai-Burma railway. Inevitably the absence of effective
and trusted leadership left the Indian masses vulnerable to
manipulation by the Communists and other underground organizations.
Therefore the latter years of the Occupation and the immediate postwar
period witnessed the growth of Indian underground political organizations
seeking to continue the struggle against British imperialism. For
example in Singapore in October 19^ *5 a number of ex-League members formed
the New Democratic Youth League which sought to spread anti-British
propaganda particularly among the Indian troops and discontented 
( 25)Indian youth. On 18 December 19*+5 British Intelligence expressed
fears over the continued existence of the Azad Hind ffauj (a remnant of 
the INA) which continually called on Indian soldiers to 'cease to be tools 
of the British*. The authorities were also concerned over the continual
movement of militant League and Indian Congress members between Malaya and 
India. There was particular concern that Congress agents were being
M.U. (Public Relations Department) File **88/*f6, enclosure,
'Displaced Person's Movement from Siam-Burma' (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
It was estimated that of the 85,000 Indians who had been conscripted, 
**6,500 died of starvation and from lack of medical care.
(25) m .U. (Confidential) File 335/^6, Vol. I, Intelligence Summary No. 5,
21 November 19^5, P- ^ (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(26) Ibid., Secret Intelligence Summary, No. 6, *+ December 19**5, M.U. 
(Confidential) File 58/**6, enclosure, 'Situation Report of Penang', 
October 19**6 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur); M.U. (information Department)
File 709/**6, Intelligence Report, 11 July 19^ +6 from N. Coates of 
Singapore Press Intelligence to C.F. Sheppard, Malayan Union Press 
Intelligence, p. 2 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
smuggled into Malaya via Burma and were infiltrating Malayan dock
sw
(28)
(27)workers. Then, in December 1943 K.A. Chandran, head of the Ne
Democratic Youth League was arrested in Singapore on his way to India
Extreme subversion was particularly evident among the Indians in
Kelantan where Sohan Singh an ex-member of the Qhadr Party and later
of the League attempted to mobilize an anti-British resistance movement
among the traditionally martial Sikhs and Pathans.^^ On 28 October 1946
Mohammed Jangir, a revolutionary from South Thailand and a colleague
of Sohan Singh in the League, was arrested for illegal entry into
Kelantan. These clandestine movements published a number of propaganda
works, most notably the Awaz-e-Hind, a Hindi weekly published in Singapore
from January 1946 (which also appeared in a Tamil edition as the Indian
(31)Murasu) and the Swarajya, an English language pamphlet from Singapore.
In the issue of 4 March 1946, the Swarajya denounced those Indian associations 
’which do not represent anybody except those high class and self-seeking 
Indians who owe blind allegiance to the British Raj and thereby forfeit
(27)
M.U. (Confidential) File 333/46, Vol. I, Secret Intelligence Summary, 
No. 6, 4 December 1943 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(28) Ibid,
^9) m .u . (Confidential) File 38/46, enclosure, 'Situation Report, Kelantan', 
9 September 1946, 14 October 1946, 1 November 1946 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
M.U. (Confidential) File 333/46, Vol. I, Intelligence Summary,
28 Octobef* 1946 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur). During this period British 
Intelligence was wary of movements between Bangkok and Malaya.
The Malayan Security Service feared that Bangkok would become a 
'Lisbon of the East* as it was being used as a communicating centre 
by Asian nationalists and the Russians were planning to set up an 
embassy there. See Stockwell, op.cit., p. 248, footnote 1.
(31) M.U. (Confidential) File 333/46, enclosures, ’Propaganda of Indian 
Nationalism', 5 December 1946; Report from Resident Commissioner, 
Kelantan, to Chief Secretary, Malayan Union, 23 November 1946 
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(32)their rights to represent the Indian community'• The paper also
revealed its revolutionary character when it supported the Mutiny of the
(33)Royal Indian Navy in Bombay in March 19*+6. It noted with deep
regret 'the failure of the Indian Army to join in and pull the pernicious 
empire to its knees; yet the abortive revolt was no failure but a
(3*0warning of things to follow'• The fervour of these clandestine
organizations was maintained in part by the speculation surrounding
the death of Subhas Bose in an aircrash in August 19^5* Many Indians
believed he had survived and in a mystical manner would return to lead
(35)the Independence campaign. And it should be noted that these under­
ground organizations in Malaya faded with the attainment of Indian 
Independence in August 19*+7.
In 19^6, in the midst of this turmoil, Pandit Nehru requested 
permission to visit the country in order to 'acquaint himself with the 
conditions of Indian nationals in M a l a y a ' . A l e x a n d e r  Newboult,
Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, was apprehensive about the visit but
(37)felt unable to prohibit it. He replied that he had no objection
to Nehru's entry 'so long as his mission concerns the relief of 
distressed persons and is not political'. It should however be
M.U. (Confidential) File 335/**6, enclosure, Report from Resident 
Commissioner, Kelantan, to Chief Secretary, Malayan Union,
25 November 19^6 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(53) M.U. (Confidential) File 335/**6, enclosure, Situation Report 
District Commissioner, No. 652, secret cypher 9606, Part 1 
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(3*+) . ,Ibid.
(35) m.U. (Confidential) File 63A 6, Vol. VI, enclosures, 25 December 
19^6, 31 January 19^7$ and letter from Information Headquarters, 
Malaya Command, G.S. 12th Division to Chief Secretary, Malayan Union 
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(36) (Administration) File R/23* enclosure, Memorandum! from BMA Hqrs.
Kuala Lumpur to Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Singapore, 21 January 
19^6 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(37) BMA (Administration) File 8/19$ enclosure, 'Indian Affairs 
correspondence together with reports of Indian communities',
22 January 19^6 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(38) Ibid.
38.
pointed out to Nehru that the BMA 'already has the organization for
dealing with the distressed of all races in Malaya and that it is expected
(39)that Nehru will coordinate his efforts with the BMA',
When the Indian leader arrived in March 1946 the Government issued a
communique, stating that the 'primary object is for the Pandit to provide
(1+0 )
psychological relief . ...' In fact, despite Newboult's fears, Nehru
was extremely restrained during his visit, though he was given a rousing
(1+1)
reception all over the country by both Indians and non-Indians.
At the same time he made subtle attacks on the planters and their
(1+2)exploitation of Indian labour. On 22 March 1946 he denounced 'this
monopoly concentration, either the plantations should belong to the state
(1+3)
or to cooperatives'. He also settled a long strike on the Sentul
(1+1+)
railways in Kuala Lumpur#
Nehru's visit, though arousing tremendous nationalist sentiment,
never expressed itself in anti-British propaganda as such, though the
District Officer of Kuala Langat reported that the visit had led to the
(1+5)
wearing of Gandhi caps among the labourers. This caused some concern
(1+
among the planters who regarded the Gandhi cap as a symbol of stbversion.
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44) Tamil Nesan, 20 April 1946.
(45)
^ BMA File 79/43* enclosure, District Commissioner I, 27/46, Report of 
District Officer, Kuala Selangor, 27 March to 28 April 1946 (N.A. 
Kuala Lumpur)•
(46)
Ibid.
Straits Times, 10 March 1946. 
Tamil Nesan, 26 March 1946. 
Malaya Tribune, 22 March 1946. 
Ibid.
The Gandhi cap had been associated with 'subversion and rowdyism if not 
of revolt' during the 1941 strikes in Klang - UPAM Circular No. 11, 
in 1941, Appendix A, cited in Stenson, op.cit., p. 32.
Malayan Indians were simply reminded by Nehru of India's role in the
liberation movements of Asia and reassured, in a somewhat unctuous
manner, that 'India could not forget her sons and daughters overseas.
Although India could not defend her children overseas today, the time
(47)is soon coming when her arms will belong enough to protect them1.
This gave courage to an Indian community grappling with the problems of
low wages, disease and an ambivalent political role in Malayan politics.
On a more practical level, Nehru set up an Indian Relief Committee to
deal with the repatriation of destitutes, and arranged for the despatch
of two Medical Missions from India. Relieved by the outcome, Newboult
attributed it to Nehru's 'sensible attitude and popularity with the 
(49)Indians*. Even so, the visit had aroused comment amongst the Malays
and 'His Excellency might consider it advisable to ask Colonial Office
to try and dissuade Indian notables from visiting us at the moment*.
(91)Governor Gent, complacently perceived 'no big issue in this'.
(ii)
The visit of Nehru to Malaya in 1946 dramatically emphasized the
Indian Nationalist Government's paternal interest in the Malayan Indian
community. This interest was usually expressed through the office of
(92)the Indian Agent in Malaya, a position established in 1922. In the
Malaya Tribune, 19 March 1946.
Tamil Nesan, 29 March 1946, 22 June 1946; M.U. (Public Relations 
Department) File 230/46, enclosure, Report of 20 June 1946 
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
BMA (Administration) File 4/23, enclosure, letter from BMA (Malaya) 
Kuala Lumpur to Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Singapore, 1 April 1946 
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
BMA (Administration) File 8/19, enclosure, Memo from Governor Gent, 
29 April 1946 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Sandhu, op.cit., p. 146.
(47)
(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
postwar years the influence of the Agent fluctuated widely, being
determined principally by his relationship with British officials and
employers in Malaya, his rapport with New Delhi, his links with the
local people, and of course, the personality of the Agent himself.
The first Indian Agent after the war was S.K. Chettur. Forty-six
years old and a graduate of the Universities of Madras and Oxford, he
had joined the Indian Civil Service in 1929» working first as a magistrate
in Tanjore, later as a revenue collector, and finally in 19^ as Secretary
(53)to the Madras Government. For a brief period after the war he had
served as a liaison officer at Mountbatten"s headquarters. In November 
19^5 ke arrived in Malaya when the country was still in turmoil following 
the collapse of the Japanese. The first task which confronted him was 
to deal with the Indians who had 'collaborated* with the Japanese. Here 
his role was crucial in persuading the British to treat such cases
(5*0leniently. Chettur's attention was also directed towards the
repatriation of destitute and unemployed Indians and in 19^ -6, a total
(55)of 18,000 Indians returned home. This cost the Government of India
#15,000, whilst a further #155,000 was spent on relief programmes on the 
(56)estates. Chettur also tackled the question of Malayan citizenship
for eligible Indians, essentially by bringing the views of the Indian
( 57)Associations to the attention of the Governor.
(53) This account of S.K. Chettur is based on information from BMA (Civil 
Affairs) File 350/^5, enclosure, Report of A November 19^5 (N.A. 
Kuala Lumpur); Tamil Nesan, 7 November 19^ +5? Malaya Tribune,
4 January 19^6.
S.K. Chettur, Malayan Adventurd, Mangalore, 19^ +8, p. 52.
^55) Malaya Tribune, 17 January 19^7.
ibid.
However Chettur did alienate certain Indian groups by his frankness 
and aggressiveness. For example, in February 19^ +6 he reported rather
( ^
optimistically to India that conditions in Malaya had returned to normal.
Consequently an indignant trade union in Selangor called for his
resignation, and in this was supported by all the labour unions in Perak
and Selangor and finally taken up in the Straits Echo and certain Indian 
(59)newspapers. Chettur also upset the Sikhs by referring to them as
'a large group in Malaya who hold a monopoly of watchmen* This drew
a quick reprimand from the President of the MIC, Budh Singh, who was
himself a Sikh. More predictably Chettur alienated the planters by his
criticism of low wages, poor housing, and severe regimentation in the
(62)lives of Indian estate workers. This dragged him into an argument
with the Chairman of UPAM, S.B. Palmer and the Straits Times, which
eventually led to his recall to India in May 19^ +7, despite protests from the
(63)Malayan Estate Workers Council.
Chettur was succeeded by John Thivy. Thivy had been the first 
President of the MIC and unlike all his predecessors as Agent, was a 
member of the local community. His appointment in July 19^7 led to
(58) ibid., 7 February 19^6.
^9) m.U. (Information Department) File 29/^ +6, Malayan Press Digest, No.12, 
January - February 19^6, p. JO (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Malaya Tribune, 8 June 19^6.
Tamil Nesan, 9 June 19^6.
(62) Straits Times, 50 April 19^6.
Malaya Tribune, 1 May 19^7, 18 July 19^ +7; Indian Daily Mail,
19 July I9V7.
42.
protests from various Indian groups that his occupation of this
important post could compromise the position of both the Agent and the MIG.
Later developments confirmed these fears. For example, in December 1948
Thivy persuaded members of the Singapore Regional Indian Congress to
contest municipal elections in defiance of a boycott decision by their
E x e c u t i v e . r p ^ e  issue was further complicated by the nomination of
Mrs. Thivy to the Elections Committee of the Singapore Regional Indian
Congress and eventually a Singapore Congress Executive member,
R. Jumabhoy, petitioned the Indian Deputy Foreign Minister, B.R. Keskar,
(66)to restrain Thivy from interfering in local politics. At the same
time, John Laycock, a member of the Singapore Legislative Council and a
prominent critic of Thivy, lashed out at his 'continuous meddling in
the politics of this colony*.
Thivy survived these outbursts, but he soon came up against a much
more formidable adversary in the person of the UPAM Chairman, S.B. Palmer.
In 1948 the All Malaya Estate Workers Union had pressed for a 100 per cent
increase in wages and Palmer responded by threatening to close the estates.
Thivy's reply was that in that event the Indian Government would not
(69)hesitate to repatriate all Indian labour from Malaya. The
Tamil Nesan, 2 August 1947.
Ibid., 22 December 1948.
Straits Times, 22 December 1948; Indian Daily Mail, 25 April 1949-
(67 )
Jananayagam, 22 December 1948.
(68) Labour Department Monthly Report, June 1948, p. 5 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur) 
(69) Tamil Nesan, 10 July 4948.
(64)
(68)
confrontation between Thivy and the planters finally led to the passing
of a Bill in December 19^9 abolishing the right of the Indian Agent to
investigate places of work and to arbitrate in labour disputes.
The Bill was passed despite the opposition of the Trade Union
(71)representative in the Federal Council, M.P. Rajagopal. During the
debate over the Bill, the High Commissioner, Henry Gurney argued that
?labour should look to authorities in this country and not outside in
(72)matters concerning their welfare'. This legislation sparked off such
severe criticism from India that within a few months, the Indian Agent's
(73)powers and privileges were restored with only slight amendments.
In this period Thivy also became involved in controversies over the 
Indian Immigration Fund and Malayan citizenship. With regard to the 
first Thivy eventually persuaded the employers to refrain from using the 
Fund for the recruitment of new labour, as they had previously intended, 
and instead to utilize the Fund to create land settlements for Indian
(7*0estate labour. On the second issue, Thivy secured a promise from
the authorities that non-citizens would not be prejudiced in terms of 
(75)promotion or pay. Thivy's tenure of office coincided with a
turbulent period in Malayan history. Unrest was rampant among the 
labourers, the Indian community was in an ambivalent position, unable to 
decide whether to return to India or settle permanently in Malaya, and 
the Emergency had brought in its wake indiscriminate arrests of suspected
Federal Legislative Council Proceedings, 2nd session, March 19*1-9 - 
1950, p. 597.
Malaya Tribune, 23 December 19*+9*
Indian Daily Mail, 26 December 19*1-9 •
Ibid., 13 February 1950.
Tamil Nesan, 10 February 19*1-9 •
Ibid., 27 April 19^9.
(70)
(71)
(72)
(73) 
(7*0
(75)
44*
Communists. It was therefore inevitable that the Agent would vacillate 
between being a Consul of a foreign government, and being a friend of the 
local Indians, forced to intervene in local problems* However after 1950, 
when the local Indian population was increasingly losing its transitory 
character, and new channels of communication were being established 
between the Malayan Government and the people, the Indian Agent gradually 
became an anachronism. Thivy resigned as Indian Agent in 1950, and was 
replaced in 1951 by Gopala Menon, who had previously been in the Indian Civil 
Service. But by this time the Agent's principal duties were to be
feted in public as an envoy of a friendly India, and to issue passports*
(iii)
The strong influence of Indian politics on the Malayan Indian
community in the period 19^5-1950 can also be seen clearly in the
attitudes and policies of the MIC in this period. In these years Nehru and
the Indian National Congress maintained a close rapport with the first
(77)two Presidents of the MIC, Thivy and Budh Singh. Indeed prior to 1950
the MIC sent delegations to the Indian National Congress annual sessions 
in India and also kept the Congress well informed on developments in 
M a l a y a . F o r  example, in December 19^6 Thivy impressed upon the
Ibid., 22 March 1951.
(77) Indian Daily Mail, 13 July 1950.
(78) Malaya Tribune, 6 December 19^ +6; Indian Daily Mail, 7 December 
“19^8, l8 January 19^9-
Indian Government the need to retain the ban on Indian immigration into 
Malaya first imposed in 1 9 3 8 . jn this way Thivy foiled an attempt 
by the MPIEA Secretary, C.D. Ahearne, to secure fresh immigrants from
t (8o>India.
The close links between the MIC and the Indian National Congress
caused severe disquiet amongst the other communities in Malaya. For
example, at the 1948 annual session of the Indian National Congress, Budh .
(21 'l
Singh described the Emergency as a 'war of liberation1. This
inevitably created a nervous furore in Malaya. Moreover, the previous
year the MIC had encountered a bitter response from the UMNO when it had
sent a delegation to a Pan-Asian Inter-Relations Conference organized
( 1
by the Indian National Congress. The UMNO had refused to attend the
Conference although the Malayan Democratic Union, the Malay Nationalist
(8"^
Party and other Malayan organizations had accepted the invitation.
As a result, the Majlis, a pro-UMNO Malay paper, questioned whether the
MIC should be allowed to participate in Malayan constitutional developments
(84)in view of its strong links with foreign nations and foreign leaders.
It further questioned the credentials of the MIC by pointing to the fact
(
that none of the MIC leaders were Malayan citizens.
(79)
(80)
(81)
(82)
(83)
Malaya Tribune, 6 December 1946.
M.U. (Labour Department) File 230/46, enclosure, Note by Chief 
Secretary, A.T. Newboult, 13 June 1946; M.U. (Confidential) File 
432/46, enclosure, letter from Chief Secretary to Resident 
Commissioner of Labour, Selangor, 23 May 1946 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur)-
Indian Daily Mail, 22 December 1948.
Ibid., 13 January 1948.
Ibid.
Majlis, 12 December 1947.
Ibid., 14 December 1947; 19 December 1947.
Attacks such as these were largely responsible for the attempts of
the MIC in June 1949 to change its constitution so as to admit only local
citizens. This coincided with a lessening of Indian National
Congress influence over the party at the end of the 1940s. This was brought
about by a number of factors; first, by an increasing challenge to the
MIC leadership from its b r a n c h e s s e c o n d ,  by the expansion of UMNO
and MCA which were coordinating their policies and programmes in
preparation for local elections, and third, from the growing influence
of local-born elites in the MIC.^8*^  The reorientation of the MIC was
also undoubtedly hastened by Nehru's pronouncement in 1950 that 'Indians
in Malaya should not look to India for any help; neither is India in a
position to render any because she has her own problems to solve and her
own population to look after'.^^ In the same year, Budh Singh was
succeeded as President of the MIC by K. Ramanathan Chettiar, a figure
(91)unknown m  New Delhi.
(86) See Chapter VI, pp. 199-201.
Indian Daily Mail, 7 July 1949.
Ibid., 6 June 1949; R.K. Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society:
A Study of Non-Communal Political Parties in Malaysia, London, 1971*
pp. 10-11.
MIC Fourth Annual Session, 29 - 30 April 1950 (MIC Papers, Kuala 
Lumpur).
^90) Indian Daily Mail, 26 June 1950.
(91) nK. Ramanathan Chettiar, born in South India; educated at Madras;
law$rer-|- Income Tax Adviser, Malaya, 1948- ; President, MIC,
1950-1951) Member, Federal Legislative Council, 195^” *
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(iv)
As the MIC was heavily influenced by the INC and Nehru in the
immediate post-war period it was inevitable that the Muslim section of
the Indian community would become increasingly alienated from the MIC
(92)
and the Hindu Indians in these years. A serious split between Hindu
and Muslim Indians had in fact begun to emerge in the immediate pre-war
period. In the 1920s and 1930s the Indian Muslims in Malaya had in
general been politically apathetic, though they had been involved in
sporadic political activity, notably the Singapore Mutiny of 1913 and the
(93)Khilafat Movement of 1922^ The Muslims were too divided on ethnic,
regional, class and educational lines to mobilize themselves politically
(9*0xn the pre-war years. Even the rise of the Muslim League in India
(9 5)
had had no immediate impact on the Indian community in Malaya.
(92) The breakdown of religious gtfoups in the Malayan Indian community 
was as follows :-
Figures is thousands
Muslims - 90.3
Hindus - 8l6.1
Christians - 58.7
Sikhs - 29.1
Buddhists - 1.1
Others - 3*7
Source: del Tufo, op.cit., p. 123-
9^3) Arasaratnam, op.cit., p. 92; Khoo Kay Kim, op.cit., pp. 9-29, 36-39- 
(gif)
Cf., Khoo Kay Kim, op.cit., p. 40, ’Indians of the merchant class 
were particularly active in promoting nationalist activities ....
Among members of this group, the Muslims were said to be most active'. 
It should be noted however that in the pre-war period, Muslims were 
generally apolitical and only exhibited sporadic political activism. 
Indeed, Indian political militancy in this period was restricted 
essentially to labour questions (Stenson, op.cit., pp. 25-37, *+9-53) 
and to radical elite organizations such as the Singapore Indian 
Association in the early 1920s (N.J. Parmer, Colonial Labour Policy and 
Administration: A History Qf Labour in the Pubber Plantation Industry 
in Malaya, c \ ' 9To*-19^ 1, Ne'v; York, i96o7~~p. 65) and the Central Indian 
Association of Malaya in the late 1930s (Ampalavanar, op.cit., pp. 
83-93, 116-118, 307-322; Arasaratnam, op.cit., p. 82-102). These 
were areas where the Muslims were not involved. This view is 
supported by CO.273/662, enclosure, Malaya Combined Intelligence 
Summary, No.6, 1-31 July 19*+0 (P.P.O. London).
CO. 273/662, enclosure, Malaya Combined Intelligence Summary, No. 6, 
1-31 July 19*1-0 (P.P.O. London).
It was the adoption of the concept of Pakistan by the Muslim League
in 19*+0 that led to the politicizatLcnof the Malayan Indian Muslim
(96)community. The resulting split between Muslims and Hindus was
exacerbated by the fact that Subhas Bose of the Indian Independence
(97)League, strongly opposed the concept of Pakistan* Bose's attitude
towards Pakistan became even more inflexible towards the end of the 
war when a number of Congress leaders, sensitive to the increasing
(98)militancy of the Pakistan movement, decided to compromise with it.
In response, Bose ordered all broadcasting stations to mount a campaign
(99)against this 'appeasement'. Hindu-Muslim relations suffered a
further seiback when the League attempted to suppress all Muslim 
associations in Malaya. Most notably in 19*1-2 the League attempted to
shut the All India Muslim Club of Singapore, despite severe opposition
(100)from the Singapore Muslims* In retaliation K.S. Anwari, President
of the Club, demanded fifty per cent Muslim representation on all League
(101)Councils which clearly could not be conceded. The Muslim Club of
Singapore was eventually closed by the Japanese who detected in its
(102)pro-Muslim League sympathies an element of pro-Britisli loyalty.
BMA (Publicity and Propaganda) File *+12/45, enclosure, Intelligence 
Report, 26 February 19*+5 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
M.K. Durrani, The Sixth Column, London, 1955, PP* 82-83?
M. Sivaram, The Moad to Delhi, Tokyo, 1966, p. 213*
J.A. Thivy, A Short History of the Indian Independence Movement, 
Hanoi, 1945 (mimeograph copy, Thivy Papers, University of Malaya 
Library, Kuala Lumpur) pp. 33-35*
Ramachandra, op.cit., p. 91.
Ibid.
Syonan Shimbun, 22 July 19*+2, 23 July 19*+2.
(96)
(97)
(98)
(99)
(100)
(101)
(102)
Henceforth the attitude of Muslims to the Indian Independence
League was either one of indifference or concealed hostility, the
latter becoming increasingly evident when rich Muslim merchants were
forced to contribute to the coffers of the League. Shortly after the
Occupation, Muslim groups led by the Penang Muslim League complained
to India of ill-treatment by Hindu groups in the Indian National Army.
However enquiries by a Select Committee under Deputy Foreign Ministef
B.R. Keskar were unable to uncover evidence of communal discrimination
(104)by the Indian National Army or League officials.
It was inevitable that the polarization between Hindu and Muslim 
Indians in Malaya would reach its peak between late 19*+5 and August 19^7
when the debate over Pakistan and the Partition of India was at its
height. Strong support for the Pakistan movement came from the highly 
nationalist Muslim press in both Malaya and Singapore. The Malaya Nanban 
(Malayan Friend) published in Singapore was in the forefront of the
campaign for Partition. Its. .editor, Karim Ghani, had a history of
rather changing not to say contradictory political stances. During the war 
he had supported Bose and was even a member of Bose's Cabinet.
( 103)
^ BMA File 432/45, enclosure, Report from Kedah and Perlis, December 
19*+5; M.U. (Secretariat) File 56/*+6, Vol. I (N.A. Kuala Lumpur); 
Dhesa Nesan, 10 April 19*+6.
Sevika, 15 May 19*+6.
(105) Malayan Nanban was first published in September 19*+1 and was 
edited by N.P. Shaik Abdul Kader, a Tamil chauvinist who expressed 
the policy of promoting 'the interest of Tamil speaking population 
of Malaya'. He was succeeded by Karim Ghani who was pro-Muslim 
League and anti-Congress. Public Relations Department (Confidential) 
File 90/40, item 18, Report of 13 September 19*+8 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(106) q. Gamba, The Origins of Trade Unionism in Malaya: A Study in 
Colonial Labour Unrest, Singapore, 1962, pp. 503-50*+. Karim Ghani 
was born in India in 1908. Before the war he published a Tamil 
daily in Rangoon. He was also Parliamentary Secretary in Ba Maw's 
Cabinet. During the Occupation he was a Minister in Bose's Cabinet. 
On the return of the British he was arrested and later released.
He became editor of the Malaya Nanban, and was also President of 
the Singapore Muslim League. After a dispute with the directors of 
the Malaya Nanban, he resigned and started a Tamil weekly paper, the 
Udaya Soorayan in Singapore which failed. He next moved to Penang 
where he published the Malay weekly, Suloh Kema.juan. In Penang he 
moved into Malay society, being friendly with UMNO officials and was 
active i^ proselytizing Islam through his Party Islam Malaya.
After the war he became staunchly pro-Muslim League and pro-British,
In December 19^6, he cabled the Colonial Office:
Having the experience of the rule of the Azad Hind Government 
and knowing the great hardships we Muslims have undergone, we do 
not desire a Constituent Assembly in the coming government of 
Free India* We support wholeheartedly the Pakistan demand under 
the leadership of Ali Jinnah, leader of All-India Muslim League,(107)
But with the establishment of a separate Pakistan, he then offered
his favours to the Malays. He was a close friend of the radical
Dr. Burhanuddin of the Malay Nationalist Party as well as more
(1 ^
conservative UMNO leaders. In 19^8 he w£*s the founder President
(109)of the Party Islam Malaya in Penang. But in this period he was
viewed with suspicion by the British who were wary of his publication, the
(110)Malay weekly Suloh Kemajuan (Torch of Progress). During the Maria
Hertogh riots of December 1950 he was implicated in the murder of a 
British subject, Peter Bell, and was banished to Pakistan following
Public Relations Department (Confidential) File ^88/^8, 
enclosure, Confidential note from Penang and Province 
Wellesley Public Relations Officer to Director of Public 
Relations, Federation of Malaya, 28 June 19^8 (N.A. Kuala 
Lumpur)•
(
Public Relations Department ^ile 533/^6, enclosure, Directive 
Intelligence Report, 20 January 19^7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur);
Malaya Nanban, 28 August 19^6.
(^09) pubpic Relations Department (Confidential) File ^88/48,
enclosure, Confidential note from Public Relations Officer, 
Penang and Province Wellesley to Director of Public Relations, 
Federation of Malaya, 28 June 19^8 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur). There 
is no evidence to suggest that the Party Islam Malaya was a 
predecessor of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party of Dr. Burhanuddin. 
The latter party grew out of the Malayan Muslim Party formed 
in>Perak in 19^8.
(110) Ibid.
51.
(111)conviction. It was the end of the colourful.career of a maverick and
opportunist politician.
The Zindabad, a Tamil weekly from Penang echoed the pro-Pakistan
sentiments of Karim Ghani's Malaya Nanban and condemned those Muslims
(112)supporting the Indian National Congress. The Dhesa Nesan, a daily
paper from Penang was also a vehement critic of the Congress Party and
(113)collected funds for Pakistan and Jinnah. This incessant press
propaganda produced further strains in the relations between the Hindus 
and the Muslims, and in April and June 19^6 led to open rioting when
(11 ij.)
Hindus attacked Muslim shops in Singapore. The June riots resulted
in the death of two and the arrest of forty-four on charges of illegal
(115)possession of arms. Rather surprisingly, the Colonial Secretary,
G.H. Hall, saw no connection between these disturbances in Singapore and
events in India but ascribed them to feuds between local political 
(116)groups. But Captain L. Gammans, a Conservative Member for
Parliament who was in Malaya, saw clearly that these disturbances
(111) Report of the Singapore Riots Inquiry Commission 1951 together with 
a despatch from the Governor of Singapore to the Secretarycf State 
for the Colonies, Singapore, 1951; Malaya Tribune, 1^ December 1950; 
Indian Daily Mail, 18 December 1950; Straits Times, 5 January 1951?
6 January 19511 20 January 1951» 5 February 1951, 3° June 1953*
This was an anti-Furopean protest caused by a dispute over the 
marriage of Maria Hertogh, a Dutch girl left in the care of a Malay 
family during the war. In 1950 her Dutch mother reclaimed her and in 
the midst of this controversy, she was placed in the custody of a 
Catholic Convent in Singapore. This was considered to be an anti- 
Islamic act and Muslims in Singapore rioted.
O'!2) Zindabad, 2k March 19^6; 7 April 19^ +6.
Dhesa Nesan, 20 March 19^6, 23 March 19^6, 26 March 19^6, k April 19^ -6. 
The Dhesa Nesan was started in 1925 but was forced to suspend public­
ation during the Japanese Occupation. In August 19^5 it resumed 
publication in Penang and had a circulation of 3»000. Public Relations 
Department File ^12/^5, item l8, ’Malayan Newspapers Data ’ (N.A.
Kuala Lumpur).
(*1 ' l  A)
Indian Daily Mail, 26 June 19^6.
^ ^ )  Malaya Tribune, 28 June 19^6.
Ibid.(116)
(117)were a reflection of events in the sub-continent. When, in
August 1946 an Interim Congress Government was formed in India, the event
(118)was celebrated by the Hindus in Malaya and mourned by the Muslims.
There is little doubt that thesd conflicting sentiments were the cause 
of a fresh outbreak of disturbances on 2 September when Muslims from the 
Geylang area in Singapore attacked Hindu shopkeepers in nearby Serangoon
(119)
road. Faced with these disturbances, the British authorities felt
it necessary to impose stricter censorship on publications coming into
Malaya both from India, and from the extremist Islamic Information
Bureau in London.
The most prominent pro-Jinnah organization in Malaya was the Muslim
League of Penang. It campaigned vigorously against the Cripps Mission
to India in early 1946 and condemned without reservation British plans for 
(121)a Federal India. This led the Penang League into a bitter feud with
(122)the Penang Hindu Sabha and the Hindu-controlled Sevika and Samarasan.
In December 1946, the Penang Muslim League, with other pro-Jinnah 
factions, joined with-Malay organizations such as the Saberkas and the
Ibid.
Ibid., 5 September 1946.
Ibid., 3 September 1946.
M.U. (Confidential) File 364/46, enclosure, Press and Printing 
censorship of incoming publications, 21 March 1946 - 18 April 1947 
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur)•
Dhesa Nesan, 21 March 1946.
BMA (Press Intelligence, Publicity and Printing Department) File 
42/45, enclosure, Malayan Press Digest, No. 18, October - November 
1945, January - December 1946 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur); Dhesa Nesan,
18 May 1946. The Sevika was started in Penang in November""19*45? 
its editors being T. Sethuraman and S. Athinahappan. The paper was 
extremist and was essentially pro-Subhas Bose. It had a circulation 
of 2,000. The Samarasan first appeared on 25 February 1946. It was 
edited by T. Kanagasundaram and was essentially concerned with 
social reform.
(117)
(118)
(119)
(120)
(121)
(122)
Singapore Malay Union, to form the All Malaya Muslim League, which 
pledged support for Jinnah and Pakistan.
However, when Partition was finally achieved in August 1947, the 
Indian Muslims in Malaya were faced with a serious and perhaps 
unexpected problem, as indeed were their co-religionists in the sub­
continent. Many Muslims had supported the Pakistan movement without 
seriously considering whether they really wished to owe their allegiance 
to a separate Muslim state. The problem was particularly acute for those 
Muslims who had come from what was now Independent India. One immediate 
consequence of Partition therefore was the splitting of the Muslim 
community in Malaya into Pakistan and Indian factions. This was 
reflected most notably in the development of Pakistan Muslim Associations 
and Indian Muslim Associations and in a rift in the Muslim merchant
(124)community. For example, Muslim members of the Singapore Indian
Chamber of Commerce divided into a pro-Indian National Copgress group
(*125)led by P. Jumabhoy and a pro-Pakistan faction led by M.J. Namazie.
In December 1947, when the turmoil within the Muslim community was most
pronounced, Thivy, the Indian Agent, argued strongly that Indians should
not fly the Pakistan flat). He stressed that 'those who want to
claim allegiance to Pakistan are welcome to do so provided they renounce
(127)all privileges and rights accorded them by the Indian Government'.
Indian Daily Mail, 2 December 1946.
See Registrar of Societies Files:- 357/62 - 'Malayan Pakistan 
Association*; 304/59 - Malayan Pakistan League Selangor; 396/59 -
Federation of Malaya Pakistan Youth Association; 1031/50 - 
Federation Uttar Pradesh Muslim Association; 207/50 - Selangor 
Pakistan Association (Registry of Societies, Kuala Lumpur).
Indian Daily Mail, 2 May 1949.
Indian Daily Mail, 2 May 1949*
Malaya Tribune, 18 December 1947.
Ibid.
(123)
(124)
(125)
(126) 
(127)
54*
The confusion within the Muslim community which followed Partition 
prompted many of its members to seek affiliations with local parties 
other than the MIC. Thus a number of Muslims from Penang applied for 
membership of thelocal UMNO branch, while others became involved
(128)with non-communal political parties such as the Malayan Labour Party.
Similarly in Singapore many Indian Muslims joined either non-communal
(-129)organizations or Arab and Malay parties. On the East Coast, where
the Muslims, largely Pathans, had married into the local population
older members of the community supported the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party,
whilst the younger, local-born Pathan Muslims with Malay mothers were
(1 70
attracted into the UMNO. It was only in Perak and Selangor that
the MIC was able to attract Muslims in substantial numbers.
The most natural candidate for Indian Muslim allegiance was perhaps 
the UMNO. This was seen most clearly in Penang where from 1947 the
( 72)
local Muslim League almost constantly aligned itself with the Malay party.
The Penang Muslim League supported the Malays in rejecting the Malayan
(1 33)Union proposals and in boycotting the hartal in August 1947. Indeed
it was largely due to the League's efforts that the hartal in Penang was
(134)a purely Chinese affair. However from December 1948 the Penang
Tamil Nesan, 31 May 1949.
^^9) Indian Daily Mail, 7 April 1949.
(“170 )
Sayed Mohammed bin Sayed Ahmad, ’Orang Pathan Di Kelantan', Academic 
Exercise, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1973? PP* 98-100.
( '171 'I
Report of the Hon. General Secretary of the MIC presented at the 
Eighth Annual Session at Prai, 16-17 April 1954 (MIC Papers,
Kuala Lumpur).
^32) Malaya Tribune, 24 October 1947.
See chapter IV, pp. 107-108, 124.
Secession Movement caused a temporary split within the Penang Muslim
Leqgue and this in turn caused a brief rift between the League and
the UMNO.^"^ Influential merchants in the League, including its
nominee to the Settlement Council, S.M. Abu Bakar, joined the Penang
Chamber of Commerce and the Straits Chinese British Association in
supporting secession as being necessary to protect Penang's free
port status. But while the mercantile interests who dominated the
League saw advantages in secession, pressure from the All Malaya Muslim
League, which was opposed to secession, was hard to resist, and this
(1 ~ZD }
left Bakar exposed. However by February 19^9 the secession
movement had lost its vigour, largely because Penang's free port status 
had been ensured, but also because the authorities had assured local 
residents of special consideration over citizenship.^"^
The Penang Muslim League's close liaison with the local UMNO 
became an electoral partnership during the municipal elections of 
1991 and 1992. The UMNO relied on the League to attract Indian 
voters and thereby defeat the Indian candidates of the Penang Labour 
Party. Under this arrangement in December 1951» Abu Bakar was nominated 
as UMNO/Muslim League candidate for Tanjong ward.^"^ However in June 
195^ Abu Bakar refused to conform to UMNO policy of boycotting all 
councils, a measure taken to force the British to bring forward Federal
Straits Echo, 21 December 19^8.
036) m .N. Sppiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: Political 
Unification in the Malaysia Region, 1945-1965, Kuala Lumpur, 197^, 
pp. 56-57. — —  "
Straits Times, 3 January 1949.
/  «*i 7 Q  \
Sopiee, op.cit., pp. 67-69*
(139) G. Hawkins, Report on Introduction of Elections in Municipality of 
Georgetown, Penang, 1951, Kuala Lumpur, 1953, Appendix A, pp. 20-21. 
Tyeb Khan and Abu Bakar were Muslim League/UMNO Municipal Councillors.
56.
(1 4o)elections to 1954. Abu Bakar's contention was that 'the municipal
council is a civic body not political, its sole aim is to look after 
(141)rate payers'. In protest against the UMNO, Bakar revived the
League as a purely political party in order to contest separately the
, (142)elections in November 1954. During the campaign Bakar was
constantly drawn into political conflicts with the Party Negara
candidate, Abdul Wahab, which reflected the severe competition between
the Muslim League, the Party Negara and the UMNO for the Indian Muslim
(143)vote on the island. Indeed, the Indian Muslims werd crucial for a
victory of the Malay political parties in the otherwise Chinese-dominated 
electorate of Penang. In December 1954 there was a scuffle between 
Bakar and the Party Negara candidate and this led to a riot involving 
one thousand angry UMNO supporters who stormed Penang Street leaving
. . . . (144)six injured.
The persistent identity of the All Malaya Muslim League with the
UMNO, led to the League requesting in October 1956, that the Alliance
(jIp5)
accept it as an equal partner. The League, representing 100,000
Indian Muslims, emphasized its political role in supporting the Alliance's
0 4 6 )independence campaign. In late 1957 the UMNO Executive Committee
Straits Times, 22 June 1954; Tamil Nesan, 22 June 1954.
Straits Times, 22 June 1954.
Registrar of Societies File 387/54, enclosure, letter from J.B.
Prentiss, Registrar of Societies, Federation of Malaya, 23 August
1954 (Registry of Societies, Kuala Lumpur).
Registrar of Societies File 387/54, enclosure, letter from
Registrar of Societies Penang, 22 October 1954 (Registry of
Societies, Kuala Lumpur).
Straits Times, 6 December 1954.
Straits Times, 29 October 1956.
Ibid., 20 December 1956.
(140)
(141)
(142)
(1^3)
(144)
(145)
(146)
decided to delay a decision on the Muslim League request, pending
(147)amendments to the constitutions of both parties* The UMNO was
particularly concerned about the presence of non-Federal citizens in the 
League and hence insisted that the party's constitution be amended so
as to admit only Federal citizens. The League was finally admitted
o (149)into the UMNO in 195° but only as an affiliate, not an equal partner.
Many members of the All Malaya Muslim League were later able to pass
directly into the UMNO fold because of their mixed racial origins. Those
150 )who lacked this entree into the UMNO joined the MIC. In the end,
race rather than religion determined their allegiance.
An interesting feature of the politics of the Indian Muslims in
Singapore in this period was their tendency to form political alignments
with their co-religionists, the Arabs and the Malays, in order to survive
in a Chinese dominated electorate. For example, in June 1947 the
Singapore Malay Union, the Singapore Arab Union and the Singapore Muslim
League, the latter led by Karim Ghani, attempted to form a single
political party to organize the electorate for the 1948 municipal 
(151)elections. However in the fragmented political atmosphere of
Singapore a purely religious identity could not suffice. From 1948 there 
was increasing Indian Muslim support for the cosmopolitan Progressive
Ibid., 19 August 1957*
Ibid.
Singapore Tiger Standard, 19 August 1958, 9 May 1959? Straits Times, 
”4 August 1958; Tamil""Nesan, 19 August 1958.
Tamil Nesan, 19 August 1958; Annual Report and'Statement of Accounts 
of the MIC, 1957-1958, presented at the 12th Annual General Meeting, 
18 May 1958, pp. 1-2 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Straits Times, 51 December 1947; Indian Daily Mail, 2 June 1947*
(147)
(148)
(149)
(150)
(151)
Party and the radical Labour Party, whilst religious-based political 
„ , , (152)parties faded.
(v)
If the period 1945-1950 had seen the Malayan Indian community most
strongly influenced by the Indian National Congress and the Muslim
League of India, then the period after 1950 witnessed the growing
influence of Tamil Nationalism and the Dravidian politics of Madras
over the Malayan Indians* This reflected in part the emergence of
vigorous Tamil separatism in India itself, as well as of course the
(153)Tamil numerical domination of the Malayan Indians. It is possible
to identify two main strands of Dravidian nationalist ideology in this
period. Perhaps the most prominent was the militant, extreme, Dravida
Kalagam, or Black Shirts movement, led by E.V. Ramasamy Naicker. This
was reflected in Malaya, principally in the Pan-Malayan Dravidian
Federation (PMDF) established in 1932.
In the post-war period the PMDF worked closely with the PMFTU in
(154)Selangor, Perak and Johore. Indeed the Secretary of the PMDF,
S. Angamuthu, was a close associate of S. Mohan of the PMFTU who was
Indian Daily Mail, 22 December 1951; Yeo Kim Wah, Political 
Development in Singapore, 1945-1955* Singapore, 1973» PP- 73, 99, 
101, 103, 120, 226,' 266.
Sandhu, op.cit., p. 237, Table 13#
(15*0 m.U. (Secretariat) File 27/46, Report from P.J. Howes, OCPD Klang 
to Officer in charge, M.S.S., 13 October 1946 (N.A. I£uala Lumpur); 
UPAM Circular, No. 10, October 1946 (R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
£155)'later involved in the MCP. The objective of the PMFTU was to
exploit the class, caste and ethnic divisions between the Indian
(15fi)
labourers and the Indian elite in order to undermine the MIC,
It is interesting to note that this link between the PMDF and the MCP 
was reflected in Madras where the Dravida Kalagam often supported
('I 57 )
Communist candidates in opposition to the Indian National Congress.
The close association of the PMDF with left-wing organizations, notably 
the MCP and the PMFTU, ensured that throughout this period it was 
deeply involved in labour unrest.
The PMDF.‘ tended to be most active following visits to Malaya by
E.V. Ramasamy Naicker, or other prominent Dravidian nationalists.
For example, when Naicker visited the country in February 19^8 there was
(159)a marked upsurge in Tamil chauvinism and labour militancy. During
a further visit in December 195^» his statements proved so extreme
(160)that the Federation Government rdfused to extend his visa. In
(161)addition the weekly paper of the PMDF, the Dravida Murasu was banned.
. Henceforth the Special Branch in both Malaya and Singapore maintained a
(155) Commissioner for Labour, Malayan Union, File 237/^71 enclosure, 
Pan Malayan Dravidian Federation Conference Report iA - 16 April 
I9A7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(156) s^enson, op.cit., pp. 122-12 .^
(157) Baker, The Politics of South India, 1920-1937* Cambridge,
1976, p. 193.
(158) upam Circular No.2, February 1951 (R.G.A. Muala Lumpur); 
Commissioner for Labour Malayan Union, File 237/A7» enclosure,
15 March 19^-7; Commissioner for Labour, Federation of Malaya, 
File 20/A8, enclosure, Monthly Report for February 19^8, p. 7 
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur); UPAM minutes of meeting of 1 October 1956 
(R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
^ ^ )  Tamil Nesan, 12 February 19^ +8.
C160)
Indian Daily Mail, 22 December 195 1^ 23 December 195^*
Singapore Tiger Standard, 30 September 1956.
(162)close watch on all visiting Dravidian nationalists. It was also
in this period that the PMDF attempted to subvert the sub-elites of the 
NUPW in order to challenge the top leadership of the Union which was 
predominantly non-Tamil.
The second strand of Dravidian nationalism emphasized socio-economic 
reform and moderate political change. It found root among Tamil 
journalists, businessmen, school-teachers and relatively high caste 
labourers, who had been alienated from the militant PMDF on the 
estates. Their principal organizations included the Tamil Reform 
Association of Malaya and Singapore, the Tamils Representative Council 
and the Tamil Pannai. The Tamil Reform Association, which had been
(164)established in 1932, was mainly involved in social and religious reform.
For example, it campaigned against such practices as the carrying of 
kavadi, fire-walking and the worshipping of idols. It had no qualms in 
resorting to legislation to eradicate such practices, though it 
encountered strong opposition from bodies such as the Brahmin-dominated 
Singapore Hindu Association and the militant Penang Hindu Sabha who were 
loathe to permit British legislators to interfere in strictly Hindu 
tradit ions„ ^  ^5 )
In the early 1950s the Tamil Reform Association promoted the 
ponggol (or harvest festival) as a festival to mark Tamil unity.^*^
Straits Times, 29 June 1959*
(163) The top officials m  the NUPW were two Malayalees, P.P. Narayanan 
and C.P.R. Menon, and a Bengali K.R. Choudhury, Indian Daily Mail,
1 October 1956,.14 June 1968.
(164) ,Arasaratnam, op.cit., pp. 172-174.
Straits Times, 10 June 1949.
Indian Daily Mail, 10 November 1951, 3 January 1956.
This was intended to replace Deepavali (the festival of lights), which 
was symbolic of North Indian domination of South India in historical 
times. Moreover, annual conferences were held to discuss issues relating 
to Tamil society, and literary circles organized to popularize Tamil 
works such as the Tirukkural, and the works of Bharathi Dasan, a Tamil
( "1 C-T) ^
nationalist poet and playwright. In 1951 the Tamil Reform
Association canvassed support for the establishment of a department of
Tamil Studies in the University of Malaya and in this it was supported
by the Carr-Saunders Commission.
Throughout this period the Tamils doubted whether the MIC
represented Tamil interests. These suspicions were expressed by the
Tamil Murasu, the paper of the Singapore Tamil Reform Association, as
early as 194-7. Then from December 1948, the Tamil Reform
(170)Association agitated for separate political representation. In
January 1949, with growing exasperation, Thivy attacked this growing
Tamil parochialism as expressed in the press and the proliferation
(171)of Tamil organizations. In the 195Cs certain MIC branches, most
notably in Penang and Kuala Selangor, were dominated by Tamils at the
lower leadership levels and this frequently led to friction between
(172)these branches and the MIC leadership. For example, in October 1953
( *1 67 )
See Minutes of Tamil Refofm Association, 1948-1959 (Singapore Tamil 
Reform Association Hqrs., Singapore).
(168) S. Arasaratnam, fIndian Studies in the University1, Tamil Qii,
Tamil Language Society, University of Malaya, 1966-1967,p. 135; 
Carr—Saunders, Report of the Commission on University Education in 
Malaya, Kuala Lumpu'r, 25 February 1948, p. 43; Indian Daily Mail, 
28 April 1951*
^ ^ )  Tamil Murasu, 25 January 1947.
Indian Daily Mail, 22 December 1948.
Malaya Tribune, 25 January 1949-
(172) MIC Annual Report presented at the 7th Annual Session, Ipoh,
9 - 1 0  May 1953» PP* 2-4 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
the Tamils Representative Council in Singapore passed a motion of no
confidence in the Singapore Regional Indian Congress, on the grounds
that the latter had defied the policy of the MIC leadership with regard
(173)to the boycott of elections. Tamil disenchantment with the MIC
increased with the latter's advocacy of a national education system which
ignored Tamil and emphasized English or Malay as the medium of
instruction.^7^
However, the most serious conflict between the Tamils and the MIC
occurred in '195^-1955• In this period the MIG leadership was eager
to join the Alliance but the Tamil community was prepared to support
this only if it could secure changes in Alliance policy, particularly
on education. The Tamil Murasu and the Indian Daily Mail were
particularly critical of the Alliance, dismissing the UMNO-MCA merger
as 'unholy and ill-conceived'.^^5) jn March 1955 Tan Slew Sin, the
MCA Publicity Officer, wrote to the Singapore Tiger Standard complaining
(176)that the paper was pro-Tamil and anti-Chinese. The Tamils then
suspected, with no evidence, that there had been collusion between the
(177)MIC and the MCA to prejudice the latter against them.
This unleashed a wave of criticism of the MIC by Tamil organizations 
throughout the country. In March 1955 there were emotional outbursts
^ 7"^ Indian Daily Mail, 6 October 1953*
(17*0v f} Ibid., 10 October 1953.
(175) Ibid., *\b July 1955.
^ 7^  Singapore Tiger Standard, 6 March 1955; Tamil Nesan, 7 March 1955*
Tamil Murasu, 10 March 1955» 12 March 1955; Straits Times,
23 March 1955; Tamil Nesan, Zh March 1955; s'evika, 26 March 1955*
(178)in the Tamil Murasu advising the Tamils to boycott the MIC.
K.L. Devaser, President of the MIC, hit back at this Tamil emotionalism
and to the chagrin of the Tamils refrained from defending them from
(179)the accusations of the MCA. This later led to Devaser's defeat at
the MIC Presidential elections in May 1955* by V.T. Sambanthan, a
comparatively unknown famil graduate of Annamalai University.
But this did not halt Tamil obduracy. In September the same year the
Tamils Representative Council asked that Tamil be regarded as another
official language alongside English and Malay, and also demanded two more
(1 R't)
Tamil representatives on the Education-Select Committee of Malaya.
(182)Here they were supported by the Penang MIC, a Tamil dominated branch.
Crucial in the promotion of Tamil chauvinism was the Tamil Press, 
for in the period 19^5-1957 it was more vocal and often more militant 
than the Malayalam and Punjabi press. The major Tamil paper was the 
Tamil Murasu, published in Singapore from 193^* In the post-war period 
it was edited by G. Sarangapany, who though a follower of the Indian
/ /1Q7 N
National Congress, was a moderate Tamil Nationalist. The Tamil
(18*+)Murasu had a circulation of 22,000 in 1957. The major Tamil paper
Tamil Murasu, 10 March 1955, 12 March 1955.
Tamil Nesan, 28 March 1955, Straits Times, 28 March 1955*
Tamil Nesan, 2 May 1955.
Indian Daily Mail, 28 September 1955*
Ibid., 27 April 1956.
BMA (Public Relations Department) Pile 90/^8, enclosure, Malayan 
Press Digest, No.12, p. 37 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Tamil Murasu, 1 December 1957.
(178)
(179)
(180) 
(181) 
(182? 
(183)
(18*0
in the Federation was the Tamil Nesan, controlled by Chettiars and high 
("18*5 }caste Tamils. It was established in 1924 by Brahmins and frequently
had Brahmin editorial staff. The Tamil Nesan supported the
moderate faction of the Indian National Congress, particularly S# Kamraj,
(*1 ^
the ^outh Indian Congress leader. It was also a strong supporter
of the Tamil elite in the MIC, and had a close relationship with
K. Ramanathan Chettiar, President of the MIC, 1950-1951*^^^ It had
a circulation of only 5,000 in 1946 but this rose to 25,000 by 1957.^^'^
A third Tamil paper, the militant Jananayagam, was sponsored by 
(190)
the MCP. An edition published in Singapore, the Munnani, was
(191)intensely anti-British. It was edited by Ganapathy, the MCP
cadre who was hanged in 1949. Finally,the Tamil literary revival in
this period produced a number of Tamil newspapers concerned solely with
disseminating Tamil literature and culture. Here the Tamil Chudar with
a circulation of 2,000 and the Tamil Kody with a circulation of 1,000 
(192)were prominent. The editor of the latter, O.A.R. Arunasalam Chettiar,
was active in the TamilPannai.
(185) (Public Relations Department) File 90/48, enclosure, Malayan 
Press Digest, No. 12, p. 37 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(186) Ampalavanar, op.cit., pp. IO8-II8.
Ibid.
( 1 °P\ ^100; Tamil Nesan*s editor S. Athinahappan was President of the
Selangor Regional Indian Congress in December 1949-
Tamil Nesan, 1 December 1957.
(190) (Public Relations Department) File 90/48, enclosure, Malayan
Press Digest, No.12, p. 37 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
^91) (Publicity and Propaganda) File 412/43; Public Relations
Department, File 95/48, enclosure, List of Newspapers in the Malay 
Peninsula (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(192) Public Relations Department, File 95/48, enclosure, List of 
Newspapers in the Malay Peninsula (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Therefore increasing Tamil chauvinism from the late 1940s
manifested itself in many areas - in religious reform, in a literary
revival, in trade union organization, and in language and educational
issues as well as in politics. Paradoxically it achieved relatively
little. Hov; can this paradox be explained? Compared with other Indian
groups, the Tamil community had a relatively small educated elite.
This had a number of consequences. First, the Tamil elite found
itself submerged by the MIC leaders and it is noteworthy that three
of the most active Tamil politicians, G. Sarangapany, S. Govindaraj and
A. Balakrishnan never acquired more than regional importance in the
(193)MIC organization. Second, while it was possible to mobilize a
huge Tamil work force, it was impossible to provide a sustained 
Tamil leadership. It is significant that the arrest of the Tamil 
labour militants, A.M. Sarny and I. Manivelu in 1947 was sufficient
(194)to defuse labour militancy in Kedah in the immediate post-war period.
Similarly, labour unrest in 1954-1956 died away sharply following the
(195)arrest of a few Tamil leaders. Finally with so many issues facing
(193) G. Sarangapany, Executive Committee Member of Singapore 
Regional Indian Congress, MIC Working Committee Member,
1947-1950, Chairman, All Malaya Tamil Reform Association and 
Tamils Representative Council; editor of Tamil Murasu and 
Indian Daily Mail.
S. Govindaraj, General Secretary of the MIC, 1949-1952*
A. Balakrishnan, President, Penang Regional Indian Congress,
1951, 1954-1955.
(194) Chapter 111, pp. 79""80*
(195) gee in, pp. 93-94*
the community and so few leaders, the potential energies of the 
Tamil population were inevitably diffused, rather than channelled 
towards just one or two issues. Another factor was the strain of 
over-emotionalism in Tamil society- Political activism among the 
Tamils was characterized by sudden, violent outbursts, rather than 
sustained campaigns. The furore over the MCA episode in March 1955, 
noted earlier, is a good example of this. In short, though the 
Tamils had the numerical strength to dominate Malayan Indian society 
and were certainly capable of creating considerable political 
commotion and noise, in the last analysis they failed to achieve 
pre-eminence over the other Indian groups in Malaya.
Ill
67*
INDIAN LABOUR 19^5-37 
(i)
The one area of Indian and indeed Malayan political life where
the Tamils could make a considerable impact was, of course, in
industrial relations, for a major proportion of the labour force
('})
on the rubber estates, the docks and the railways, was Tamil#
It was essentially for this reason that the Tamils were heavily 
involved in the widespread labour unrest and trade union militancy 
which swept through Malaya in the years 19^3 to the declaration of 
the Emergency in June 19^8*
In the immediate postwar period, unstable economic and political 
conditions caused great hardship to the workers in Malaya. High 
unemployment, rapid inflation and shortages of essential foodstuffs
(2)such as rice, were the most conspicuous signs of economic dislocation.
Under these conditions the propaganda of the MCP was understandably
effective and the Party provided the leadership for hunger marches,
for demonstrations against unemployment and in the organization of 
(3)trade unions. In Singapore the first signs of labour unrest 
(1)
Del Tufo, Report on the 19^ -7 Census, pp. 78-79* 113-H^-* See also 
Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, p. 125«
(2) M.U. File 463/^6, 'Confidential memo on the present high cost of 
living', submitted by MSS, 9 January 19^ +6 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
An Interim Report on prices and wages published in 19^6 stated 
that while the monthly expenditure of the average Indian labourer 
in Penang was only jj^ .ll in December 1939* it had increased to 
$$9*05 in October 19^3* an increase of more than eight times. The 
British Military Administration had granted wage increases of 
21-31 per cent but this was clearly inadequate. C. Gamba, The 
Origins of Trade Unionism in Malaya, p. +^0.
BMA File **521/^ 6, 23th Indian Division Weekly Intelligence 
Review, week ending 28 November 19^5* P-6 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
surfaced as early as October 19^5 when 7*000 dockworkers at Tanjong
Pagar went on strike* Here the Straits Times noted the presence
of a large number of agitators though it was clear that real issues 
(5)
were involved. The British Military Administration reacted by
arresting ten trade union leaders and using British troops and
( 6)Japanese prisoners-of-war to work on the docks.
Later the same month Asian employees of the Singapore Traction
(7)Company went on strike m  support of a forty per cent wage increase.
They also demanded a victory bonus of three months salary, and /20
(8)relief payment to workers who had not been re-employed after the war.
In the Batu Arang Collieries there was a strike the same month over
(9)low wages and the rise in rice prices. These were not isolated 
incidents. They were symptomatic of widespread discontent caused by 
poor economic conditions, political instability and by the arrest of 
Japanese ' collaborators!
w
(5)
Straits Times, 22 October 19^3*
Ibid. The Singapore Harbour Board labourers were exposed to 
Communist pressure from 19^5 to mid-19^7. From mid-19^7 the MCP 
derived little support from the Indian dock workers. There was 
a rare interruption in April 19^8 when thirty South Indian dock 
workers were arrested for Communist subversion and exiled to India. 
Mi.U.File 335/^6, Secret Intelligence Summaries for December 19^3 - 
October 19^ +6 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur). See MU File 171/^7, 'Labour 
Situation Report For Singapore 19^7' and 'Singapore Harbour Board 
Labourers and Communist Influences' (N.A. Kuala Lumpur). See also 
Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, p. 2l8.
(6)
(7)
(8)
Straits Times, 27 October 19^5; Stenson, op.cit., p. 218. 
Straits Times, 26 October 19^5*
Ibid. Gamba, op.cit., p. 180.
Straits Times, 26 October 19^3«
(10) BMA File C/1/1/*f, Telegram from BMA (Malay peninsula) to BMA 
(Hqrs.), 29 October 19^3 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
The authorities were soon aware of the Indian role in this unrest
and their involvement with the MCP. For example, in November 19^5
Malayan Union Intelligence reported that the Coastal Indian
Association in Klang, formed mainly of ex-members of the Indian
National Army had come under Chinese left-wing dominance, and was
(11)organizing Indian workers in the area* In Singapore the New Indian
Democratic Youth League was formed, modelled on the Chinese Democratic 
(12)Youth League. Initially it had two hundred members and was led
(13)by K.A. Chandran who was also an MCP cadre. Chandran sympathized
with the radicals in the MCP who by this time were convinced that the
policy of compromise and conciliation with the British was now futile
(1*0and that an armed struggle for independence was inevitable. In
early December 19^5i an Indian Communist Party was formed in
(15)Singapore under Mahadev Singh. But almost immediately the Indian
M.U. File 335/^6, Vol. 1, Intelligence Report No. 3» 29 November 
19^5; Intelligence Report No. 1 December 19^5 (N.A. Kuala 
Lumpur).
M.U. (Confidential) File 335/^6, Vol. I, Intelligence Summary No* 7
13 December 19^ +5* ^he objectives of the New Indian Democratic 
Youth League were outlined as follows a) The spread of anti- 
British propaganda among Indian troops* b) Organization of 
propaganda missions to India, c) Close liaison with the MCP 
(MCP financial assistance was openly solicited), d) Fight for 
Indian Independence, e) Unity among all Indians.
(13) Ibid. K.A. Chandran was an ex-MPAJA member who later joined the 
MCP in October 19^+. He dominated Singapore's left-wing politics 
until December 19^5* He and the Chinese Communist cadre Lim Boon 
Kim were keen to retain former arms supplies for a future armed 
revolution. Two arms dumps on Singapore island were already in 
the control of Indonesian agitators in the Colony. Chandran also 
maintained a close rapport with Indian National Congress 
terrorists in India and Burma.
M.U. (Confidential) File 335/^6, Vol. I, Intelligence Summary No. 7
15 December 19^5 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
M.u. (Confidential) File 335/^6, Vol. I, Intelligence Summary No. 6 
week ending 8 December 19^ +5» P- 12. Report by Brigadier General 
Staff of Intelligence, 603/4, GSI, 10 December 19^5 (N.A. Kuala 
Lumpur).
Mahadev Singh's party appears to have had few connections with 
the New Indiah Democratic Youth League nor with the Indian 
Communist Party of the Indian subcontinent.
Communists on the island suffered a serious setback when Chandran was 
(16)arrested. Under interrogation he revealed Communist plans for
(17)the infiltration of the Singapore Harbour Board work force.
Meanwhile the authorities had received reports that Indian Congress
Agents, who were sympathetic to leftwing terrorist movements, were
„ (18)being smuggled into Singapore via Burma.
The development of the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions
(PMFTU) marked the next phase of growing MCP influence over Indian 
(19)labour. Whilst the MCP supplied the initial impulse for
increased trade union militancy, deteriorating socio-economic
conditions ensured that this militancy soon acquired a momentum of
its own. Therefore, whereas in early 1946 purely economic grievances
were sufficient to stimulate strike action, by late 1946 subversion
was increasingly in evidence in strikes throughout Singapore and
M a l a y a . I n d i a n  labour was attracted to the PMFTU essentially
because it was more efficiently organized, had strong financial
support, and was in a position to force concessions both from the
(21)employers and the Government. The conservative Negri Sembilan
M.U. (Confidential) File 335/46, Vol. I, Intelligence Summary 
No.6, 10 December 1945 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
M.U. (Confidential) File 335/46, Vol. I, Intelligence Summary 
No.5, 4 December 1945 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
See Stenson, op.cit., pp. 147, 199, 200, 203, 203* 206, 208-13, 
214, 228-229; A. Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya,
1948-60, London, 1973, pp. 302, 470 and 499.
UPAM Circular No. 4 in 1946, 2.6 April 1946 (R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur);
M.U. File 60/46, Vol. II, 'Situation Report, Johore', June - 
August 1946, 'Situation Report, Selangor', December 1946 - 
March 1947 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Stenson, op.cit., pp. 182, 188.
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
Indian Labour Union, which later had branches in Perak and Selangor,
resisted the PMFTU and in this it was supported by the Trade Union
(22)Adviser of Malaya. However the Union remained insignificant until
late 19^8, when the Emergency resulted in the collapse of the PMFTU.^3)
Indian domination of the PMFTU was particularly evident between
19^6-^7, when S. Mohan became Vice-Chairman of the Selangor
Federation of Trade Unions and P. Veerasenan Vice-President of the
Singapore Federation of Trade U n i o n s . i n  January 19^7* S.A.
Ganapathy, then aged only twenty-two, was appointed President of the
(25)PMFTU. An analysis of the activities of the principal trade
union agitators in this period reveals the extent to which they 
were influenced by the MCP and therefore the extent to which the 
Communists exploited discontent within the Indian labouring masses.
Ganapathy's importance lay in the fact that he had been 
associated with prewar Indian Communism in Malaya, a movement which
( pC)
was largely independent of the MCP. Apparently he had been
(27)strongly influenced by prewar terrorism xn India. During the
( 22) M.U. File 562/A7, enclosure (5)i Report by Commissioner for 
Labour, Malayan Union, 23 August 19^7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
See also, Stenson, op.cit., p. 100.
(23) For further details on the Negri Sembilan Indian Labour Union, 
see C. Gamba, The National Union of Plantation Workers: The
History of the Plantation Workers of Malaya, 19^-6-1958, 
Singapore, 1962, pp. 25-26.
(P4)
BMA (Public Relations Department) File 3587/^6, Chinese Press 
Summaries, New Democracy, 6 February 19^ +6.
(25) Ganapathy was born in 1925* During the Japanese Occupation 
he was an instructor at the Azad Hind Military School in 
Singapore. He attended the New Delhi Inter Relations Conference 
in I9V7 as a representative of the PMFTU. He joined the Malayan 
Races Liberation Army in mid-19^8. See Short, op.cit., p. 210.
(26) jpor a brief account of pre-war Indian Communism in Malaya, see 
Khoo Kay Kim, 'The Beginnings of Political Extremism in Malaya, 
1915-1935'1 p. 70, Stenson, op.cit., p. 36 and Ampalavanar, 
op.cit., pp. 113-118.
(27) Short, op.cit., p. 210.
Japanese Occupation, Ganapathy had moved from the self-styled
Malayan Indian dommunist Party to the Indian National Army under
Subhas Bose. However while in the Indian National Army, Ganapathy
had resumed his earlier links with the Communists, and shortly before
the end of the Occupation he was arrested by the Japanese for being 
(
a Communist. After the war he joined the PMFTU and consorted
(29)openly with the terrorists. He edited the Munana, a Tamil
paper subsidized by the MCP.^^
His essential attitude in 1945 and 1946 was that the struggle
(31)against the British had economic as well as political objectives.
'The fight for a democratic constitution was also a fight for better
(32)
food and clothing'• When the MCP later subordinated the economic
campaign to the political struggle against the British, Ganapathy was,
(33)for a brief period, disenchanted with the Party. But he was soon
(34)appointed head of the Indian section of the MCP and in June 1948
when the insurrection broke out, he joined the Malayan Races
(35)Liberation Army as the MCP now styled itself. In April 1949
he was arrested on charges of carrying arms and for consorting with
Ibid.
M.U. File 517/47, Commissioner for Labour Malayan Union, Report 
for August 1947 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
M.U. File 676/47, 'Malayan Newspapers Data' (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
M.U. File 60/46, Vol. II, Labour Department Report for 1946, 
p. 2 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Jananayagam, 10 June 1947; Malaya Tribune, 16 October 1947* 
Jananayagam, 12 December 1947.
Ibid., 12 April 1948.
Tamil Nesan, 12 June 1948; Indian Daily Mail, 10 December 1948.       ,,,,,.........
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(3*0
(35)
/ ‘z/TN
the guerrillas. It was also alleged that he had participated
in a meeting in Johore in November 19^ +8 when plans were laid to kill
a Ceylonese clerk, against whom the Tamil labourers had made several 
(37)complaints.
In spite of protests from the Indian community and the inter­
cession of the Indian Government as well as international concern
(
over his arrest, Ganapathy was hanged on ^ May 19^9- Nehru’s
bitter reaction to it was thatthe Malayan Government had acted with 
(39)extreme folly. Alec Newboult, Chief Secretary, Federation of
(ifO)Malaya, complacently believed that 'justice had been done'.
P. Veerasenan, another prominent Indian Communist had been shot dead
(V I)by Gurkhas on 3 May. It is clear therefore that the estates were
open to subversion both from within the Indian community who were
eager to see an improvement in working conditions and from outside
forces principally the MCP. The estate managers were quick to speak
of 'external agitation', referring principally to agitators such as
(lf2)
Ganapathy who were from the trade unions.
(36) UPAM Circular No. *f, April 19^9 (R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(37) Short, op.cit., p. 210.
Indian Daily Mail, 20 March 19^9» 28 March 19^ +91 23 April 19 V?; 
Malaya Tribune, 2 April 19V?, 20 April 19^9»
Indian Daily Mail, 13 May 19V?.
Malaya Tribune, 13 May 19V)•
( k ' l ) Indian Daily Mail, 9 May 19^9- Veerasenan was President of 
the Singapore Harbour Board Labourers Union, later Vice- 
President of the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions and it was 
when he became an executive of the Selangor Federation of Trade 
Unions that he openly consorted with the guerrillas and with the 
outbreak of the revolt in 19^ -8 he fled to the jungle and operated 
in nearby Kuala Selangor district.
(
M.U. File 125i+/VS, Part II, Report of Commissioner for Labour, 
Malayan Union, November 19V>, 'Subversion on Estates' (N.A. Kuala 
Lumpur). For further details on agitators on estates see BMA 
File 250/VS, Secret Monthly Report No. 3i November 19V?, p. l*f 
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur); UPAM Circular No. 5» May 19V) (R.G.A.
Kuala Lumpur).
The PMFTU was adept at exploiting the established influence and
power of local protest movements on the estates. For example, in
Kedah it relied on the Thondar Padai (Youth Corps) led by A.M. Sarny,
(43)a sixty-year-old shopkeeper on Harvard estate in Kulira. Sarny1s
movement was initially influenced by Indian Congress Nationalism and by the
Indian National Army but was increasingly affected by Tamil chauvinism
(44)and by class unity among the labourers. It was heavily involved in
(A-5)
social reform campaigns principally in support of temperance. The
Thondar Padai youths^dressed in khaki shorts and drill caps with red 
bands, were an aggressive group. They enforced order on the estates 
and established informal courts to judge breaches of discipline and 
b e h a v i o u r . T h e  culprits were fined. They also resorted to strikes
(if7)
to intimidate the managers. Though the Thondar Padai began as a
rather anarchical body, resentful of authority, it was soon disciplined
by the PMFTU and began to channel its anti-European feelings in more
effective ways. It eventually emerged as an organization seeking
(*+8)workers' control of estates.
M.U. File 93/47, enclosure 8, Report of Commissioner for Labour, 
Malayan Union, 6 August 1947 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur); M.U. File 
207/47, Vol. II, Telegram No. 232 from Governor, Malayan Union to 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2 March 19^7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur). 
A.M. Samy was; born in India but had lived in Malaya since 1920. 
Although he did not join the Indian National Army, he was strongly 
affected by the movement. He had been also exposed to MCP propaganda 
during the Japanese Occupation. After the war he was Secretary of 
the Kedah Federation of Trade Unions in Sungei Patani. He dis­
appeared from Kedah during the March disturbances and in July he 
returned and established contacts with militant groups in the area.
(44) m ,u . File 207/^7, Vol. II, 'Report on the South Kedah Disturbances'
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
^5) ibid.
M.U. File 207/47, Vol. II, 'Report on the South Kedah Disturbances';
M.U. File 207/47, Vol. I, Telegram from Governor Malayan Union to
Colonial Office, 7 March 1947 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
^7) M.U. File 207/47, Vol. II, 'Report on the South Kedah Disturbances'
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur)•
(^8) m .U. File 207/47, Vol. II, Report of Commissioner for Labour,
Kulim, 20 March 1947 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
In Kedah the Thondar Padai was composed largely of tappers and 
(1*9)
estate school teachers. They were supported by the New Democratic
Mouth League, by the ex-members of the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese
(50)Army and by the MCP. Sarny's followers were also opposed to the
subordinate staff on the estates who were predominantly Ceylon Tamils 
(51)and Malayalees. Initially Sarny had difficulty in attracting the
Telegu workers who formed one third of the labour force on the Kedah 
(52)plantations. The Telegus were dissuaded by his temperance
programme and by deep-rooted ethnic suspicions. The toddy contractors
(53)and the toddy tappers were another group opposed to Sarny. His
relationship with the Labour Department in Kulim was also very
strained, essentially because the Assistant Labour Inspector for the
district, a Ceylon Tamil, was invariably in conflict with the South
(5*0Indian Tamil, Samy* Therefore the Thondar Padai was a lower class
protest movement united by Tamil chauvinism and inculcated with the 
principles of Gandhian social reform of caste and personal discipline. 
It was anti-authoritarian and thus sympathetic to the Communist 
propaganda of anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism. Though the
M.U. File 207A7» Vol. II, enclosure (A), Secret Report by 
Deputy Commissioner for Labour, Kedah, 7 June 19*+7 (N.A. 
Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
M.U. File 207A7, Vol. II, Report of Commissioner for Labour 
Kulim, 20 March 19**7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur). A.M. Samy was 
suspected of the murder in December 19*+1 of a Ceylon Tamil 
conductor, S. Karthigesu.
Ibid.
M.U. File 207A7» Vol. II, Report of Commissioner for Labour, 
Kulim, 20 March X9*+7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
M.U. File 207/*f7, Vol. II, Confidential Report of Deputy 
Commissioner for Labour, Kedah, J.T, Rea* 29 March 19^7 
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
A 9 )
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
(5*0
Thondar Padai was active mainly in Kedah, Malacca, Johore and Selangor, 
it rose to prominence during the Kedah strikes between February and 
April 19^7/ 55 ^
The first of these broke out in Bedong in February 19^7, when
pickets in front of a toddy shop forced the labourers to boycott the 
( 56)shop. Police were called and in the violence that followed one
(57)worker died and nine others were wounded. Twelve labourers were
(
arrested and sentenced to three months' imprisonment. The second
strike occurred at Bukit Sembilan.estate, when police who came looking
(59)for a trespasser, started a riot among the resisting labourers. 
Sixty-six people were arrested and all were later dismissed from the 
estate. The third incident occurred on the Dublin estate on
17 April 19^7 when armed police broke up a labourers' meeting.
A Chinese labour leader was shot dead. The strong action by the
police seems to have been pre-planned. At a meeting in February 19^7
Ibid.
Malayan Union Advisory Council Proceedings, 'Report on the 
Conflict on Dublin Estate, South Kedah, 28 April 19^7? C2 - 12. 
Also published as Report of Commission of Inquiry into Dublin 
Estate Conflict, 2V February 19^ -8, Federal Legislative Council 
Paper.
Ibid. Malaya Tribune, 6 September 19^7- 
Malaya Tribune, 6 September 19^7•
Straits Echo, 15 March 19^7*
Ibid; Democrat, 27 April 19^7; Indian Daily Mail, 20 March 19*+7» 
Democrat, 27 April 19^ +7.
Ibid.
(55)
(56)
(57)
(58)
(59)
(60) 
(61) 
(62)
between the planters and the police, it was agreed that a display
of force would discourage labour unrest. The Police Commissioner
for the area, Mr. W. Gouldsbury, was notorious for his aggressive
(6*0handling of delicate situations. European families in the area
had been evacuated earlier as if in preparation for a violent
. (65)police manoeuvre.
The Deputy Commissioner for Labour, J.T. Rea, was divided in 
his attitude towards the strikes. While admitting the deplorable 
plight of the Indian labourers, he nevertheless confirmed that wages 
in Kedah were far higher than in Selangor. He identified
'subversion* as the main cause of the unrest in Kedah. In his
memorandum of 11 February 19*1-7 to the Resident Commissioner of Kedah, 
he accused Samy and his assistants in the Rubber Workers Union of 
Sungei Patani and Central Kedah of using labour grievances as a 
cloak for political s u b v e r s i o n . H e  quoted one of Sarny's emotional
J Democrat, 27 April 19*+7. See also, The Findings of the Board of 
Inquiry into the Kedah Incidents, Kuala Lumpur, August 19^7.
This was an unofficial enquiry conducted by the MIC with 
representatives from the MNP, MDU, PMFTU, MCP and All Malaya 
Council of Rubber Workers Union.
(6*+) The Findings of the Board of Inquiry into the Kedah Incidents,
pp. 12-13.
Indian Daily Mail, 10 September 19*1-7 •
(66) File 207/^7, Vol. II, enclosure (A), ’Report on Dublin
Estate Riot* by Deputy Commissioner for Labour, Kedah, 7 June 
19*4-7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
M.U. File 207/^7, Vol. I, Memorandum from Deputy Commissioner 
for Labour, Kedah, to Resident Commissioner, Kedah, 11 February 
19*1-7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(
Ibid. 'When I came to Kedah, the Chinese were in the forefront 
of the General Labour Union, but gradually in 'Indian areas' they 
have gone into the background. But it is believed they are still 
directing these Indians whom they regard as puppets' - J.T. Rea, 
Deputy Commissioner for Labour, Kedah. See also, M.U. File 
207/*t-7, Telegram from Governor, Malayan Union to Colonial Office, 
16 March 19*1-7, 'Labour situation in Kedah' (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
outbursts, ’drive out the white man, sack the Asiatic staff, let'us
tap the rubber tree for our own profit; if we are united the
Government cannot stop us .
The use of the police and military to break up the strikes
aroused extreme anger in the Indian community. S.K. Chettur, the
Indian Agent, lamented that ’labour leaders see in the severe police
action an attempt to crush the legitimate aspirations of the Indian
labourer to better his living conditions The Tamil Murasu while
admitting the presence of political subversion, reasserted that bad
(71)living conditions were responsible for the strikes. The Tamil
Nesan of 10 March 19*1-7 condemned the arrogance of the employers.
The Indian Daily Mail called for a Committee of Inquiry into the Kedah 
(72)strikes. It protested at the Registration of Societies Ordinance
which was being rushed through the Federal Council and which, it
(73)argued, would be used to crush all forms of political expression. 
Despite long standing suspicions between the MIC and the Thondar Padai 
(essentially because of class and ethnic differences between the two
bodies), the MIC took full advantage of the strikes to support the
(7i+) R
Tamil workers. It set up its own -“oard of Inquiry to investigate
M.U. File 207/^7^ Vol. I, Memorandum from Deputy Commissioner 
for Labour Kedah, to Resident Commissioner, Kedah, 11 February 
19^7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
UPAM circular No.^ f, 20 March 19*1-7, ’Chettur’s Report on Kedah 
Strikes to Government of India’ (R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Tamil Murasu, 9 March 19*+7.
Indian Daily Mail, 11 March 19**7.
Ibid.
M.U. File 207A7, Vol. I, enclosure (A), 11 July 19*1-7 (N.A. 
Kuala Lumpur)•
(69)
(70)
(71)
(72)
(73) 
(7*0
(75)the strikes* Its conclusion was that the planters and the police
(76)had collaborated in forcefully crushing the strikes*
The planters agitated for a tighter control of labour. The
United Kedah Planters Association declared that 'the history of
labour trouble in Kedah is one of potential agitation by subversive
(77)elements coupled with intimidation and extortion'. Governor
Edward Gent, genuinely afraid of the unrest spreading, accepted the
planters' case and cabled the Secretary of State that while there
were legitimate grievances, such as the high cost of living and rice
scarcity, the labourers were being manipulated by 'outside political
agitators' .(78) He banned the use of uniforms on the estates, a
(79)measure directed against the Thondar Padai. Indeed Sarny's
organization was outlawed in March 19^8.^^ Gent also criticised 
the absence of wage uniformity within the planting industry for 
wage disparities between the states had made it more difficult to 
control labour. (®^
<«>.-Ibid.
(7^) The Findings of the Board of Inquiry into, the Kedah Incidents, Kuala 
Lumpur, August 19^ +7, pp* 12-13* While the official enquiry blamed 
the Treasurer of the Timber Labourers Union, Lim Ah Soo for extreme 
provocation and agitation in the strikes, the MIG report blamed the 
'degree of cooperation that amounts to collusion between the vested 
interests on the one hand and the Government executive, the police 
on the other for the purpose of suppressing ... labour ....'
Ibid., p.2.
(77) Malaya Tribune, 10 June 19^ +7; Short, op.cit., p. 76.
(7^ ) M.U. File 207/^7, Telegram from Governor, Malayan Union to Colonial
Office, 16 March 19^7. See also, M.U. File 20?/^?, vol.Ill, enclosure 
62(A), 'Summary of reports by the Governor of the Malayan Union 
regarding recent disturbances on estates in South Kedah' (N.A. Kuala 
Lumpur). Here Gent was also submitting to pressure from the 
Commissioner of Police, Kedah, A.S.Haines that the unrest was 
caused by 'political agitation by illiberal organizations'.
Democrat, 27 April 19^7*
(79) m,u. File 207/^7, Vol. I, Telegram from Governor, Malayan Union to 
Colonial Office, 7 March I9V7.
(80) p.S. File 9356/^8, enclosure, 'Registrar of Societies Annual Report 
19^7' (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(81) m.u. File 207A7, Vol.Ill, enclosure 62(A), 'Summary of reports by 
the Governor of the Malayan Union regarding recent disturbances on 
estates in South Kedah' (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
The Kedah strikes marked a turning point in the history of
industrial relations in Malaya. The Government alarmed by the turn
of events in 19^7» embarked on a programme of strict control of 
(82)trade unions. By June 19^7 two hundred and seventy trade unions
(
had been registered. There was constant police and managerial
harassment of trade union leaders and the arrest of militant trade 
u n i o n i s t s . I n  January 19^8 I. Manivelu, the Secretary of the 
Kedah Federation of Rubber Workers' Unions, was convicted on
/ Q j“ \
intimidation charges. The Penang Harbour Board labourers'
fiery leader, S. Appadurai was arrested on a similar charge in 
February 19^8.
Meanwhile tension was increased between the Chinese and Indians
in the PMFTU essentially because, apart from traditional racial
mistrust, the Chinese placed more importance on political goals,
while the Indians, because of increasing police . pressure^sought
(87)to keep the unions free of political influences. The attempts
of J.A. Brazier, the Trade Union Adviser, to form splinter trade
unions among the Indians, in opposition to the MCP unions, added 
(
to this tension. In Perak, Brazier's success was checked by
Labour Department File, E/1/3 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
/ Q-y \
Register of Trade Unions 19^7, cited in Stenson, op.cit., p.l6*f. 
Jananayagam, 12 December I9V7.
Straits Times, 25 February 19^8; Stenson, op.cit., p. 190* 
Tamil Nesan, 26 February 19^8.
( 87)
M.U. (Labour Department) File 93/^7, enclosure (1), Memorandum 
from Deputy Commissioner for Labour, Kedah to Commissioner for 
Labour, Malayan Union, 6 October 19^ -7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Stenson, op.cit., pp. 1^3-1^*
(89)the popularity of R.G. Balan's Rubber Workers Union. Balan, then
aged twenty-seven, was a successful Communist union organizer strongly
opposed to Brazier. ^ 0) Balan was active in lower Perak from late
was
19^7. His Rubber Workers Union^concentrated on the Socfin-owned
estates of Lima Bias, Klapa Bali, Slim River and Bagan Datoh where it
„ , (91)
competed with Brazier's protege, the Perak Estate Employees' Union.
Lower Perak had been a strong MPAJA area during the Occupation and
immediately after the war, the New Democratic Youth League emerged
as the dominant organizing force on these Socfin estates.^
(93)During 1948 there were eighty-five strikes in Lower Perak alone. 
Balan emerged as the chief instigator of the major disputes. Strikes 
involving 12,000 labourers broke out on the Klapa Bali and Lima Bias 
estates in early 1948.^^ These estates were particularly vulnerable
Ibid., p. 192. R.G. Balan.born in Teluk Anson, was a clerk on an 
estate there and later became a schoolteacher. He was in the MPAJA 
during the war and after the war became an MCP activist in the
labour unions. He was appointed President of the Perak Rubber
Workers Union in 1947 and soon after was also elected to the MCP 
Central Committee. In 1947 he went to Britain as a representative 
of the MCP to the British Empire Communist Party Conference.
He was actively involved in the strikes in 1948 and was arrested
while planning to leave for the jungle. In 1955 while in detention 
he was elected Vice-President of the MCP by the Central Committee. 
He was released by the Federation Government in 1961 after 15 years 
of imprisonment. He then joined the Government service as Tamil 
Reader in the Publications Section of the Ministry of Interior.
He is also a member of the Gerakan Raayat Malaysia. (Compiled
from Straits Times, 14 April I960, 28 June i960, 24 September
i960; Tamil Nesan, 1 April 1961; and from interviews with
R.G. Balan, 22.1.75-, 24.1.75,. Klang, Malaysia.
(90) UPAM Circular No.4, April 1948; Stenson, op.cit., p. 192.
^91) M.U. (Labour Department) File 517/47, enclosure (17), 'M.U.
Labour Department Monthly Report for December 1947’; and 
enclosure (20), 'M.U. Labour Department Monthly Report for April 
1948', p. 8. See also Short, op.cit., p. 92.
(92) Short, op.cit., p. 66.
(95) UPAM Circular No.5, May 1948. Short, op.cit., p. 92.
(94) UPAM Circular No.5, May 1948 (R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
to agitation because of harsh, unyielding management. Communist
subversion reached its height after April 19^8 when the estate unions
(95)were so disorganized that they could be easily infiltrated. In
the same year three estate managers were killed in the Sungei Siput
area of Perak By MCP-led trade u n i o n i s t s . B a l a n  was arrested
in May 19^ +8 and placed under a Restricted Residence Order.^7) ip^ g
following month the premises of the Rubber Workers Union were raided
and documents seized. ^ 8) The President and Secretary of the Union
(99)were banished to India. This wave of arredts forced Communist-
orientated trade union leaders to flee to the jungle and ultimately 
this led to the collapse of the PMFTU. With the disintegration of 
organized labour, the estate managers attempted to revive the 
panchayats in Lower Perak but this was unsuccessful* it is
clear that Balan's Rubber Workers Union was more successful in 19^8
Ibid.
(96) -gpAM Circular No.6, 21 June 19^8, p. 2. Tamil Nesan,
17 June 19^8; Stenson, op.cit., p. 223*
9^?) Malaya Tribune, 3 June 19^ +8.
Short, op.cit., p. 92.
Indian Daily Mail, 17 June 19^8.
(*100) j/j.U. (Labour Department) File 517/V?, enclosure (l8),
'Labour Department Monthly Report for January 19^ +8;
Malaya Tribune, 20 August 19^9* Panchayat means Council of 
Five and existed in South Indian villages as a Caste 
Council responsible for maintaining order and settling caste 
disputes. On the Malayan plantations, the panchayat 
originated as a temple committee, assigned with the arrange­
ment of religious festivals but later in the 1930s its powers 
were extended to include labour-employer relations. The 
estate management sought to retain this conservative 
'arbitration council' in the face of rising industrial 
militancy in the 19^0s.
than in 1947, because in 1948 estate conditions were more anarchical,
and unrest was aggravated by low wages and by the Government’s
(101)repressive measures to control labour and its unions.
Communist control of Indian labour in Johore and Selangor was
more haphazard. There were extensive guerrilla activities in north
Johore where the Chinese dominated trade unions often attempted to
(102)coerce Indian labour into taking strike action. In March 1947
strikes broke out on Paloh estate in Kluang.^^^ Here the planters
had evidence that Indian labour had been mobilized by a pro-
(104)
Vietnamese Communist League. Labour disturbances were also
( "lORl
frequent on Sagil estate near Muar. Here in May 1948, the
European management alarmed by increasing disorder, arrested four
Indians who were banished the following D e c e m b e r . i n 1949, a
revival of the Thondar Padai movement in Johore ensured a further
(107)brief period of Indian labour militancy. In Selangor two Indian
agitators, S. Henganathan, editor of the Communist sponsored
M.U. (Labour Department) File, 83/47, enclosure (25), Report by 
Assistant Commissioner for Labour, Perak, 3 November 1947;
F.S. File 9356/48, enclosure (26), Report by Assistant
Commissioner for Labour Perak, 3 August 1948 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
002) m .U. (Confidential) 60/46, Vol. II, 'Situation Report, Johore, 
June 1946', 'Situation Report, Johore, August 1946'; M.U.
(Labour Department) File 139/47, Report by Commissioner for 
Labour, Malayan Union, 2 April 1947 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(103) m .U. (Confidential) 63/46, Vol. I, 'Situation Report Johore,
17 March 1947’ (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(10*0 m .U. (Confidential) 63/46, Vol. I, 'Situation Report Johore,
13 February 19^7' (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
^^5) Ibid. M.U. (Labour Department) File 139/47, Circular from 
Commissioner for Labour, Malayan Union, 12 March 1947 (N.A.
Kuala Lumpur).
(106) F.S. File 11328/48, enclosure 126/48, letter from Chief Police 
Officer, Johore to Commissioner of Police, Federation of Malaya,
5 December 1948 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(107  ^ Tamil Nesan, 20 June 1949.
Jananayagam, and K. Kurup, Vice-Chairman of the Batu Arang Collieries
(108)Labour Union, were active between March 19^ +6 and December 19*1-8.
There were strikes on almost every estate in Selangor in this period.
Local issues were rarely involved; the main impetus for the unrest
appears to have been a general dissatisfaction with working conditions
accompanied by subversion and intimidation.
The unrest in Kedah, Perak, Selangor and Johore exhibited a number
of common features. First, the MCP used Indian labour and subversive
Indian groups inherited from the time of the Indian National Army, to
challenge European authority on the plantations, the wharves and the 
(110)railways. Second, the labour movements were led by the labourers
themselves and not by members of the Indian elite. Third, the Indian
(111)labour movements were more tightly organized in 19^7 than in 19*1-8.
In the latter year labour militancy became more sporadic and unco­
ordinated, partly because of the repressive legislation and measures
M.U. (Labour Department) File 125V^6, Part I, enclosure, 'Labour 
Report for July 19*1-6'; M.U. File 60/46, Vol. II, 'Situation 
Report for Selangor, 3-11 July 19*1-6'; M.U. File 60/*f-6, Vol. II, 
'Situation Report by Resident Commissioner, Selangor, 2 - 8  
August 19*1-6'; M.U. (Confidential) File 66/H/*f6, 'Report by 
Mr. Ross, Dephty Commissioner for Labour, Selangor, 30 November 
19*+6'. M.U. (Labour Department) File 158/*f7, letter from 
Assistant Commissioner for Labour, Klang to Deputy Commissioner 
for Labour, Selangor, 25 February 19*1-7• M.U. (Labour Department) 
File 158/^7, letter from D. Morgan, Assistant Commissioner for 
Labour, Klang, to Mr. Ross, Deputy Commissioner for Labour, 
Selangor, 12 July 19*+7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur). UPAM Circulars, 
September 19*1-8, December 19*1-8 (R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
M.U. (Public Relations Department) File 235/^6, enclosure (1A), 
'Report by Commissioner for Labour, Malayan Union, 11 June 19^6' 
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
UPAM Circular, July 19*+8 (R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(108)
(109)
(110)
(1 1 1)
introduced by the Government and employers early in the year, and
partly because there was increasing confusion in the ranks of the PUFTU
(112)over the real objectives of the MCP* With the declaration of the
(11^)Emergency in June 19*18 Communist-dominated trade unions collapsed.
Either they were banned, or the arrest of their leaders caused them to
disintegrate. The Selangor Estate Workers Union and the Penang
Harbour Labour Union were two of the more prominent organizations
(11*f)which collapsed in this way with the detaining of their leaders.
With the removal of extremist unions, the way was open for conservative
organizations (the Negri Sembilan Indian Labour Union being a prime
example) to come to the fore.
In late 19**8, the PMFTU itself was banned.^^) yn(jer
Emergency, powers of detention and deportation of agitators were
increased. The Trade Union Amendment Act passed in April 19*1-8, was
condemned by the PMFTU for sponsoring 'the formation of a set of
subservient trade union organizations under the patronage of the
(1 *l 6}employers and the state'. In June 19**8 the MCP embarked upon
open insurrection, dictated both by developments within the party
and by conditions in the country. The events of the years 19*t-5-*+8 had
revealed to the MCP the futility of its policy of appeasement with the
British. The British Government was recognizing, tacitly helping and
(117)promoting an alternative political force in the UMNO. The British
were ignoring the credentials of the MCP, most noticeably in the
C *1 "18}consultations over the Federation Agreement in late 19**7-
('HZ) Indian Daily Mail, 7 May 19*^8.
(113) Stenson, op.cit., p. 227*
Ibid., p. 235- 
(115) Ibid., p. 23**.
Sunday Tribune, 30 May 19*+8.
(117) M.R. Stenson, Repression And Revolt: The Origins of the 19*+8 
Communist Insurrection in Malaya and Singapore, Ohio, 1969* p.5*
(118) See Chapter IV, pp. n't —
Similarly the British deliberately ignored the MCP influence in labour
relations. The registration of trade unions in 19^8 dealt the final
(119)blow to MCP influence in this area. Lai Teck, leader of the
moderate faction within the MCP, was continually challenged by the
(120)revolutionary faction throughout 19^6 and 19^7- In March 19^7 be
disappeared with all the party's funds and this led to the disinte-
(121)gration of the moderate section of the Party. Hence by March 19^ +8
at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the MCP, the
revolutionary wing was in power and a formal decision to revolt was
, . (122) taken.
The new militancy was first exhibited on the Singapore docks in 
(”12^ )
April 19^8. A strike was called in support of a series of demands
(12^ f)that had been made in the previous February. But the central
objective of -the strike certainly went beyond an improvement in wages
and conditions. Posters appeared in the name of the Singapore Harbour
Board Labour Union calling on the labourers to 'settle their bloody
accounts with the British Imperialists', 'to rely on [their] forces
to solve all difficulties', and 'to launch a gigantic blood-bath
against the Imperialists, should the employers continue to belittle 
r (125)I.the labourers] forces'. In response the police raided the
( 1 'I ^ Stenson, Repression And Revolt, pp. 6-8, 11-1^.
(120) Short, op.cit., pp. **0-^ 1; R. Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution 
in Singapore and Malaya, 19^5-1963» London, 1973* p* 5k*
Short, op.cit., pp. 41-^2.
(122) Translation of Min Sheng Pau, 29 March 19^8, in Federation of 
Malaya, Commissioner for Labour, File E/3/3 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur). 
The MCP had recognised by March 19^8 that there was no alternative 
to open insurrection and the instructions from the Calcutta 
Conference 'may only have added the extra tinder which caused ... 
[.the revolutionary spark] to burst into flame* - Ruth McVey, The 
Calcutta Conference and the South East Asia Uprisings, Interim 
Reports Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, 1958, p. 2k,
(123) Malaya Tribune, 22 April 19^8.
Malaya Tribune, 17 April 19^8; Jananayagam, 16 April 19^8.
(125) Commissioner for Labour, File M/3/1* Deputy Governor's despatch,
'Ik April 19^8, cited in Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya,
p. 218.
premises of both this Union and the Singapore Federation of Trade
( '  (127)
Unions* Nine labourers were charged and convicted for sedition*
These arrests did not break the strike and by 21 April 19 -^8, a total of
(128)11,000 men were idle. The Singapore Federation of Trade Unions
(129)organized a one day general strike throughout the colony. Fifty-
0 3 0 )two thousand workers were reported to have stopped work that day.
(131)But with mounting police oppression, the strikers returned on 27 April.
The MCP's intention had been to create industrial chaos, but it had failed
because of strong official measures.
The early phase of the MCP revolt concentrated on disrupting the
estates and it was here that the Indian workers were most involved.
The MCP hoped to establish self-sufficient bases in the estate areas.
By late 19^8 a significant number of estates were reported to be under
(132)varying degrees of Communist control. A few European estates were
temporarily lost when the managers either left or discreetly permitted
the Communists to infiltrate the remoter parts of the plantations,
(133)whilst they confined themselves to the safety of their quarters.
Asian owners of estates had a more difficult time, having little 
access to police protection. Many Asian managers either paid protection
Straits Times, 21 April 19^8.
Ibid. Indian Daily Mail, 22 November 19^8. A total of thirty 
South Indian dockworkers involved in this strike were exiled 
to India in November 19^ +8.
Straits Times, 21 April 19^8.
Ibid., 2^ April 19^8.
Ibid.
Indian Daily Mail, 28 April 19^8.
Short, op.cit., p. 106.
Ibid.
(126)
(127)
(128)
(129)
(130)
(131)
(132)
(133)
(13*0money to the terrorists or abandoned control to the MCP. The
Indian labourers were subverted quite rapidly in those areas where
(135)managerial authority was weakened. Discontent on the estates over
the new MPIEA wage rates, that were to be enforced from 1 April 19^8
(136)helped further infiltration of the estates by the MCP. Areas of
former MPAJA control such as Slim River Perak, south Malacca and north 
Johore where arms were already stored and where supply lines were 
guaranteed, proved to be areas of intense intimidation and widespread 
strikes/1^
In the midst of this lawlessness, the British officials on the 
Legislative Council and the Asian members could not agree about either 
the fundamental causes of the unrest or the appropriate remedial
/ yj 7O \
action. V.M.N. Menon, a trade union representative on the
Legislative Council, called for a Commission of Inquiry into the
unrest. At the same time he defended the Indian workers, arguing
that they had been made scapegoats and that 'the whole brunt of the
Government onslaught in curbing lawlessness in industrial front falls
unfortunately on the back of these men who are really misguided and
(139)misled, in many ways ....' Gent rejected this view, pointing out
Malaya Tribune, 8 February 19^9• See also Short, op.cit., p. 222.
(135) upam Circular, July 19^9 (R.G. A. Kuala Lumpur); Short, op.cit., 
p. 211. Indians in the Sungei Siput area of Lower Perak were 
readily subverted by MCP activities causing considerable dis­
ruption to estates, and by early August 19^ +8 only one estate 
smokehouse was left standing. Short, op.cit., p. 111.
Labour Department monthly report for April 19^ -8, p.2 (N.A.
Kuala Lumpur).
(137) UPAM Circulars September 19^8, November 19^8, May 19^9 (R.G.A. 
Kuala Lumpur).
(138) op.cit., p. 68.
(139) Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Federation of 
Malaya (First Session) February 19^8 - February 19^91 B.2^4.
that; 'British. Indians have increasingly become prominent qs leaders
('1/+0)
m  recent months m  disturbances accompanied by threats of violence'.
He hence requested the enforcement of 'banishment of British subjects
from the Malay states . •• at the very least for an emergency period 
(1/+1)
of say two years'. He argued that no amendment to the law was
(1 -^2)involved and that in practice only Indians were likely to be affected.
The Colonial Office was opposed to the use of the Banishment 
(1^3)Ordinance. Therefore detention without trial became the common
practice in coping with the revolt. By August 19^8, 150 Indians were
under detention and this caused considerable distress to both the
(1 VlOlocal Indian community and the Government of India. In
September 19^8 Ramani attacked the Detention Regulations both on
the grounds on which a man could be detained and his limited right 
(1^ +5)
of appeal. He saw in the Regulations a reflection of the 'new
f'XUC)
despotism of the Executive and the newer despotism of the Police'.
( 1 W7)The majority of the Indian detainees had held office in the PMFTU.
Short, op.cit., p. 72.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 76. The Banishment Enactment, No.10 of 1910 vested 
the Governor with powers to banish non-British subjects 
and foreign-born British subjects. Banishment for
criminal but not for political offences was revived in the 
Malayan Union(and permission was given to Singapore to banish 
for political offences but this was not used until May 19^8). 
Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, p. 158.
Tamil Nesan, 26 September 19^8.
Malaya Tribune, 4 September 19^8.
Ibid.
Indian Daily Mail, 10 December 19^ +8.
(1 0^)
(1V 1)
(1 2^)
(1*K3)
O W
(1^5)
(1 6^)
(1^7)
The Indian Government, increasingly alarmed by the detention of Indian
(148)'militants' initially requested their repatriation to India*
Then in February 19491 Nehru announced to the Indian Parliament, the
establishment of an enquiry into the case of the detainees.
The Indian Government was also disturbed about the arrest of
wealthy Chettiars who were alleged to have paid 'protection money'
(“1 RO 1
to the guerrillas. The Secretary for Internal Security in Malaya,
D.G. Watherston reported in September 1948 that some of the Asian
estates and mines, particularly in north and central Johore, were
(151)paying protection money to the guerrillas. There was strong
( "1 RP^
evidence against Chettiar-owned enterprises. Faced with this
problem, Gurney had originally intended to take over the Chettiars'
(153)estates and install European management. However this was
(154)impossible because of the large number of estates involved. In
February 1949 fourteen Chettiars were arrested in north Johore on
(155)charges of paying extortion money to the insurgents. A further
twelve were arrested in Malacca and Muar.^'^ In August the same year
Ibid., 10 January 1949.
Ibid., 17 February 1949•
Malaya Tribune, 8 February 1949- 
Short, op.cit., p. 222.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
UPAM Circular, February 19^ +95 Indian Daily Mail, 12 February
1949.
Malaya Tribune, 8 February 1949*
(148)
(149)
(150)
(151)
(152)
(153)
(154)
(155)
(156)
the problem came to a hstad when an Indian Councillor from Malacca was
(1 571
arrested on similar charges. Thivy attempted to intervene but was
/ /| £“ Q \
condemned by the Malayan public. This wave of arrests created a
panic among the Chettiar firms in Malaya and many sold their business
(159)
and repatriated their funds to India.
The uneasiness within the Indian community over the arrests, was
soon replaced by a mood of shock and disbelief when 8. Ganapathy,
the ex-PMFTU President was hanged on 4 May 1949 for carrying arms and
( ^
for consorting with the guerrillas. The Indian Government having
failed to save Ganapathy was now more determined to save V. Sambasivam
(161)
also facing a death sentence for illegal arms possession. In
July 1949 the Indian Government financed Sambasivam1s appeal to the
(16?)
Privy Council in London. In April 1950 the Privy Council
acquitted him but six days later he was rearrested under the
(163)Emergency Regulations. The Indian Government pressed for his
(164)repatriation to India and finally on 2 June, he was deported.
UPAM Circular, August 1949.
^  xbid.
^^9) Tamil Nesan, 22 January 1950.
^n<^ tan Daily Mail, 13 May 1949*
Malaya Tribune, 11 May 1949; Indian Daily Mail, 24 May 1949* 
Malaya Tribune, 28 July 1949.
Indian Daily Mail, 1 April 1950.
Tamil Nesan, 4 June 1950. It is reported that shortly before 
being deported, Sambasivam reaffirmed to the Malayan Special 
Branch his anxiety over housing,sanitation and the generally 
deplorable conditions of Indian estate workers in South and 
Central Malaya. See Short, op.cit., p. 211, footnote 3*
Indian-led dacoity was rampant in Johore and south Kedah in this
period for many local Indian youths had been members of the Malayan
Peoples Anti-Japanese Army during the Occupation.^ In July 1949
two Indian terrorists, V. Muthu, the ex-President of the Batu Pahat
Rubber Workers Union and his comrade, the ex-President of the Johore
(166)Federation of Trade Unions, were killed by security forces.
From mid-1949 to early 19501 the Indian section of the MCP was
dominated by the former President of the Kedah Rubber Workers Union
who had been employed in the Penang Municipality since the Japanese
O c c u p a t i o n . H e  was a skilled cartoonist and the MCP-produced
(168)Tamil pamphlets which circulated in Kedah were largely his work.
In May 1950, with reports of a resurgence in Communist activity among
the Indian tappers in south Kedah, the security forces mounted a
counter-offensive.^^9) They shot one Indian insurgent and arrested
eight others; all nine had been employed as tappers before they had
(170)fled to the jungle. In late 1951 work on the estates at Bahau
(171)in Negri Sembilan was continuously disrupted by strikes. In
January the following year British Intelligence reported increasing
(172)Communist infiltration among Tamil labourers in the area.
UPAM Circulars, May 1949* July 1949 (R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur). 
UPAM Circular, July 1949 (R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
UPAM Circular, April 1950 (R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
UPAM Circular, May 1950 (R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
Federal Legislative Gouncil proceedings, 22 November 19511 
p. 441. See also UPAM Circulars, January 1951* P« 1 and 
27 February 1951 (R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
UPAM Circular, January 1952, p. 21 (R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(165)
(166)
(167)
(168)
(169)
(170)
(171)
(172)
93.
By mid-1951 there was evidence that the MCP was engaged in a co­
ordinated campaign to recruit Indian labourers to the Party. A document 
entitled, The rules of the union of workers supporting the liberation 
struggle was issued by the Indian section of the Central Committee of 
the MCP in April 1951* The document outlined plans for the
recruitment of Indian labour, first to the divisional committees and
(17^)then to the Central Committee of the MCP. The labourers were to
75) member
be attracted by anti-British slogans. Each trade unionjwas to be
compelled to pay fifty-cents for the supply of food and uniforms to 
C 176)
the guerrillas. The MCP's recruiting campaign indicated that the
Party was aware that while a few hard-core Indian Communists
continued to support it, support Trom the mass of Indian labour
was declining in the aftermath of the hanging of Ganapathy and the
(177)
shooting of Veerasenan in May 19^9* By late 19^9 it was
evident to the MCP that Indian labour felt 'insufficient enmity with
/ >1 nQ \
British Imperialists*• Declining militancy was also a result
(179)of a rise in wages in the same year.
(173)
(17*0
(175)
(176)
(177)
(178)
(179)
UPAM Circular No.*f, April 1951» Addendum A, p. 36, copy to 
UPAM from Commissioner for Labour, Federation of Malaya 
(E.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. This document is in accord with MCP's change of policy 
in 1950 where though hard-core Communist cadres formed the 
fulcrum of the party, expansion was considered essential at 
lower levels to include peasants and workers, so that this 
civilian support or Min Yuen would add a dimension of mass 
loyalty to the movement. See Short, op.cit., p. 111-112.
Short, op.cit., p. 210.
Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, p. 218.
Ibid., p. 228.
The Indian Communists suffered further setbacks in 1951 when two
Indian terrorists were hanged and approximately nine hundred others 
(1
arrested. Then in late 1956, the most notorious Indian bandit,
M  Si 1
V. Ramasamy was killed by the security forces. He was aged
thirty-six. He had been Vice-Chairman of the PMFTU in 1948 and then 
leader of the MCP's Indian section. He had worked among the Batu 
Arang coal miners; indeed, in 1949, all terrorist attacks in that
(182)area had been his responsibility. Also in late 1958, V. Perumal,
/ /j Q'yN
then aged thirty-one, was murdered by assassins hired by the MCP.
He had worked on an estate in Sungei Siput before fleeing to the 
jungle in 19^8. He was a district committee member of the MCP and 
commanded an Indian platoon operating in Perak. In August 1958, the 
Government offered a reward for his capture. The MCP fearing that
(184)under interrogation he could betray the Party, had him murdered.
By the mid-1950s it was reported that Indian terrorists could be 
found only in Batu Arang, rural areas of Selangor and in parts of 
Lower Perak.
Indian Daily Mail, 24 May 1951.
(181 )
Straits Times, 25 September 1958.
(182) In 19^9 Ramasamy had made an unsuccessful assassination 
attempt on the European manager of the Malayan Collieries. 
Tamil Nesan, 21 December 1949*
Tamil Nesan, 2 December 1956.
(184) Ibid. This practice of eliminating guerrillas suspected of 
falling into enemy hands was quite common particularly after 
the defection of Lam Swee in June 3-950. See Short, op.cit., 
pp. 510-5H.
/ *1 O cj \
The estimates for Indian terrorists in these areas wer# >- 
Batu Arang = 7, Selangor = 108, Perak = 90-100. Indian Daily 
Mail, 22 September 1955, 25 November 1955*
In conclusion, the role of Indian Communists in the MCP revolt was
limited. Their most important contribution was to mobilize Indian
labour on the estates. In this capacity they succeeded in supplying
the guerrillas with food and information as well as bringing work on
the estates to a standstill through strike action. But this was the
limit of their contribution to the MCP revolt. The impression remains
that even when Indian involvement in the MCP was most pronounced, the
Indians remained subordinate to the Chinese in the Party. Following
the arrival of Gerald Templer in February 1952 there was increased
surveillance of labour, wage increases, the introduction of elections
(186)and increased representation in Government councils. Inevitably
in these circumstances the grip of the Chinese-dominated MCP on the 
Indian labourer, weakened.
(ii)
What was the response and attitude of the British authorities and 
the employers to the turmoil and MCP subversion on the estates?
Briefly, the period 1945-48 was marked by indecision, 1948-51 by 
repression, and 1952-57 saw the search for non-Coramunist alternatives. 
On the outbreak of the revolt, the Government and the employers
(187)disagreed in their analysis of the situation. In 1947 over 500
(186) shop-fc, op.cit., pp. 338-3*+*+; Clutterbuck, op.cit., p. 186. 
Templer's tenure of office from 1952-195*+ saw two-thirds 
of the guerrillas wiped out, while the incident rate dropped 
from 500 to less than 100 a month and civilian and Security 
Force casualties declined from 200 to 40 - Clutterbuck,
op.cit., p. 186.
( 1 87 } Straits Times, 17 June 1948 (editorial 'Govern or get out'),
18 June 1948"; Malaya Tribune, 18 June 1948.
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strikes had caused considerable disruption on the estates and in the
mines. a total of 696,036 man days were lost during the year.
In the first half of 1948, 370,464 man days were lost.^'^ Employers
called for tough action to combat this lawlessness but the higher echelons
of the administration and particularly the High Commissioner urged 
(191)caution. S.B. Palmer, the Chairman of the United Planters
Association of Malaya blamed the unrest solely on agitators and
pressed for the registration of trade unions, the strengthening of
(192)the police force and the banishment of all 'subversive elements'.
Even after the violence of the Kedah strikes in 19*+7, Palmer and
the planters resisted pressure from the estate unions for a one
hundred percent wage increase and an end to wage disparities between
(193)Chinese and Indian labour.
A.W. Wallich, director of a major agency house and Chairman of
the Federated Malay States Chamber of Commerce, supported Palmer's
(194)demands for firmer control of labour through legislation. He
denied that the unrest was 'the manifestation of a discontented and
oppressed labour' but 'behind in the shadows skulk the professional
(195)sedition mongers On the other hand, the Government was
(188) Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs: how Malaya defeated 
the Communist guerrillas, 1948-1960, London, 1971, p. 21. "
(189) Federation of Malaya, Department of Information, 'Communist 
Terrorism in Malaya: The Emergency June 1948 - June 1952,
Kuala" Lumpur, 1952, P* 18.
(19°) Ibid#
^91) Straits Times, 18 June 19*+8.
Indian Daily Mail, 10 June 1948.
(192 ) Malayan Monitor (London) Vol. 1, No. 9, September 1948, and No. 14 
December 1948. UPAM Circular, July 19*48. See also Short, op.cit.,
P. 73-
(193) Commissioner for Labour, Malayan Union, File 517/47, enclosure, 
'Labour Department Monthly Report June 1947', pp. 4-5 (N.A.
Kuala Lumpur)•
Federal Legislative Council Proceedings, (First Session) February 
1948 - February 1949, B.245. See' also "Short, op.cit., p. 68.
(195) short, op.cit., p. 69.
anxious that these wage demands be met in order to prevent the uprest
from spreading. It was clear that Gent was not fully sympathetic to
the planters and commercial interests.^ ^ 6) Commissioner of Police,
H.B. Langworthy also remained sceptical of the estimates provided by
the Special Branch, of increasing Communist strength in l^?-^, and it
is possible that his opinions influenced the High Commissioner and 
(197)his officials.
By May 19^ +8 the planters were crippled by increasing violence on
their estates. On 8 June they met and urged Gent to declare a state of
Emergency in order to prevent the unrest plunging the country into 
( 1Q P1
chaos. The Government responded merely by asking the employers
'to keep a sense of proportion so as not to create an impression that
(199)the position was actually worse than it was1. It was only the
killing of three planters in Perak on 16 June 19^8 that convinced Gent
of the seriousness of the situation facing the c o u n t r y . T h e
Emergency was declared on l8 June 19^8. Following this act, differences
of opinion between the Government and the employers over the unrest,
faded. But dissatisfaction with Gent continued, not least from within
(201)his own circle. Between 22 - 29 June, Malcolm Macdonald
(198) ? pp. 70, 72; Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, p.227-
(197) Barber, op.cit., p. 20; Short, op.cit., pp. 120-121; Federation 
of Malaya, Department of Information, 'Communist Terrorism in 
Malaya: The Emergency June 19^ -8 - June 1992, p. l8I For a fuller 
account of John Dailey, M.S.S. Chief and his forecasts of MCP 
intentions and activities, see Short, op.cit., pp. 8O-89, 119-116; 
Barber, op.cit., pp. 36-37•
^ ^ 8) Tamil Nesan, 9 June 19^8.
^99) Straits Times, 17 June 19^8.
(P O O )
Tamil Nesan, 19 June 19^8.
(201) short, op.cit., p. 118; Straits Times, 1 July 19^8.
telegraphed to the Colonial Office that Gent had been a stumbling
(202)block to prompt action* He had ignored Macdonald's earlier warnings
(20 5^)
with regard to the seriousness of the situation. Ultimately he
had been forced to take action under pressure from 'unofficials' and
the military. Gent was recalled from Malaya on 29 June 19^8 but
he died in an aircrash over London four days later.
In the same way that Gent failed to deal effectively with the
rising lawlessness and employers' demands in 19^8 so in 19^7, John
Jeff the Commissioner for Labour had failed to withstand pressures
from both labour and management over the Kedah strikes. Jeff
admitted that the low wages and deplorable living conditions on the
(107)estates had contributed to the disturbances of 19^6-V7. His
handling of the Kedah strikes was heavily criticised by the employers 
who accused him of 'being out of touch with labour', and demanded
/ PqQ \
his 'replacement by a strong, active and progressive officer'.
Short, op.cit., p. 118.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Indian Daily Mail, 7 July 19^8. It was three months later 
that the Colonial Office appointed a successor, Sir Henry Gurney 
who had been Chief Secretary in Palestine during the last two 
years of the British Mandate.
John Jeff was attached to the Chinese Protectorate in the pre­
war years and was appointed to succeed Mr. Nightingale as 
Commissioner for Labour Malayan Union in 19^6. But S.B. Palmer, 
President of United Planters Association of Malaya was opposed 
to Jeff's appointment on the grounds that Jeff had no experience 
of Indian labour. Moreover the UPAM feared that Jeff’s appoint­
ment was a forerunner to the subsequent amalgamation of Chinese 
and Indian Labour Offices. (UPAM Circular, No.2, 12 April 19^6). 
This prejudice of Palmer liras reiterated at the UPAM annual 
general meeting on 23 April 19^7 where Palmer emphasized that 
Jeff 'had no knowledge of the Tamil mentality*. Democrat,
27 April 19^7.
Jananayagam, 12 April 19^7.
Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, p. 157* Jeff's position 
was made increasingly untenable by his difficulties with the 
Trade Union Adviser, John Brazier. See Short, op.cit., p. 66.
(202)
(203)
(20k)
(205)
(206)
(207)
(208)
He was later recalled to London and in this can be seen Palmer's
influence with the authorities. With the arrival of Jeff's
replacement, R.G.D. Houghton, there was a general hardening of
official and employer attitudes towards labour and the unions.
Houghton's first action was to seek a ban on the Thondar Padai,
(209)the organization which was responsible for the Kedah strikes.
In his letter to the High Commissioner, Houghton warned that the
Thondar Padai 'was an organization of the same kind which had
planned and executed the murder of Gandhi. They are as dangerous
(210)as the Triad Societies'. Houghton's major task was the
reorganization of the trade unions. His recommendations in this
area were repressive. He ensured the gradual decline of the
militant PMFTU by recommending that only unions with similar
(211)objectives could combine. He also banned from office
(212)unionists convicted on charges of intimidation and extortion.
The rapprochement between the Government and employers in the
post June 19^8 period was assisted by a close liaison between
Houghton and the Secretary of the Malayan Planting Industries
(Pi
Employers Association, C.D. Ahearne.
F.S. File 11328/^8, enclosure, 'Memorandum from R.G.D. 
Houghton to the High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya, 
22 January 19^9' (N.A Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
C. for L., E/1/3, Houghton to C for L, Singapore,
30 December 19^7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid. See also Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya,
p. 168.
Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, p. 186.
(209)
(210) 
(211)
(212)
(213)
Another dominating figure in industrial relations in this period
was the Trade Union Adviser, J.A. Brazier, a fervent anti-communist,
who was faced with a labour movement which was rapidly being
subverted by the Communists. Prior to the violent strikes of 19^ 6-*f7
he was confident of promoting a liberal trade union movement free of 
(21*0political control. After 19^7 it was clear to Brazier that only
a paternalist trade union movement could wean the labourers away
from MCP domination. Brazier maintained good relations with
the English-educated Indian trade unionists of the Government 
(216)service. However he failed to gain the support of the semi-
(217)literate railway and estate unionists. This was apparent in
(218)his dealings with the Perak Federation of Trade Unions.
Finding that he had little support from the militant Indian
unionists of the Perak Federation of Trade Unions, he attempted in
mid-19^7 to install John Emmanuel as leader but in this he was
(219)vehemently opposed by the dedicated MCP member, R.G. Balan.
Brazier's paranoia with regard to Communism made a clash with the 
PMFTU inevitable. By mid-19^7 be was convinced of the futility of 
promoting 'liberal' unions. Indeed he supported the repressive
Ibid., pp. 1**2-I*f3- 
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 192. Jananayagam, 22 June 19*+7- 
Jananayagam, 22 July 19*1-7 .
Indian Daily Mail, *t April 19*1-8. Stenson, Industrial Conflict 
in Malaya, p. 192.
Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, p. 192.
(21*0
(215)
(216)
(217)
(218)
(219)
legislation which the Government was then introducing to control the 
(220)unions. As M.R. Stenson concludes, 'The role of Brazier with the
encouragement of 'liberals' Gent and Macdonald, was of significance
less for its constructive value in creating 'genuine' independent
unions than for the legitimacy which it granted to increasingly
restrictive and eventually destructive, regulatory policies and 
(221)actions.
S-.P. Garrett, the Trade Union Adviser in Singapore, was a fervent
indeed militant unionist, but even so he failed to gain support from
the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions. He was opposed to trade
union registration and persuaded the authorities to waive registration
requirements for the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions, though its
(222)affiliates had to be registered. The Singapore unionists found
him ambivalent. The President of the Singapore Federation of Trade
Unions, a loyal MCP member accused Garrett of being 'neither pro-
(PP'Z>')
Government, pro-employer nor pro-employee'. Garrett's relation­
ship with the Government and employers deteriorated during the wave
of strikes in Singapore in early 19**-7. He accused the employers of
(22*0using the 'Red bogey' to 'resist social progress'. He resigned
the same year, a profoundly disappointed man. This marked the end 
of formal resistance to the economic policies being pursued by the 
Government and the employers in the late 19**0s.
(220)
(221)
(222)
(223)
(22*0
Ibid., p. I*f0.
Ibid., p. 193-
Malaya Tribune, 28 August 19*1-6.
Straits Times, 7 May 19*^ 7•
Malaya Tribune, 3 February 19*+7- Singapore Free Press, 
3 May 19*1-7.
With the passing of the Amended Trade Unions Ordinance in 19^8, 
and the desertion of the militant unionists to the jungle, the over­
whelming majority of the workers were left unorganized. By the end
of the year there were only 162 trade unions in Malaya and 100 in 
(225)Singapore. In 19^7 there had been 289 trade unions in Malaya and
118 in S i n g a p o r e . T h e  year 19^9 saw further reductions.
The only trade unions to survive the Emergency were those sponsored
by the Trade Union Adviser. They survived essentially because of
their moderate character, and the rise in estate wages which occurred
during the Korean War boom of 1950-51 helped to consolidate this
trend towards conservative unionism. It should also be noted that
the greater proportion of unions which survived were Indian-dominated,
partly because of their conservatism, and partly because the
authorities paid more attention and indeed tended to proscribe
Chinese-dominated unions.
In the early 1950s the Negri Sembilan Indian Labour Union, the
Perak Estate Employees Union, the Johore Plantation Employees Union
and the Malacca Estate Employees Union worked together, bound by
close ethnic ties. In addition, there was co-operation between the
Kedah Plantation Workers Union and the Selangor Plantation Workers
(229)Union despite serious leadership conflicts. These six unions
had a combined membership of 56,000 in 1952, of whom more than half 
was I n d i a n . j n a^Q these state unions amalgamated to
Annual Report on the Trade Unions Registry, 19^8, p. 2; 
Singapore Labour Department Annual Report, 19^8, Table XXVI.
Gamba, The Origins of Trade Unionism in Malaya, p. 15^-
(227) Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, p. 23^«
(228) ibia,4 p. 238.
(229) UPAM Circulars, 12 December 1952, and August 1952, p. 10 
(R.G.A. Kuala Lumpur).
/ p~zr\ ^
Gamba, The National Union of Plantation Workers, p. k-7*
form the National Union of Plantation Workers under P.P. Narayanan. 
The amalgamation was prompted by impending strike action over the 
Taylor Wages Award of 1953i the agreement being unfavourable to
(23'))
estate workers. But a sudden rise in the price of rubber led
(232)the employers to concede the wage increases. Subsequently in
1955 the National Union of Plantation Workers negotiated with the
employers over a decision to cut wages following an increase in the
export duty on rubber. They agreed to a system of calculating wages
on the gross price of rubber and this Agreement was implemented in 
(233)August 1955* In early 1956 the union initiated a series of
(234-)strikes m  support of a demand for a minimum wage. In June,
the employers responded with a small wage increase. It was only
in 1958 that the Union achieved its objective of an estate wage
(235)structure independent of rubber prices.
The NUPW was concerned not only with industrial questions but 
also functioned as a reform organization seeking a prohibition on
/ O ^
toddy sales and promoting education for workers' children.
The Union epitomized the important role of Indians in the labour 
movement. Indian labour was relatively homogenous and was 
concentrated on the estates and in certain Government departments. 
Therefore it could be readily mobilized. Educated Indians who had 
attempted to lead non-communal political parties in the 19*K)s found 
themselves obsolete in the growing communalism of the 1950s.
Ibid., pp. 73“7*i-; Tamil Nesan, 21 September 1953* 
Arasaratnara, op.cit., p. 1*+5«
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 1^6.
Gamba, The National Union of Plantation Workers, pp. 118-120, 
12*f-126“  — —
(231)
(232) 
(233) 
(23*0
(235)
(236)
Therefore they channelled their energies and talents into the trade 
union movement. With the collapse of the Chinese-directed but 
Indian-dominated PMFTU, the Government sought the aid of these 
educated Indians to lead the moderate labour movement. In March 
1950, the Government-sponsored Malayan Trade Union Congress had as 
President P.P. Narayanan, Secretary E.E. Nathan, and Treasurer 
M.P. Pajagopal. This simply reflected the fact that the
majority of unionists in Malaya were Indians.
The appointment of Indians to executive positions in the trade 
unions also occurred in Singapore. However, here it would appear 
that where the majority of unionists were Chinese, Indian activists 
were often appointed to militant Chinese-dominated unions, as if to 
provide them with Indian ’respectability*. For example, the 
Singapore Traction Company Employees Union was led by Devan Nair, 
a school teacher, the Singapore Harbour Board Staff Association 
was led by Jamit Singh a lawyer and in 1953 the Naval Base Labour 
Union was guided by S. Woodhull a militant graduate of Singapore 
University. All these were Chinese left wing trade unions.
(237) Arasaratnam, op.cit., p. 153-
(238) Yeo K±m Wah, Political Development in Singapore, 19^5-55>
pp. 2 0^-2^1.
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Malayan Union To Federation Agreement: The Indian Response
(i)
Immediately on their return to Malaya, the British proposed major 
constitutional changes for the country. The Malayan Union scheme, 
first announced on 10 October 19^5, envisaged the creation of a
(1)unitary state from the nine Malay states, plus Penang and Malacca.
(2)Singapore was to be constituted as a separate crown colony.
Citizenship was to be granted on the basis of jus soli, that is it
could be claimed by all those born in the Malayan Union or Singapore,
(3)whether Malay, Chinese or Indian. In order to introduce these 
radical changes, it was necessary for the British to negotiate new 
treaties with the Malay rulers, by which the British Government
Wwould be able to exercise full jurisdiction within the Malay states.
According to M.N. SQpiee, the Malayan Union was an attempt H o
create the basic political infrastructure allowing for movement
towards eventual self-rule', essentially through the creation of a
(5)'Malayan consciousness and nationalism'. The proposed unitary 
state would help destroy the divisive state loyalties which were 
strong amongst the Malays whilst for the Chinese and Indians, 
citizenship rights would encourage them to sever their ties with 
their homelands. The result, it wqs hoped, would be the creation
CD Great Britain, Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of Policy 
on Future Constitution, Crnd. 672 ,^ London,19^6.
(2)v ' Ibid., p.3-
^  Ibid., p. 1.
See Hansard, Vl*f, HC DEB 5£»’t columns 255-256.
(5) M.N. Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: Political 
Unification in the Malaysia Region, 19^5-65, Kuala Lumpur, 197^, 
pp." 1 6 - 1 7  • ”
^  J.V. Allen, The Malayan Union, New Haven, 1967i P- 13-
of a common identity which would form an important basis for eventual
self-rule* However as M.R. Stenson has argued the Malayan Union
(7)proposals were, at heart, undemocratic. First, the proposed
Legislative Council was to be nominated, not elected. Second, the
powers of the Council were to be severely restricted. Third, the
proposed citizenship rights in practice did not confer any privileges that
( P's
were not already available to non-citizens.
The initial Indian response to the Malayan Union proposals was very
weak. The Central Indian Association of Malaya, at that time the only
pan-Malayan Indian organization, simply invited comments on the proposals,
(9)which it would in turn submit to the authorities. Only the Selangor
Indian Association, and a few scattered individuals responded to this
in v i tation.However  it would appear that this poor response was less
a reflection of Indian indifference to the proposals than of the
community's unwillingness to become involved with the Central Indian
Association of Malaya, whose leadership had been severely scarred by its
involvement in the 194-1 Klang strikes and in the Indian Independence
League. Indeed in 194-5 many of the Association's leaders had been
(11)detained by the British on charges of 'collaboration'.
(7) M.R. Stenson, 'The Malayan Union And The Historians', Review 
Article, JSEAH, Vol. X, No.2, September 1969* P* 34-7*
/ O'S
See, White Paper, Malayan Union and Singapore: A Summary of Proposed 
Constitutional Arrangements, Cmd. 67*+9, London, 194-6, Section 23*
Tamil Nesan, 27 April 1946.
Ibid., 7 May 19^6.
(11)
See Chapter II, pp. 32-33* See also Chapter 1, p. 21, footnote 4-3*
The Indian Press made no mention of the Malayan Union proposals
until 27 October 19^5» and there was no editorial comment until
(12)1 February 19^6. Food shortages, rising prices and industrial
unrest were the main preoccupations of the Tamil Press in this period.
This was in strong contrast with the Malay Press which was deeply
(13)perturbed by the proposals. However, by early 19^6, as more details
of the Malayan Union proposals became known, Indian opinion began to 
crystallize. On 26 March 19^ +6 the Jananayagam, an extreme left-wing 
newspaper published in Kuala Lumpur and subsidized by the MCP, vehemently
(1*f)
denounced the Malayan Union. The paper was particularly suspicious
of the proposal to separate Singapore, arguing that 'the British Government
considers that if Singapore remains under its direct rule it will be
possible for the pursuance of her colonial policy .... The Malayan Union
does not in the least accept democracy and self rule ... The Malayan
Union is introduced to strengthen the methods of administration and to
plundering the country. It is a plan to divide Malaya to satisfy the
(15)needs of the imperialists'. Similar objections were expressed by the
Tamil Murasu and the Sevika. ^ ^
The Tamil Press was joined in its denunciation of the Malayan Union
by the pro-Malay, extremist Indian Muslim Press, most notably the
Islamic Voice of Malaya, edited by Sultan Marakkayar, and the Malaya Nanban,
(17)edited by Karim Ghani. The latter criticised what it called the
M.U. Information Department File 32B/^5» 'Indian Press Summaries', 
October 19^ +5 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur); Tamil Murasu, 1 February 19^6.
Utusan Melayu, editorial, 16 October 19^5; Warta Negara, editorial,
10 November 19^5; Utusan Melayu, 22 December 1945.
Jananayagam, 26 March 19^6.
Ibid.
Tamil Murasu, 2 April 19^6; Sevika, 8 April 19^6.
Islamic Voice of Malaya, 11 February 19^6; Malaya Nanban,
22 August 19^6.
(12)
(13)
( W
(15)
(16) 
(17)
intrusion of outsiders, that is non-Malays, in Malaya's internal politics 
and claimed that the Malays were 'the owners of the c o u n t r y yet  
there is little or no evidence thatthe Malays responded to this Indian 
Muslim opposition to the Malayan Union* Essentially Indian Muslim
(19political opinion carried little weight m  Malay circles in these years. 
Indeed not all Indian Muslims were pro-Malay with regard to the Malayan 
Union. For example, moderate Muslim newspapers, such as the Dhesa Nesan 
from Penang, viewed the Malayan Union plan as 'the first step towards self- 
government', though it added that 'the administration should be in 
conformity to the principle of Islam
Several attempts were made to heal the divisions within the Indian
Muslim community over the Malayan Union plan. Most prominently, a number
of Indian Muslim organizations, which had been defunct since 19*+1» were
(21)revived in order to consolidate the community's view. But the most
significant result of this revival was a concerted attempt to secure
separate communal representation for Indian Muslims, similar to that
(22)granted under the Montague-Chelmsford reforms in India in 1919*
The assistance of Jinnah was sought on this issue. Other moderate
minorities within the Indian community, the Ceylonese, Punjabis and
(23)Malayalees, gave vague approval to the Plan. Similarly the Chettiars
accepted the proposals, though the All Malaya Chettiars Chamber of 
Commerce, through Roland Braddell, expressed concern as to whether the
Malaya Nanban, 22 August 19^6.
(19) This was in strong contrast to the 1950s when Indian Muslim 
electoral support was highly valued by the Malays particularly in 
Penang and Singapore. See Chapter II, pp.
Dhesa Nesan, 19 March 19^6.
(?1)
Malaya Nanban, 22 August 19^6. See also M.U. (Confidential) File 
7^26/46 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Sevika, 2 January 194?.
(23) M.U. Information Department File 533/46, 'Malayan Press Digest',
No.20, November 1946 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur); Tamil Nesan, 22 June 1946.
adoption of Malayan Union citizenship would necessitate the
(24)relinquishing of British Indian nationality.
The diverse and scattered response of the Indian community to
the Malayan Union can, in part, be explained by the fact that throughout
the first half of 1946 the community's attention was focused on political
developments in India itself. However, in mid-1946 it seems clear that
the majority of Indians welcomed two features of the Plan, the prospect
of common Malayan citizenship, and the centralization of government,
though they deplored the fact that the new Constitution did not confer
democratic rights and represented no 'political advancement on the 1941 
(25)status'. Only left-wing Indian organizations and the left-wing Tamil
press were clearly apprehensive of the scheme. For example, in a
memorandum to Nehru in December 1946, the New Indian Democratic Youth
League in Singapore declared that 'the ushering in of the Malayan Union
( 26)scheme is calculated to denationalize the Indians and the Chinese'.
It was only with the formation of the MIC in August 1946 that Indian 
society was effectively organized on this constitutional issue, and 
the community developed an awareness of the deeper implications of 
the Malayan Union scheme.
With regard to the Chinese population, the radical Chinese view, as
represented by the MCP, rejected the Malayan Union on the grounds that it
did not provide for elections, that the powers of the Governor in Council
were deemed excessive, and that the separation of Singapore was
(27)politically and economically illogical. The MCP demanded universal
Tamil Nesan, 18 April 1946.
M.U. (Confidential) File 60/46, vol. II 'Indian Reactions And 
Press Comments', January-June 1946 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Indian Daily Mail, 5 December 1946.
The Democrat, 9 March 1946.
(24)
(25)
(26) 
(27)
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adult suffrage, an elected assembly and the inclusion of Singapore.
The Party's view was supported by the Indian labouring masses through the
PMFTU. Here the radical Chinese made no call for the establishment of a
(29)socialist state for fear of alienating moderate opinion. More
moderate Chinese were less antagonistic towards the proposals, being 
attracted by the opportunity to acquire citizenship. However they 
expressed discontent over the long residential requirement for citizen­
ship and demanded that Chinese be accepted as a language qualification.^30)
Finally the Malayan Democratic Union, a non-communal party, composed
of English-educated liberals, welcomed the Plan as 'a progressive move',
but totally opposed the exclusion of Singapore, and the wholly-nominated
(31)nature of the proposed Legislative Council. The Party also drew
attention to the fact that it was far from clear what rights a Malayan
( 32)Union citizen would enjoy in Singapore and vice versa. In conclusion,
it is clear that between April and November 19^6, both the Indian and
Chinese communities responded with some vigour to the Malayan Union
proposals, though the response was far from united, and was certainly not
as vehement as that from the Malay community. In other words, earlier
writers on this subject have erred in concentrating too greatly on the
(33)Malay reaction to the Plan. In particular, J. Allen has very
seriously under-estimated the Indian and Chinese interest in this
(3*+)Constitutional reform.
Ibid., 12 May 19^6.
Ibid.
(30) Malaya Tribune, 10 May 19^ -6.
(31) Malayan Standard, 10 May 19^6; Malaya Tribune, k May 19^6.
(32) See 'Malayan Democratic Union's Statement on Citizenship', in 
Malayan Standard, 17 April 19^6, 17 June 19^6.
3^3) See, Allen, op.cit., pp. 19» 70; K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and the
Political Process in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1965 ? pp* 5^-57* M.R. Stenson 
in his review article ’The Malayan Union and the Historians', JSEAH, 
vol. X, No.2, September 1969» pp* 3^-35^ 1 was among the first to draw
attention to this earlier neglect of the non-Malay response to the
Malayan Union.
(3*0 Allen, op.cit., p. 70.
As with the Indians and the Chinese, the Malays took a few months to
respond clearly to the Malayan Union Plan, for in the second half of
19^5* food shortages, racial conflict and inflation were the main 
(35)preoccupation. Even so there was a scattered initial reaction.
In early October 19^5t the liberal Malay paper Utusan Melayu, gave a general
welcome to the scheme though it expressed some misgivings about the fate
(36)of the Malay© under the new Constitution. Indeed, in the same month
the Malay Sultans were seriously antagonized by the arrogant and high­
handed behaviour of the Special British Representative, Harold MacMichael, 
who had been sent from London to negotiate fresh treaties with them. The 
Sultans responded by engaging a legal adviser, by writing to retired MGS 
officials in England to encourage them to mount a campaign in the British
Press and Parliament, by aligning themselves with the Malay political
(37)parties and by threatening to petition King George VI.
In November 19^5 the Kesatuan Melayu Johore was formed by Malay
aristocrats and Malay civil servants, to channel and consolidate the 
(
Malay ferment. It was soon followed by similar organizations, most
notably the Peninsular Malay Movement of Johore led by Onn bin Jaafar. 
December 19^5 witnessed the first public demonstration by the Malays 
against the Malayan Union. When the British Government published a 
White Paper on the constitution in January 19^ +6, the Malay community was 
convulsed with anger. Letters were written to The Times, retired MCS 
officials lobbied the authorities in London, and in March, forty-two
(39)Malay organizations met to devise a campaign to defeat the Malayan Union.
(35) a.J. Stockwell, ’The Development of Malay Politics during the Course 
of the Malayan Union Experiment, 19k2-k8' t Ph.D. Thesis, University 
of London, 1973» P- 98.
(36) Utusan Melayu, 12 October 19^5*
(37) Allen, op.cit., pp. 41-45.
For a good discussion on the Malay opposition to the Malayan Union, 
see Stockwell, op.cit., pp. 109-125.
Ibid., pp. 112-113.
This group was soon to form itself into the UMNO, which organized a 
boycott of the installation of the new G o v e r n o r ,  Edward Gent, and refused 
to cooperate with Governmental reorganization.^0  ^ The strength of Malay 
opposition to the Plan was also conveyed to the British Government by 
L.D. Gammans, a Conservative Member for Parliament, who visited Malaya 
in May 19^6.^^
Malay objections to the Malayan Union were clear: it threatened the
(4 2)
sovereignity of the Malay rulers, and it gave citizenship to non-Malays.
On this latter point, the Malay rulers wrote to the Governor, explaining
that they opposed the citizenship provisions becausd 'they will and must
mean extinction of the Malay state nationality and lead to the submergence
of the Malay race ... If the alien races are to have the same political
rights as the Malays they should have the same duties and should regard
themselves as subjects of the respective rulers, which their Highnesses
(^ ■3)would welcome very much'• The Sultans also expressed severe
reservations with regard to the loyalty to Malaya of ishe 
Indian and Chinese population^
There is now in Malaya a strong and organized Indian National 
movement. The Indians in Malaya though they must use these 
political rights, will never regard themselves as anything but 
Indian or have that tie with the British Empire which the Malays 
have always had in the past and wish to continue to h a v e ' . ( V f )
Ibid., p. 109; Straits Times, 6 March 19^6. For details on the 
early history of the UMNO see, A.J. Stockwell, 'The Formation 
and First Years of the United Malays National Organization',
Modern Asian Studies, vol. 11, part k, October 1977, pp* ^81-513*
M.U. (Confidential) File 60/46, Vol. II, 'Situation Report for 
May 1946', 19-30 May 1946 (N.A. KualaILumpur); Malaga Tribune,
11 June 1946',
M.U. (Confidential) File 294/46, 'Record of Meeting held with Malay 
Rulers and leading Malays at Kings House, 23 July 1946'. A detailed 
copy of the memorandum of the Rulers and the UMNO, pertaining to 
citizenship is attached to the minutes of this meeting. (N.A. Kuala 
Lumpur).
Ibid.
Ibid.
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
In the light of this memorandum alone, Allen's contention that 'what the
Sultans were concerned about ... was not citizenship but the loss of
(45)their sovereignity', cannot be sustained.
Initially, left-wing Malay parties, most notably the Malay Nationalist 
Party favoured the Malayan Union, essentially because it implied political
(46)uniformity and eventual self-government. But by February 1946 the
Malay Nationalist Party had turned against the Scheme on the following 
grounds: MacMichael's treatment of the Sultans; the fact that in
preparing the White Paper, the British had not consulted Malay opinion;
(47)and the proposed exclusion of Singapore. Moreover the Party began
to fear that if it continued to support the Union, it would become
isolated from growing Malay nationalism, based on anti-Malayan Union
fervour. It is also perhaps worth noting that the Malay Nationalist Party
was the first political organization to demand that Malay be accepted as
(48)an official language. However the Party never acquired substantial
influence, partly because its republicanism was repugnant to Malay
(49)society as a whole.
Formal Indian political protest against the Malayan Union appeared 
only with the formation of the MIC in August 1946. The MIC opposed the 
Scheme on the grounds that it had been imposed on the country by the
Allen, op.cit., p. 47.
M.U. (Confidential) File 335/46/S, Hqrs., Malaya Command,
Intelligence Summary, 7-15 December 1945, p. 9 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
M.U; Information Department, File P.R. 77/46, 'Manifesto of the 
Malay Nationalist Party with regard to the White Paper on the 
Malayan Union', 3 February 1946 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
For further details on the Malay Nationalist Party ideology, see 
Stockwell, op.cit., pp. 86-92; N.J. Funston, 'The Origins of 
Parti Islam Se Malaysia', J#EA$, vol. 7 ', No.l, March 1976, 
pp. 59-61.
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
(49)
British without any prior consultation with the local people.
The general opinion amongst the Indian community was that Malaya was a
(5"0Malay country and should remain so. It followed that the Indians
would not accept any constitutional reform that was unacceptable to
the Malays. Thus in December 19^6 Thivy reassured the Malays that the
Indians would ’never appeal over the heads of the Malays to the British
for any particular right or privilege in the task of establishing a
constitution for Malaya; if we do so we would be sowing the seeds of
(52)communal dissensions*. Moreover Thivy was convinced that 'Malaya
under the.new constitution will still be backward so far as responsible
(53)government is concerned*.  ^ He also objected to the fact that, under
the Malayan Union, the Sultans were deprived of their prerogatives,
arguing that the sovereignity of the Sultan should be a real rather than 
(5*0
a hollow concept.
However the position of the MIC on the constitutional issue was 
undermined by criticisms from local-born Indians, who resented the 
domination of theparty by foreign-born Indians, whom they dismissed 
as birds of passage. The Indo-Malayan Association, claiming to 
represent Indians born in Malaya, warned the MIC not to interfere in
Resolutions Passed At MIC Regional Delegates Meeting, Sentul, Kuala 
Lumpur, 17 November 19^6 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur); Jananayagam,
18 November 19*1-6; Tamil Nesan, 19 November 19^6. It should be noted, 
however, that by November 19*+6, the Malayan Union had been suspended 
and the British, the Sultans and the UMNO were involved in secret 
negotiations for a new constitution. Indeed, the British change of 
heart had occurred between March and July 19^6. See, Allen, op.cit., 
p.2*f.
(5D First Presidential Address by J. Thivy at first annual session of the 
MIC, Kuala Lumpur, 7 June 19**7 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
Malaya Tribune, 2k February 19*+7; Jananayagam, 25 February 19k? •
(5*0 Jananayagam, 25 February 19*+7-
local politics and dismissed the Congress' comments on the Malayan
(55)Union as 'being very mischievous'. The MIC's stand was further
undermined by class and ethnic divisions within the community. Most
notably the Indian working class tended to follow the line of the MCP,
and therefore totally rejected the new Constitution, while the more
( 56)conservative groups within the community generally favoured it.
Despite these difficulties, Thivy and the local Indian political 
leadership were constant in their support of the Malays and Malay rights 
throughout the first half of 19*1-6. Indeed Thivy even attempted to 
persuade the Sultans and the UMNO to join with the non-Malays against 
the British.(57)
However this conciliatory attitude on the part of the MIC President 
changed radically after July 19*1-6, with the formation of a Working 
Committee, composed solely of the Government, the Sultans and the UMNO, 
designed to prepare a new draft constitution to replace the Malayan 
Uni&n. The formation of this Committee caused Thivy to realize that 
the major divisions within the Malayan community were not simply between 
Malays and hon-Malays but also between conservative Malays (typified 
by the UMNO) and the radical Malays (principally the Malay Nationalist
/ r Q \
Party). Thivy was particularly stung by the fact that the UMNO had
(55) m .u . (Confidential) File 733/*i-6, Malayan Intelligence, Letter from
Indo-Malayan Association to the Governor, Malayan Union, 2*f November 
19*1-6 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur). In 19*1-7, local-born Indians comprised 
slightly over fifty per cent of the total Indian population - 
M.V. Del Tufo, Malaya, A Report On The 19*1-7 Census of Population, 
London, 19*1-9, p. 65. *"
M.U. Information Department File 533/*1-6, ’Malayan Press Digest', No.20, 
November 19*1-6 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(57) Malaya Tribune, 18 January 19*1-7.
(58) 'The History of the Congress Association in the Constitutional Issue', 
p. 7 (Thivy Papers, n.d. University of Malaya Library, Kuala Lumpur). 
This Paper was also submitted to the second annual session of the MIC, 
in mid 19*1-8 and its authorship was then attributed to the MIC working 
committee. However the language and the views of the Paper reveal 
more of the personality of J. Thivy.
entered into secret negotiations with the British, and he accused the
Party of unscrupulously playing on Malay fears of 'being overwhelmed
(59)by the immigrant population'. The UMNO was 'founded on a narrow
fascistic concept of racialism' • in contrast, again according to
Thivy, the Malay Nationalist Party 'believes that the main problem 
before the community is the elimination of imperial exploitation ...
These people then are our automatic allies'.
The MIC became even more critical of the UMNO and conservative
Malays after the report of the Working Committee appeared in 
/
December 19**6. Indeed, the same month the MIC joined the AMCJA
coalition, and from then began a vigorous campaign for non-Malay political 
rights. It outlined proposals for a new constitution which would entail 
single citizenship, Thivy criticizing dual citizenship on the grounds that 
it would 'make the citizen lukewarm in his loyalty to this country'.
It was also proposed that citizenship would automatically bestow 
nationality. The MIC further pressed for the inclusion of Singapore 
in the Constitution of the mainland and for a fully-elected Legislative 
Council.
Ibid., p. 6.
Ibid., p. 7.
Ibid.
Malay Mail, 23 December 19*+6. The Working Committee Report which 
was first published on 2*f December 19*1-6, later appeared as 
Great Britain, Federation of Malaya: Summary of Revised
Constitutional Proposals, Cmd. 7171, London, 19*+7.
Malaya Tribune, 27 January 19**-7.
Jananayagam, 23 December 19*US. 'Nominated Councillors can hardly 
be expected to bite the hand that selected them*, J. Thivy 
commented, Malaya Tribune, 27 January 19*+7.
(59)
(60) 
(61) 
(62)
(63)
(6*0
The AMCJA was a loose coalition of various political organizations,
including the Malayan Democratic Union, the Malayan New Democratic Youth
League, the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army Old Comrades Association,
the PMFTU, the Malay Nationalist Party, Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API), the
Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce, the Ceylon Tamils Association and,
( 6r)
of course, the MIC. ^ It was a left oriented organization, being the
leading spokesman of the non-Malay communities in alliance with radical
Malays against the UMNO. On its formation in December 19*1-6, the AMCJA
had a pronounced inter-communal character, but later it became
increasingly Chinese dominated. First, in January 19*1-7, the Malay
Nationalist Party and the Angkatan Pemuda Insaf withdrew from the
coalition, after severe criticisms from the UMNO and the Malay Press
that it was betraying Malay interests by aligning themselves with the
C h i n e s e . S e c o n d ,  Thivy who could have been expected to command a
senior position in the coalition, left for India in November 19*1-6
(67)
to attend a meeting of the Indian National Congress. The most
senior MIC member of the AMCJA executive was A)*N. Mitra, a colourless 
figure who was elected Treasurer.
(65) Jananayagam, 21 December 19*1-6. Of the *+00,000 members in the 
AMCJA, 300,000 belonged to the PMFTU.
(66) Yeo Kim Wah, 'The Anti-Federation Movement in Malaya', 19*+6-*+8', 
JSEAff, vol. IV, No. 1, March 1973, p. 39.
( 67) Jananayagam, 23 December 19*+6. Though Yeo Kim Wah (Yeo Kim Wah, 
op.cit., p. 36) has suggested that John Eber or Lim Kean Chye of the 
Malayan Democratic Union may have been the principal source of 
inspiration behind the formation of the AMCJA as an inter-communal 
front against the Malayan Union, there is however some evidence 
that Thivy had earlier proposed such an inter-communal constitutional 
front but had not acted upon it and in fact left for India a few 
days after his proposal for such a conference - Jananayagam,
12 November 19*+6. The Majlis of 17 November 19*+6, considered 
Thivy*s call for this conference as 'audacious, irresponsible and 
dangerous', in view of the fact that he was planning to leave for 
India, only days after 'meddling' in Malayan affairs.
The recommendations of the Anglo-Malay Working Committee were
( &R
leaked in December 19^6. The Committee proposed the creation of a fully
nominated Legislative Council, the separation of Singapore and a form 
of dual citizenship, without nationality.^^) Though the Indian Daily
(to)Mail dismissed the proposals as' 'undemocratic, anti-national and retrogade’,
however, according to the Department of Public Relations (not an unbiased
source) Indians who were local-born or permanently domiciled were
(71)generally in favour of the new constitution. However the MIC rejected
the Federation Agreement, as thsAnglo-Malay proposals were known, at its
(72)first annual session in June 19^7. Radical Malay opinion, again
typified by the Putera, also rejected the Agreement on the grounds that it
was undemocratic, that dual citizenship would exacerbate communal
differences, and that there was no recognition of Malay as the national 
(73)language. Indeed the Putera rejoined the AMCJA to agitate against
(7*0the Federation proposals.
C 68) Jananayagam, 23 December 19^6.
(69)
M.U. (Confidential) File 29*bA6, 'Constitutional Working Committee 
Report*, pp. 7-10, (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Indian Daily Mail, 2*f July 19^7.
M.U. Public Relations Department File 565/*+7» Report by Acting 
Director of Public Relations, J.N. Mchugh, 29 August 19^7 (N.A.
Kuala Lumpur). Indian Muslim organizations from Penang and 
Singapore made known their approval of the new constitution.
Malaya Nanban, 22 July 19*+7*
(72) m .U. (Confidential) File 709/^7» 'Situation Report', 16 June 19^ -7 
(N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(73)
Straits Times, 1 April 19^7- After its withdrawal from the AMCJA in 
January 19*+7i the Malay Nationalist Party organized a coalition of 
Malay organizations. This coalition called the Putera (Pusat 
Tenaga Raayat - Nucleus of People's Force) was inaugurated on 
22 February 19**7. Sunday Tribune, 23 February 19*1-7 •
C 7/4%
Stockwell, op.cit., pp. 170-180.
With regard to the Chinese community, the MCP, inevitably, rejected
the Federation Agreement, again on the grounds that it was undemocratic.
This was seen most clearly in the fact that the Legislative Council was
(75)wholly nominated by the High Commissioner. Conservative Chinese, as
represented by the Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce had more 
pragmatic objectives; they feared that citizenship would be difficult 
to acquire and they saw in the separation of Singapore, a serious blow 
to c o m m e r c e . T h e  Malayan Democratic Union, with its usual 
political acumen, recognised that the proposals only served to ’safe­
guard the privileged position of a small minority* comprising the 
elite of all races, Malay, Chinese, Indian and British.
In response to these criticisms, the Government established a
Committee to consult non-Malay opinion on the constitutional issue.^8)
The Committee, comprising five Europeans, two Chinese and two Indians
had as its chairman, H.R. Cheeseman, the Director of Education. Since
the Committee had only advisory powers, it was boycotted by the MIC
and the two Indian members were dismissed by the Party, in a somewhat
(79)unoriginal phrase, as ’stooges of the British'. However, other
Indian groups and individuals took the opportunity to make their views 
known to the Committee. For example, a leading Indian lawyer, R. Ramani,
Jananayagam, 22 March 19^7*
Straits Times, 25 March 19^ +7*
(77) .  rStraits Times, 3 February 19^8 - 'ProHMalay Nonsense’, 12 February
19^8 - ’Anglo-Malay Poison’.
/ \
Constitutional Proposals for Malaya: Report of the Consultative 
Committee together with proceedings of six public meetings, a 
summary of representations made and letters and memoranda considered 
by the Committee, Kuala Lumpur, 21 March19^7»
Tamil Nesan, 2 January 19^7* The two Indian representatives on the 
Committee were M.I%R. Doraisamy, an Indian Councillor on the Malayan 
Union Advisory Council, and C.P.R. Menon, President of the Malacca 
Regional Indian Congress.
though criticizing the citizenship provisions, argued that the 
'unimpeachable rights of the Malays to have priority in the politics 
of their country', should be accepted by all. The Penang Muslim
League pressed the Committee for special consideration of Indian Muslim 
interests, including separate representation, on the grounds that there 
were irreconcilable differences between Hindu and Muslim Indians
( P i'i
in Malaya. This in turn led to agitations from Pakistani Muslims
( 2? 1
and then Sikhs for separate representation.
In early 19^7 the MIC found itself in conflict over the 
constitutional issue, not only with other important Indian groups, but 
also with its allies in the AMCJA-Putera coalition. From the formation 
of the coalition in December 19^6, the MIC had been regarded as 
troublesome by the other members. First, there had been strong Indian 
pressure for Thivy to be elected President of the coalition, though 
this move collapsed when Thivy left, temporarily, for India. When
the MIG had to be content with the election of A.N. Mitra as Treasurer, 
John Eber of the Malayan Democratic Union, expected the MIC to 
w i t h d r a w . S e c o n d ,  the Malayan Democratic Union was disenchanted 
with the MIC because the latter refused to accept the oath of exclusive 
allegiance to Malaya, and also acted as though it were indispensable 
to the AMCJA. Third, the Malay Nationalist Party was irritated
Warta Negara, 31 January 19*+7.
Sevika, 2 January 19^7.
Malayan Daily News, 28 January 19^7; Malay Mail, 1 February 19^7; 
Tamil Nesan, 12 February 19^ +7; Sevika, 2 September 19^7.
Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., p. 37.
Ibid.
Straits Times, 22 December 19^6. See also Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., 
p. 37.
(80)
(81)
(82)
(83)
(8*0
(85)
by the MiG's strident and uncompromising attitude on the importance 
of democratic rights.(86) It was particularly annoying for the MICs 
allies to have the Indian National Congress and Nehru constantly 
promoted as the leader of the anti-imperial struggle throughout Asia, 
This disenchantment with the MIC was made clear by John Eber in a 
letter to Tan Cheng Lock:
Do not hesitate to silence speakers (during meetings) who 
hold the floor too long .... Be particularly on your guard with 
Indian speakers whose voice as I have said, although loud, is 
not important and see to it that the speakers of the General 
Labour Union, whose voice though not loud is very important, 
are listened to with respect and attention.(87)
Despite these disagreements, Thivy played an important part in the
drafting of the People's Constitutional Proposals to be presented by 
(88)the AMCJA. This called for the granting of independence to Malaya
(including Singapore), the establishment of a fully elected Legislative 
Council with fifty-five per cent Malay representation for nine years, 
the creation of a Council of Races to safeguard all against dis­
crimination and the adoption of Malay as the official language. ^ 9)
In early 19^7, in response to the Malay Nationalist Party's pressure, 
the AMCJA added to the proposed constitution the following clauses; 
that the Malay rulers would be recognised as constitutional rulers; 
that Malay religion and custom would be protected under the Sultans; 
that Malay special rights would be safeguarded; and that Melayu
nationality would provide the basis for citizenship for all the
(90)peoples of Malaya.
indian Daily Mail, 27 December 19^6.
Letter from John Eber to Tan Cheng Lock, y\ December 19^6 (Tan 
Cheng Lock Papers) cited in Yeo Kim Wah,op.cit., p. 38.
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'The History of the Congress Association in the Constitutional 
Issue', p. 9 (Thivy Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
The Peoples Constitutional Proposals for Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 
November 19^7» pp« ^6-^7; Malaya Tribune, 11 July 19^7*
^9C) Malaya Tribune, 16 December 19^7; Yeo Kim Wain, op.cit., p. ^6.
The MIC objected particularly strongly to this last proposal and
insisted that citizenship should be on the basis of Malaysian, not Melayu
(91)nationality. They also argued that the Malays should receive only
forty-eight seats in the Legislative Council, instead of the one hundred
(92)
and seventeen which the AMCJA had suggested. By voicing these
objections, the MIC finally lost all favour with the Malay Nationalist 
Party. Indeed by September 19471 the MIC had become so estranged 
from the coalition that it was not even given a copy of the People’s 
Constitution, though it had already appeared in the Malayan press. ^ 93)
Sensing the irritation within the AMCJA against the MIC, Malcolm
Macdonald, in June 19471 attempted topersuade Thivy to pull the Party
(9/+)
out of the coalition. Macdonald sensed that the MIC’s enthusiasm
for the AMCJA was cooling, principally because in mid-1947, Indian 
attention was focused on the sub-continent where independence was
(91) Amended Proposals by the MIC to the Draft of the New Constitution 
for Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, n.d. (Thivy Papers), also cited in Yeo 
Kim Wah, op.cit., p. 48, footnote 78. Tan Cheng Lock too faced 
criticisms from the Chinese community over this concept of Melayu 
nationality. In a letter dated 7 October 1947* to Gerald de Cruz, 
Liaison Officer of the AMCJA, Tan Cheng Lock said, 'They (Chinese) 
are all opposed to their losing their racial individuality, culture 
and independence by calling themselves Melayu ....' (Tan Cheng Lock 
Papers, I#EAiE> Singapore).
(92)
Amended Proposals by the MIC to the Draft of the New Constitution 
for Malaya. The one hundred and seventeen seats represented 
fifty-five per cent of the seats in the proposed Legislative 
Council.
^93) Letter from Budh Singh to the AMCJA-Putera, 16 September 1947
(Tan Cheng Lock Papers, Singapore); also cited in Yeo Kim Wah, 
op.cit., p. 48, footnote 78. The 'People’s Constitutional 
Proposals1, was completed on 10 August 1947 - see Minutes of
Third Delegates Conference of the AMCJA-Putera, 3 November 1947 
(Tan Cheng Lock Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
(94) Indian Daily Mail, 20 June 1947.
(95)imminent. Macdonald's advice went unheeded. The position of
the MIC in the AMCJA became almost untenable as a result of the hartal
of 20 October 19^7. When the Party supported the one-day general
strike, conservative Indian businessmen withdrew their support from it«/*^
They were already disgruntled by the fact that the MIC had, despite
its earlier vigorous objections, compromised on the issue of Melayu
(97)citizenship and that it had not fought for dual citizenship.
However there was still substantial Indian support for the AMCJA,
principally from Penang, Singapore and parts of Selangor. ^ 8) On the
other hand, according to an opinion poll carried out in October 19^7 by
the Malayan Information Department, Indians in Johore, were in general
in favour of the Federation proposals and therefore opposed the AMCJA's 
(99)stand. The poll also indicated that in Negri Sembilan, Indians and
Ceylonese were found to be more interested in developments on the sub­
continent. The hartal of 20 October 19^7 was called by the AMCJA to
demonstrate opposition to the Federation Agreement. It revealed the very 
serious weaknesses within the MIC over the constitution issue. The hartal
Ibid.
Tamil Nesan, 30 October 19^7. For example, the Selangor Indian 
Chamber of Commerce argued that 'it is not the intention of the 
mercantile community to meddle in the internal affairs of this 
country and its Constitutional Proposals ... We are here as mere 
Indian citizens. We are here as a trading community'. M.U. 
(Confidential) File 77/^6, 'Materials for Local Affairs Talk',
20 October 19^7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Tamil Nesan, 30 October 19^7* *
Tamil Murasu, 22 October 19^7.
M.U. Information Department File 703/V7, 'Situation Report',
11 October 19^7 (N.A-. Kuala Lumpur). It should be noted that this 
opinion poll was carried out before the hartal of 20 October 19V?.
Ibid.
(95)
(96)
(97)
(98)
(99)
( 100)
was most successful in the main cities - Kuala Lumpur, Singapore,
Ipoh and Penang - though in the rural areas, Indian estate labourers, 
organized by the PMFTU, also stopped work, whilst many Chinese and 
Indian shopkeepers, under the threat of intimidation closed their 
businesses.^^
Within the Indian community, opposition to the hartal came mainly
from the Muslims. The Penang Muslim League instructed local businessmen
(102 )to ignore the day of action and to support the UMNO. In Johore
Bharu and Selangor too, Indian Muslim businessmen defied the boycott.
Though the Indian Chamber of Commerce of Malaya, comprised of Muslims,
Sindhis, Punjabis and a few Tamils considered the constitutional issue of
little importance to it, it was forced by threats of intimidation, to
(10Vadvise its members to support the hartal. The success of the hartal
in Singapore was due mainly to the support of the Indian municipal 
labourers. But in general, the success of the hartal was limited
by the non-cooperation of the Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce.
This was a rather conservative body, interested only in those clauses 
of the Constitution which would affect their business - that is, 
citizenship and the degree of Chinese representation in the Legislative 
Council. Whereas in early 19V7 these reservations were sufficient to
cause the Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce to boycott the Federal 
Legislative Council, by the end of the year it was prepared to give it 
limited cooperation.
Malaya Tribune, 2b October 19V7; M.U. Labour Department File 5 1 7 /V ,  
enclosure (1 3 ), Labour Department Monthly Report for October 19V7;
M.U. Labour Department File 9 3 /V ,  Memorandum from Deputy Commissioner 
for Labour, Kedah, to Commissioner for Labour, Malayan Union,
10 November 19V7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Malaya Tribune, 2b October 1 9 V •
Tamil Nesan, 23 October 19 V .
Straits Times, 30 October 19V *
Jananayagam, 1 November 19 V * Out of a total of 8,000 municipal workers, 
approximately 5»500 observed the hartal. Of these, 3»300 were Indians.
Straits Times, 12 November 19V*
Ibid.
(101)
(102)
(103)
(10V
(103)
(106)
(107)
By early 19^8 the enthusiasm of the MIG for the constitutional 
agitations was waning, not least because it was constantly under
/ A nQ \
attack in the Malay papers. In particular, the Ma.jlis emphasized
the inability of the MIC to influencd strongly Malaya's political future
(109)because the majority of its members were non-Federal citizens.
It also played on the differring ethnic objectives within the community 
and indeed when the UMNO introduced associate membership in 19^9* a
(110)number of Sikhs, Ceylon Tamils and Indian Muslims joined the Party.
But these defections from the MIC, and the general weariness of the 
Party, did not prevent it from embarking upon an eventually futile 
boycott of the Federation Agreement between 19^8 and 1950.
(ii)
The Federation Agreement, which had been derived initially from the
negotiations which took place between the British, the Sultans and the
UMNO from July 19^7 following the collapse of the Malayan Union, came
(111)into effect on 1 February 19^8. It recognised 'the Rulers as
sovereign monarchs with the prerogatives, power and jurisdiction which
(112)they enjoyed prior to the Japanese Occupation'. It also endorsed
British postwar policy of preparing the Federation for eventual self» 
government, but postponed the introduction of an elected assembly
Majlis, 12 December 19^7, 1^ December 19^7* 19 December 19^7* 
Majlis, 12 December 19^ +7.
Tamil Nesan, 30 May 19^9•
Great Britain, Colonial Office, Federation of Malaya: Summary of 
Revised Constitutional Proposals, Cmd. 7171, London, 19^7*
Ibid., p. 5«
(108)
(109)
(110) 
(111)
(112)
(*1 *13)•until conditions were more suitable'. Under the new Constitution,
the High Commissioner governed the country with full powers, including
(11*0the right to veto legislation. He was assisted by an Advisory
Executive Council comprised of seven officials and five to seven
unofficials. The Federal Legislative Council comprised fifty
( ^ 5)unofficials, fourteen officials and eleven 'free' members.
Ethnically the Council was divided into thirty-one Malay members, 
twenty-one Europeans, fifteen Chinese and seven others. All members 
were nominated.
Under the new Constitution, citizenship (without nationality) was
(116)
granted automatically to the following :
1) the subjects of the Sultans, that is, the Malays.
2) those born in the Malay States of parents who themselves had 
been born in the Malay States and who had resided there for 
fifteen years.
3) those born in the Federation who spoke Malay and conformed to 
Malay custom
The Federation of Malaya Agreement, 19^8, reprinted 1952 with 
amendments, Kuala Lumpur, 1952, p. 2.
Ibid., p. 23.
The eleven 'free' members were the nine Mentris Besar- of the State 
Councils and the two representatives of Penang and Malacca, who 
were free to vote as they wished.
Malayan Union, Constitutional Proposals for Malaya: Report of the 
Working Committee appointed by a Conference of His Excellency the 
Governor of the Malayan Union, Their Highnesses the Rulers of the 
Malay States and the representatives of the United Malays National 
Organization, 19^6, p. 66 (Article 128 of the 'Draft Federation 
Agreement') cited in Ratnam, op.cit., p. 76. The citizenship 
provisions of the Federation Agreement of 19*1-8 were almost identical 
with those of-the Working Committee. The only two amendments made 
were:- 1) That for British subjects born in Penang or Malacca, 
permanent residence in the Federation was sufficient for citizenship 
acquisition; 2) automatic citizenship would also be conferred on 
any person born before 1 February 19*1-8, and who spoke Malay or 
conformed to Malay custom. (Federation of Malaya Agreement, 19*1-8, 
Article 12*1-, clause (d), cited in Ratnam, op.cit., pp. 81-82.
(113)
(11*0
(115)
(116)
4) British subjects born in Penang and Malacca who were permanent 
residents in the Federation
3) British subjects born in the Malay States, whose fathers were 
born there or who had completed a minimum of fifteen years' 
residence.
6) British subjects born in the Malay States, whose fathers were 
Federal citizens at the time of the former's birth.
In practice these regulations ensured that all Malays and Indonesians 
qualified for citizenship, while the 'place of birth' and residential 
requirements severely curtailed the numbers of non-Malays who could 
acquire citizenship. The non-Malays were further disadvantaged by the 
need to pass an English or Malay language test.
The MIC's objections to these citizenship proposals have already
been fully documented. In 19*1-8 the Party argued that Malaya was a
multi-racial country, not a Malay country, and consequently that there
should be a common citizenship (with nationality) with equal rights for
all r a c e s . T h r o u g h o u t  19*1-7, the MIG as a member of the AMCJA had
campaigned against these revised proposals and even after the demise of the
coalition in April 19*1-8 the MIC continued to boycott the Federal and
State Councils which had been established under the Federation Agreement.
However there were individuals, some within the MIC, who were prepared
to cooperate with the Government and accept nominations to Federal,
State and Settlement Councils: indeed there were five Indian
(118)representatives in the Federal Legislative Council alone. As the
MIC had passed a resolution at its annual session in March 19*1-8 in
(117) 'The History of the Congress Association in the Constitutional 
Issue', p. 9 (Thivy Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
( 'I *1 ft ^
P.P. Narayanan and M.P. Rajagopal were Indian Labour 
representatives on the Federal Legislative Council; S.O.K* 
Ubaidullah represented the Indian Chamber of Commerce while 
R. Ramani and V.M.N. Menon represented the general Indian 
community.
favour of a Constitutional boycott, it was inevitable that the Party
( *1 *1 9 }would expel those members who accepted Government nominations.
/ DO)
Ten such members were expelled in April 19^8.
However the boycott policy was strongly opposed by a number of
important MIC branches* In March 19^8 the Malacca Regional Indian
Congress advised the MIC to leave the AMCJA and pursue a policy of
(121)limited cooperation with the Government. At a meeting of the
Congress working committee the following July, it again pressed for the
(122)abandonment of the boycott. The Malacca resolution was defeated
(1 ^and the branch executive committee resigned in protest. With the
re-election of Budh Singh, the architect of the boycott policy, as 
President of the MIC at the same meeting, the policy was confirmed. 
However with the declaration of the Emergency, a complete constitutional 
boycott could be interpreted as supporting, however indirectly, the 
Communist revolt. Therefore, the MIC announced that, though it still 
opposed the Federation Agreement, it would contest elections to town
councils and rural boards which had been established prior to the
* <12*0 Agreement.
Indian Daily Mail, 6 March 19^8.
Ibid., 12 April 19^8.
Ibid., 6 March 19**8.
Tamil Murasu, 5 July 19^8; Minutes of the second annual session 
of the MIC Working Committee, Kuala Lumpur, 3 July 19^8 (MIC 
Papers); Tamil Nesan, 12 March 19^8.
Tamil Murasu, 9 July 19^8.
Tamil Murasu, 2 August 19*f8; Malaya Tribune, 3 August 19^8.
(119)
(120) 
(121) 
(122)
(123)
(12*f)
In Singapore the pace of constitutional development was more 
rapid. The Elections Ordinance, introduced in April 19*+8, conferred 
universal adult suffrage on all British subjects of 'sound mind and
f 'Ipc^
character, resident in the island for a year preceding elections1.
As the result of pressure from the Malayan Democratic Union and the Malay
Nationalist Party, the franchise was later extended to include British
(126)protected subjects born in the Federation. Since the majority of
foreign-born Indians in Singapore were British subjects, whereas the
foreign-born Chinese were predominantly alien, it followed that Indians
constituted the largest proportion of the electorate in the Chinese- 
(127)dominated island. This provided an opportunity for an electoral
advantage which the Singapore Regional Indian Congress was loathe to
ignore. When elections to the Singapore Municipal and Legislative
Councils were announced, factions v/ithin the MIC branch, ignored the
(128)boycott policy and made plans to contest the elections.
R. Jumabhoy, President of the Singapore Regional Indian Congress, 
was already an unofficial member of the Singapore Advisory Council. At 
the first annual session of the MIC in June 19^7, some delegates had 
demanded that such members as Jumabhoy should resign from their
(129)Government positions to demonstrate their support for MIC policy.
Thivy refused to submit to these demands but at the same time assured 
the Party that these Councillors would not act in any way 'detrimental
(125) Text of Governor's Despatch, 11 March 19^8, cited in Yeo Kim Wah, 
Political Development In Singapore, 19*P?-1955f P» 232.
(126) y0O Kjjn v/ah, op.cit., p. 252.
(127)K n  Ibid., p. 255.
<1^^ Tamil Murasu, 19 April 19^7*
Indian Daily Mail, 9 July 19^7•
to the real interests of Indians in Malaya or against the policy of
the MIC'.^^0  ^ But immediately following this, V.M.N. Menon, the
Indian representative on the Malayan Union Advisory Council and an MIC
official, voted against a motion in the Council which proposed the
(151)abolition of toddy shops. Since the MIC had long agitated for
this measure, Menon was clearly challenging the Party. An MIC Board 
of Inquiry later found him guilty of defying Party policy and he was 
expelled.
Menon was swiftly followed by Jumabhoy. In July 19*f7 Jumabhoy
voted in the Singapore Advisory Council in favour of separate elections
(133)to the Singapore Legislative Council. This was clearly in defiance
of MIC policy which aimed at a united Malaya. It was at this point that 
Jumabhoy also announced that the Singapore Regional Indian Congress 
would contest the Municipal and Legislative Council elections, and 
immediately began to register Singapore Congress members on the
(13*0electoral roll. Denunciation came swiftly. The Indian Daily Mail
declared that the decision of the Singapore Congress was ’tantamount
(135)to an utter reversal of the declared policy of the parent body'•
Jumabhoy was also attacked in the Tamil Murasu and the Tamil Nesan, the
latter arguing that he should resign from the Singapore Regional
Indian Congress and contest the election as a candidate of the Indian
(136)Chamber of Commerce. At a meeting of the working committee of
Ibid.
Malayan Union Advisory Council Proceedings, 9 June 19^7, B.102. 
Tamil Murasu, 28 August 19^7*
Indian Daily Mail, 9 July 19^7; 18 July 19*+7.
Ibid., 18 July 19*f7.
Ibid., 19 July 19V7.
Tamil Murasu, 17 July 19*^ 7; Tamil Nesan, 2*+ August 19*f7•
(130)
(131)
(132)
(133) 
(13*0
(135)
(136)
the MIC, the Selangor branch called for disciplinary action against
(157)
the Singapore Congress. Jumabhoy did not wait for expulsion. He
resigned from the Party on 16 October 19*+7, wildly accusing the MIC of
(138 )allowing itself to be dominated by Ceylonese and Pakistanis.
He was subsequently nominated unopposed to the Singapore Legislative 
Council by the Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce.
The Singapore Congress justified its participation in the elections
on the following grounds. First, that the MIC had not passed a formal
(139)resolution to boycott elections. Second, that the Malayan
Democratic Union, an active member of the AMCJA, had already announced
that it would contest the elections in Singapore. In reply the
President of the MIC argued that a boycott was essential for the
following reasons. First, that separate elections for Singapore
would be contrary to the Party's objective of securing a united 
(1*f1)Malaya. Second, that since the MIC demanded a fully elected
assembly, the elections to the Singapore Legislature (where only six
of the twenty-three sdats were to be contested) were insufficiently 
(1*f2)democratic. Third, that as the MIC insisted on citizenship based
on undivided loyalty to Malaya, it could not accept the elections in
(l*f3)Singapore where the franchise was based on British nationality.
<1^7) Indian Daily Mail, k August 19**7.
<1-^ Tamil Nesan, 17 October 19*+7*
(139) The Singapore Regional Indian Congress interpreted the resolution 
passed at the emergency session of the MIC in March 19*+8 v/ith regard 
to a Constitutional boycott as binding only on nominations to 
official posts, and not pertaining to elections for Councils.
Tamil Murasu, 26 April 19*+8.
Indian Daily Mail, 29 July 19**7* In fact, the Malayan Democratic 
Union reversed its decision of May 19^7 to participate in
elections, because of pressure from the Malay Nationalist Party
and the Singapore Press - Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., p. 261.
Tamil Nesan, 9 September 19*^ 7? Straits Times, 19 September 19^7; 
Indian Daily Mail, 20 September 19^7. "
<1^2) Tamil Nesan, 9 September 19*^ 7; Straits Times, 19 September 19*+7*
<1^-^ Indian Daily Mail, 20 September 19V7*
The MIC decided that it would have 'nothing to do with a form of 
political skull-duggery which promises to hold out the shadow of
(q Zf if)
democracy but actually denies the very core and substance of it.
In April 19*1-8, it expelled the two members of the Singapore Regional
(145)Indian Congress who had contested the elections. In August the
same year, the MIC slightly relaxed its boycott in Singapore, when it
directed the local branch to contest the municipal and rural elections.
It justified this on the grounds that these councils were not integral
(147)parts of the Constitution. In reality, the MIC's slight change
of policy was due to an awareness that a complete constitutional boycott
by the Party could be misinterpreted during the period of insurgency.
The MIC was acutely aware that earlier it had been closely involved with
lef;t-wing parties which after June 19*1-8 had been proscribed. Therefore
it took care to 'disassociate itself from violence in any shape or 
(148)form'. At the same time Budh Singh emphasized that the partial
truce with the Government should not be interpreted as a defeat for 
(149)the Party's stand. The MIC, he reiterated, had not 'lost sight
of her ideals in general and objectives in particular, namely, self-
050)government for Malaya as an indivisible nation'. By announcing
its willingness to participate in local elections, whilst continuing 
to boycott the Legislative Council, the MIC was in effect salving its 
conscience whilst saving its skin.
Ibid.
Ibid., 12 April 1948. The two members were V.P. Abdullah and 
Mrs. V. Malathi.
Malaya Tribune, 3 August 1948.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
(
(1*1-5)
(146)
(147)
(148)
(149)
(150)
However some sections of the Indian community in Singapore argued
that the full boycott should be maintained. The Indian Daily Mail
and the Tamil Murasu, for example, argued that by participating in the
municipal elections, the Singapore Congress would excite communal 
(151)
tension. With the resignation of Jumabhoy from the MIC in
August 19*47, those factions in the Singapore branch, who were in
favour of a complete boycott were able to gain dominance. In December
19*48 the Singapore Congress reversed its earlier policy and announced
(15P^
that henceforth it would boycott all elections. The result was
an open rift within the branch, with certain factions continuing to
/ (“7\
prepare electoral campaigns. In frustration Congress members
began to drift towards non-communal parties on the island.
There can be little doubt that the boycott policy severely weakened 
the MIC. Most importantly, with the expulsion from the Party, of Indian 
Councillors who accepted Government positions under the Federation 
Agreement, the MIC lost those powerful members who had exercised a 
moderating influence on the leadership. Moreover as they left the Party 
they took with them the support of those sections of the community who 
were themselves becoming increasingly disenchanted with the MIC and
(15*0its policies. In addition, large sections of the mercantile
community, a significant source of finance for the MIC, were alienated
(155)by the Party's 'extremist policies'.
Tamil Murasu, 12 March 19*4-8; Indian Daily Mail, 12 April 19*48. 
Tamil Murasu, 22 December 19*48.
Ibid., 16 February 19*4-9*
Tamil Nesan, 12 March 19*48.
Ibid.
(151)
(152)
(153) 
(15*4) 
(155)
Agitations within the Party to abandon the boycott, such agitation
which had been rife within the Singapore Regional. Indian Congress from
as early as August 19*4?, soon took hold within branches on the mainland.
Most prominent here was the Selangor branch and its President from
December 19*49, S* Athinahappan, who was also editor of the Tamil Nesan.
Athinahappan used his press position to campaign for a policy of
cooperation with the Government. He argued that the Malays were opposed
to immediate independence on the grounds that it would lead to their
domination by the Chinese and I n d i a n s . A s  a result, by boycotting
the Constitution and demanding independence for Malaya, the Indians
were engaged in a futile exercise, the only result of which would be
(157)to antagonize the Malays. The Indian community in Malaya would
have to accept that its future was 'inextricably bound up with that of
(158)the Malays and the Chinese'. Athinahappan further pointed out that
the partners of the MIC in the AMCJA were now participating in the
(159)Federal and State Councils. They were pursuing a constructive
policy as was, in a sense, the MCP when it decided to embark on open 
insurrection against the Government's Constitutional policies. A 
Constitutional boycott was negative: it left the MIC drifting.
The MIC position was further threatened by the emergence of nev; 
organizations purporting to represent Indian political interests.
Most notable here was the Federation of Indian Organizations, formed 
by Indian Councillors who, on being expelled from the MIC, were seeking 
a new political base.^^^ However, the Federation of Indian
Ibid., 25 September 19*49.
Ibid.
Indian Daily Mail, 10 May 1950.
Ibid., 25 December 19*49*
See Chapter VI, pp. £1^ ; Indian Daily Mail, 19 April 1950.
(156)
(157)
(158)
(159)
(160)
Organizations remained elitist and limited in appeal. The formation of
the Malayan Chinese Association in 19*49, in which Tan Cheng Lock played
a leading role, was a decisive blow against the policy of the MIC.
Tan Cheng Lock had been President of the AMCJA. He had been the
architect of the coalition's opposition to the Federation Agreement.
With the demise of the AMCJA in mid-19*48, Tan Cheng Lock worked for
the establishment of the MCA as a party which would co-operate fully
(161)with the Government. Whilst the MIC was expelling Indian
Councillors from the Party, the MCA granted automatic membership to
(162)those in the Chinese community who had received Government nominations.
The MIC was isolated. For example, with the formation of the
Communities Liaison Committee in January 19*49, the Government failed to
(*165)appoint an Indian representative. Later in the year when M.N.
Cumarasaray, a South Indian Tamil, was nominated by the Government for 
this Committee, his name did not appear in official communiques. In 
early 1950, when the Government announced its intention of forming a 
cabinet composed of representatives from each of the communities, the 
exclusion of the Indian community from constitutional advance became 
a real possibility.
That the MIC clung so tenaciously, and with such futility, to the 
boycott policy was due essentially to one man - the President,
Budh Singh. He was a man of strong, extreme beliefs, incapable of 
compromise, unwilling to reassess and reflect. At the 19*48 annual 
session of the MIC, the anti-boycott Malacca branch attempted to oust
Straits Times, 28 February 19*49*
(162) Constitution stated that 'the Chinese members of the
Legislative and Executive Councils would automatically become 
officers of the Association'. See G.P. Means, Malaysian Politics, 
London, 1970, p. 120.
(163) £ee chapter y^  p# 143^
Budh Singh but, with the support of powerful factions in Selangor,
Penang and Singapore, he successfully defended his position.
Two years later the anti-boycott, anti-Budh Singh feelings within the
(165)
Party were much stronger. In April 1950? he was replaced by
K. Ramanathan, whose first act as President was to abandon the 
boycott* In his first Presidential speech he declared that hence­
forth the MIC would participate in the working of the Constitution 
and 'by so doing expose its inadequacies and demand a real and 
substantial political advance1/
Predictably there was opposition to the change. It did not
escape the attention of the Indian Daily Mail that in the same month
that. ' the British Government had announced plans for the
formation of a representative Cabinet, the MIC had abandoned its
/1 fin  ^
Constitutional boycott. The Paper also drew attention to the
fact that the fourth annual session of the Party had been dominated
by the merchant class, as shown by the fact that the Accounts Bill,
which severely threatened the interest of Indian merchants, had
prompted perhaps the most committed discussion.Ramanathan,
the new President, was also Secretary of the All Malaya Chettiars
Chamber of Commerce. The Indian Daily Mail was supported by the
Singapore Regional Indian Congress, which had earlier been such
(169)a ferocious critic of the boycott. The Singapore branch,
Tamil Nesan, 5 July 19*4-8.
See letter from A. Balakrishnan to ,£>. Govindaraj, 25 December 1953 
(MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Presidential Address by K. Ramanathan at the fourth annual session 
of the MIC, 29-30 April 1950 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Indian Daily Mail, *4 May 1950.
Ibid., 12 May 1950.
Ibid., 5 May 1950.
(16*4)
(165)
(166)
(167)
(168) 
(169)
depleted by the defection of moderate members following the 
resignation of Jumabhoy, was, by 1950? merely a radical rump.
They feared that the ending of the boycott implied the emergence 
of communal politics and communal bargaining. They wished to be 
left out.
The decision in 1950 to abandon the Constitutional boycott was 
clearly a triumph of political reality over idealism within the 
Indian community. Even so, the successful re-engagement of the 
community in formal politics in Malaya v/as to prove difficult 
to achieve. It was to take some four years before the Indian 
community securely positioned itself in Malaya's political 
establishment.
V 138.
Indian Participation In Politics: Political Reform
And The Indian Response.
(i)
The nature and extent of Indian participation in formal politics
throughout the period under study was determined to a large extent
by the changing Malayan political infrastructure. Immediately after
the Occupation the scope for formal politics was limited essentially to
advisory councils. These were introduced by the British in 19^5 to
'bring into consultation the various communities in the country and to
(1)seek their advice on the problems which face the administration*.
The councils were composed almost entirely of the wealthy and English-
educated, who were noted for their cordial relations with the British
administrators. Tan Cheng Lock and E.E.C. Thuraisingham were typical 
(2)of this group.
The British Military Administration Advisory Council, established
in late 19^5, contained seven Indians, of whom four were professionals,
(3)two were businessmen and one an estate clerk. The Malayan Union 
Advisory Council, established in 19^6, was dominated by Doraisamy Iyer, 
a lawyer and by H.H. Abdoolcader, who had been a councillor in the pre-
(if)
war years. Neither had been involved m  the Indian Independence League.
M.U. File l6V ^ 6, Speech by Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer 
for Negri Sembilan Advisory Council, September 19^5 (N.A. Kuala 
Lumpur).
(2) Malcolm Macdonald later referred to E.E.C. Thuraisingham as 'one of 
the most influential and trusted leaders in Malaya*. Indian Daily Mail, 
6 October 1951-
M.U. (Confidential) File 325/^6, Report by Deputy Director, Malayan 
Security Service, 18 June 19^6 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
V.M.N. Menon, M.P. Rajagopal and later P.P. Narayanan were Trade Union
representatives on the Council and could be described as the only members
with lower middle-class origins. Hence the councils were filled mainly
from the upper classes though great care was taken to ensure that all
Indian groups - merchants, Muslims, Hindus and workers - were
represented. However ethnic suspicions within the community were so
powerful that not all interests were satisfied. For example in Singapore
in 19^7* Tamil merchants, annoyed that Indian mercantile interests were
represented by a North Indian, R.N. Jumabhoy, petitioned the authorities
(5)for separate Tamil merchant representation.
It is apparent that the Indian representatives on the councils
commanded little support throughout the whole community. This militated
against the rise of a responsible leadership, acceptable to the
authorities and to the Indian community as a whole. This ’elite1 was,
to use Professor H.J. Benda's terminology, a 'modernizing, traditional 
(6)elite'. However its role as an innovating force was limited by its
restricted rapport with the Indian masses and even with the major
political groups within Indian society. For example, in June 19^7
V.M.N. Menon voted in the Federal Legislative Council against the abolition
(7)of toddy shops, a motion introduced by S.B. Palmer. Since the MIC
had embarked on a temperance programme in 19^6, Menon was clearly out of
step with opinion in the Indian community. The furore this action
(
provoked, eventually led to Menon's dismissal from the MIC. In 19^8 
C
M.U. File 175A6, Vols. I and II, Singapore Advisory Council 
Proceedings, 17 April 19^7 (N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
For an excellent study of leadership in directly-ruled and indirectly- 
ruled colonial territories, see H.J. Benda, 'Political elites in 
colonial Southeast Asia: an historical analyses*, Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, Vol. 7* April 19&5* pp. 233-251.
(7) Malayan Union Advisory Council Proceedings, 9 June 19^7* B100-102; 
Indian Daily Mail, 10 June 19^7.
Tamil Nesan, 26 August 19^7*
political opinion in the Indian community favoured a boycott of the
councils* because they were felt to be unrepresentative and to retard the
political advancement of the country. While this campaign for a
Constitutional boycott gathered momentum, the Indian representatives
(9)stubbornly clung to their positions. In other words though the 
MIC attempted to project itself as the spokesman for the Indian 
community, it was unable to engage the energies of the Indian 
councillors.
However it should also be noted that the elites themselves were
deeply concerned about their unrepresentative character. For example
in March 1951* R* Ramani, who typified this elite, declined an
invitation to become a Cabinet member because he feared that acceptance
would lead to accusations within the community that he was hungry for
p o w e r . C e r t a i n l y  his acceptance would have split the Indian
community. Moreover the Indian representatives on these councils were
occasionally confused as to whether they represented Indian interests
or occupational interests. This ambivalence can be illustrated by
the resignation of P.P. Narayanan and M.P. Rajagopal from the Federal
Legislative Council in October 1953 in protest against the absence
(11)of an Indian in the enlarged Cabinet. As Indians they felt obliged
to resign; as trade union representatives the issue did not affect 
them. Their decision to follow the dictates of race sparked off a 
serious controversy within the Selangor and Penang branches of the 
Labour Party.
See chapter IV, pp. 129,133. Indian Daily Mail, 12 April 19^8.
Ten council members were expelled from the MIC in April 19^8 for 
opposing the constitutional boycott policy of the MIC.
Indian Daily Mail, 14 March 1951*
(11) Singapore Tiger Standard, 13 October 1953*
(12)
Ibid. For further details of this controversy, see pp. 149“15^*
The representatives were also confronted with the dilemma of 
reconciling their community's welfare with British policy, while 
simultaneously safeguarding their own nominated positions. They could 
not act as spokesmen for their community whilst that community viewed 
them with deep suspicion and whilst they owed their position to the 
colonial regime. This system of representation encouraged the emergence 
of an Indian elite who shared the conservatism and pro-British loyalties 
of their counterparts in the other communities. This had two 
consequences. First, the Indian councillors worked with the Malay and 
Chinese representatives in the Independenee of Malaya Party (IMP) and 
the so-called Radical Party of Penang, and thereby helped to bring
(13)moderate Indian political opinion into these multi-racial organizations.
(14)Second, the Indian councillors sought a base in Indian society.
In the early 1950s, finding the struggle against the Communist
revolt an increasing strain, the British tried to foster the growth of
moderate multi-racial parties, most notably the IMP, as a counterpoise
to the MCP. Here they could rely upon the support of the conservative
elites. Indians formed the backbone of the IMP, though the founder and
(15)leader was Dato Onn. However this Indian elite became increasingly
aware of their lack of support within their community and in July 1950
formed the Federation of Indian Organisations in an attempt to mobilize
(16)
the existing Indian organizations under their leadership. But the
councillors failed to attract mass support; they even failed to 
influence political and ideological developments in their community.
(13) Indian Councillors in the IMP included E.E.C. Thuraisingham,
R. Ramani and P.P. Narayanan. Dr. N.K. Menon, a Councillor from 
Penang,remained active in the Radical Party of Penang in the early 
1950s and was responsible for attracting Indian professional groups 
into the Party's ranks. See R.K. Vasil, Politics In A Plural Society: 
A Study of non-communal political parties in Malaysia, London, 1971, 
pp. 50-55, 80, 99.
(14) See chapter VI, pp. 212-214*
^5) Vasil, op.cit., p. 59*
Indian Daily Mail, 26 July 1950.
It is ironic that many of these councillors who often sought
associate membership to the UMNO in the late 1940s were bitter critics
(17)of the MIC when it joined the Alliance in 195*+* Political experience
on the councils does not seem to have bred in them political wisdom.
With respect to Singapore, when mass parties began to emerge in the mid-
1950s, this elite was predictably discredited as being 'colonial
(18)stooges'. Their career in the councils destroyed their political
future. R. lumabhoy, N. Mallal and M.J. Namazie were all left stranded
(19)as the tide of politics turned inexorably against them.
(ii)
Though the outbreak of the Communist revolt in June 1948 was 
immediately followed by political repression, it was soon evident that 
repression could not contain the Communist threat and that a political 
initiative was urgently required to reverse the deteriorating situation. 
In 19^9 Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner, encouraged the formation
(17)
Ibid., 12 September 1949. V.M.N. Menon, S.O.K. Ubaidullah,
R. Ramani, P.P. Narayanan and E.E.C. Thuraisingham were associate 
members of the UMNO in 1949 • For more details on the MIC-Alliance 
controversy see chaptef VII, pp. 244-245*
(18)
Yeo Kim Wah, Political Development in Singapore, 1945-55* Singapore, 
1973* P* 101, footnote 42.
(19)
R. Jumabhoy, born in India; businessman; Municipal Councillor, 
1938-48; Member, Executive Council, Singapore; President, Singapore 
Indian Chamber of Commerce, 1949-50; President, Singapore Indian 
Association, 1949-52. Served on various committees of the 
Legislative Council.
N.A. Mallal, born in Pakistan; educated in London University; lawyer; 
Municipal Councillor, 1936-41; Legislative Councillor, 1948-55; 
founder member, Singapore Progressive Party; retired from politics 
since 1955-
M.J. Namazie, born in India; educated in Oxford; lawyer, company 
director; President, Singapore Indian Muslim League and All Malaya 
Muslim League.
of the MCA to consolidate the moderates in the Chinese community, but it
was Macdonald who attempted to stem the tide of discontent within all
c o m m u n i t i e s . F i r s t  he tried to involve the various communities in a
discussion of their problems by establishing the Communities Liaison
Committee in January 19^9- ^he CLC made its debut simply as the Sino-
Malay Goodwill Committee which caused considerable anger amongst the 
(21)Indians. Later the CLC was expanded, and E.E.C* Thuraisingham, a
(22)Ceylonese, was appointed chairman. Somewhat predictably this did not
quell Indian criticism, partly because Thuraisingham was notoriously
(23)Anglophile and partly because of his Ceylonese origins. Later
(2*0M.N. Cumarasamy was appointed to the Committee. The objective of
the CLC was to allow representatives of each community to discuss the
problems peculiar to each of them. It also brought together prominent
individuals from each ethnic group bound by close friendship,
(25)educational and professional ties. The CLC was crucial in the
attempts to find a solution to the citizenship controversy, the language 
issue and the question of elections.
For more information on the role of Henry Gurney in the formation 
of the MCA, see M. Clark, 'The Malayan Alliance and its 
Accommodation of Communal Pressures, 1952-62', M.A. Thesis, University 
of Malaya, 196*f, p. 21.
Indian Daily Mail, 20 April 19^9*
Ibid.
Ibid.
Indian Daily Mail, 20 September 19^9. However M.N. Cumarasamy's name 
never appeared in the official communiques of the CLC.
The CLC included five Malays - Dato Onn, Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang 
(Perak mentri-besar), Salleh Hakim (Selangor State Councillor), Dr. 
Mustapha Osman (Kedah) and Zainal Abidin (Secretary-General, UMNO); 
four Chinese - Dr. Lee Tiang Keng, C.C. Tan, Yong Shook Lin and Tan 
Cheng Lock, all were state councillors; one Ceylonese - E.E.C. 
Thuraisingham, and one Indian - M.N. Cumarasamy, a fairly unknown 
figure in Indian political circles.
(20)
(21)
(22)
(25)
(2*f)
(25)
In its first major statement in September 19^ +9, the CLC declared
in favour of a thorough reconsideration of the citizenship provisions
of the Federal Constitution, the election of members to the Federation's
legislatures, elections for municipal councils, a franchise based on
Federal citizenship and the compulsory teaching of English and Malay in
(26)Government and aided schools. On this last point, it foreshadowed the
Barnes Report of 1951- In April 1950 the CLC made fresh proposals for
(27)citizenship reforms. It suggested that there be a ten year
(?R)
residential requirement as opposed to the existing fifteen years.
It recommended that as a result of this 'political concession on the part
of the Malays', the Government should compensate by making extra
efforts to 'ensure the full participation of Malays in the commercial life 
(29)of the country'. Thus the CLC ushered in the practice of communal
bargaining over sensitive political issues, a tradition which survives 
in the Alliance of today.
The CLC was comp&sed essentially of men of goodwill trying desperately 
to find solutions through compromise rather than coercion. The role of 
Macdonald here was crucial. He initiated the CLC, acted as 'liaison 
officer', and attended all the sessions. It is quite clear that through 
the CLC, the British were attempting to promote to national status, 
leaders of each community who were acceptable to the British.
Macdonald was able to act as a very sensitive channel for the authorities 
of opinions and feelings within the CI£, The information he could command 
was essential because of the Communist insurgency. If changes to the
Straits Times, 18 September 19^9- 
Ibid., 19 April 1950.
Ibid.
Ibid.
(26)
(27)
(28) 
(29)
Constitution were now necessary in order to diminish the appeal of the
MCP, the British had to make a display of consulting the local
communities. The CLC can also be regarded as a kind of 'test bore'
to assess the depth of racial antagonism and undercurrents within each
racial group. The CLC hence epitomized the British policy of fostering
the aspirations of 'natural' nationalists over 'communist opportunism',
ensuring of course that any concessions to 'genuine' nationalists
(^ 10 ^
would not threaten British interests.
The reactions of the Indians to the CLC's Report of September 19*+9
(31)was one of enthusiasm despite initial misgivings. Budh Singh,
President of MIC, though slightly annoyed over the exclusion of the
MIC in the deliberations, welcomed the CLC as a forum where issues such as
self-government, nationality, citizenship and education could be 
(32)discussed. However the Indian Daily Mail, the Tamil Murasu and Tamil
(33)organizations remained critical of the CLC and its members. What
was perhaps most significant about the CLC was that occasionally it 
projected the overwhelming suspicions of the Chinese by the Malays.
Though on the surface Chinese and Malay members had reached agreement 
on the vital issues of citizenship and Malay privileges, in private Dr. 
Mustapha Osman from Kedah and Dato Zainal Abidin of the UMNO, were 
opposed to liberal citizenship laws and insisted on the preservation of
(3*0MajLay privileges. Moreover Malay members, in particular Zainal Abidin,
Straits Times, k March 19*i-9*
Malaya Tribune, 20 September 19*f9*
Ibid.
Tamil Murasu and Indian Daily Mail editorials for the entire month 
of September 19*^ 9 were critical of the CLC.
Tan Cheng Lock to Yong Shook Lin, 19 January 1950 (Tan Cheng Lock 
Papers, N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(3*0
were firmly convinced that nationality was more significant than
citizenship and were eager that non-Malays become state nationals before
(35)gaining Federal citizenship. Moreover the moderate recommendations
of the CLC were denounced by the 'Varsity Malays' who declared that 
it was a matter for consideration 'whether they should prefer continuing 
under the present system of Government to living under a Government
comprising principally of Chinese towkays, Indian lawyers and Malay
. , (36) puppets1•
(iii)
The years 1950-1952 saw major political reforms, principally the
introduction of the ministerial system, changes in citizenship laws and
the introduction of elections. These changes were introduced
essentially because the war against the communists was dragging on
with little apparent success for the Government. Expenditure in
connection with the Emergency had risen from $>2k million in 19^8 to
(37)$120million in 1950* Communist attacks on the railways, tin-mines
and rubber-estates had assumed dangerous proportions.
J. Griffiths, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and J. Strachey,
Secretary of State for War, were sent to Malaya in June 1950. They
were followed in December 1951 hy the then Secretary of State for the
(39)Colonies, Oliver Lyttleton. The MIC submitted a memorandum to
^35) CLC, -meeting, 29 December 19^9 (Tan Cheng Lock Papers).
Indian Daily Mail, 20 May 1950.
Straits Times, 6 May 1950.
Malayan Monitor, volume 3* No* 12, December 1950.
Tamil Nesan, June 1950; Malay Mail, 10 December 1951.
Griffiths on 2 June 1950 urging the transfer of power to the local
people and the introduction of elections within a 'reasonable' time.^^
The MIC also suggested that representation in the legislatures be in
(VO
proportion to the population of the various communities. To
Lyttleton, the Indians submitted two separate memoranda, one from the
(Zf2)
MIC, the other from the Federation of Indian Organizations. The
memoranda differed only with respect to their recommendations on 
(43)
citizenship. The fact that two memoranda were presented undermined
the representative claims of both the MIC and the FIO.
The visits by British Ministers in 1950 and 1951 coincided with a 
growing belief in British circles in Malaya that the authorities would 
have to nurture leadership within each community in order to woo the 
masses away from the Communists. In March 1950 the High Commissioner 
announced the introduction of the 'Member System' whereby Malayans 
would be appointed as head of various Government departments in order to
. . . (44)gam administrative experience. Gurney saw this as 'a sure and steady
(if5)
progress towards freedom and democracy'. The first appointments under
this system were made in April 1951- The appointments involved three 
Malays, (Dato Onn, Tengku Yaacob Sultan Hamid who was a brother of the 
Kedah ruler, and Dato Mahmud bin Mat, chief minister of Pahang), one
Memorandum submitted by the MIC delegation to Rt. Hon. Mr. J. 
Griffiths, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2 June 1950, 
signed by K. Ramanathan, K.L. Devaser, Gurubaksh Singh Sambhi 
(MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
Memorandum from the MIC to 0. Lyttleton, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 2 December 1951 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur); Malay Mail,
10 December 1951*
Malay Mail, 10 December 1951•
The Member Bystem was proposed in April 1950, approved by the Legis­
lative Council in January 1951 and put into effect in March 1951- See, 
Memorandum Relating to the Proposal for the Introduction of a System 
Under Which Departments of Government Will Be Grouped and Placed Under 
Members Who Will Be Responsible Therefore to the High Commissioner and 
Certain of Such Members Will Be Appointed From Among Unofficial 
Members of the Legislative Council, Council Paper No. 49 of 1950. 
Federation of Malaya.
Straits Times, 9 October 1950.
(4o)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
Ceylonese (E.E.C. Thuraisingham) and one Chinese (Dr. Lee Tiang Keng,
CLC Member)
Because no Indian had been appointed to the Cabinet this announcement
(47)was met by an uproar from the Indian community. In reply Gurney
explained that an Indian councillor who had been approached in this matter
(48)had declined the post. Gurney was referring here to R. Ramani who had
(49)refused the appointment ’for personal as well as political reasons’.
Ramani's fear was that the invitation to him as President of the FIO would
exacerbate the antagonism between the FIO and other Indian organizations
and aggravate existing divisions within the c o m m u n i t y . H e  had been
criticized at the time of the formation of the FIO as being ambitious to
an unseemly degree, and had been stigmatized as 'the arch seeker of 
(51)them all*. However this explanation did not quell the criticisms
over the omission of an Indian from the Cabinet. The Indian Daily Mail
which considered the Member System as 'an outmoded and diabolical form of
dyarchic administrative reform*, was nevertheless irate over this 
(52)
omissxon. The Indian papers also criticised Ramani*s refusal and in
despair the councillor declared that he 'was happy in the thought that as
apparently I can never hope to do right, there was no sense in
(53)attempting to do anything at all ....'
The appointments were to the departments of Home Affairs, Agriculture 
and Forestry, Lands and Mines and Communications, Education, and 
Health.
Indian Daily Mail, 14 March 1951*
Ibid.
Singapore Tiger Standard, 2 September 1951* 
Sunday Mail, 2 September 1951*
Ibid.
Indian Daily Mail, editorial, 15 March 1951, 10 April 1951*
Sunday Mail, 2 September 1951*
(46)
(4?)
(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
The Member System was expanded in October 1953 with the inclusion
of Dr. Ismail (UMNO) and H.S. Lee (MCA).^^ Still with no Indian in the
Cabinet, all five Indians on the Federal Legislative Council resigned to
(55)save 'our own honour and the honour of our countrymen*. They were
disturbed as to why the Government never explained 'either why Indian 
participation in this expansion [of the Member System^ was considered 
inappropriate at this stage or why the Government has now turned back
<a,i*
on its protesijfions of anxiety to secure Indian participation for the
purpose of achieving a broad-based administration*• They argued
further that since Cabinet members had to be chosen from the
Legislative Council, it was clear that they had been considered
unsuitable for office and hence were an embarrassment to the 
(57)Government. If they left, the Government would be free to
appoint whoever they felt had the more appropriate qualifications.
The letter of resignation continued in increasingly melodramatic 
language:
For this reason primarily and in the conviction that the 
attitude of the Government is bound to create the feeling here 
and elsewhere that the Indian community is no longer regarded 
by Government as of any political significance now or in the 
future, we have no alternative but to step back to the side 
of our countrymen and share with them the burden of their 
economic insignificance and political unimportance.(58)
(5*0
(55)
(56)
(57)
(58)
Sunday Times, 11 October 1953« See also, Harry Miller, Prince and 
Premier, London, 1959, pp* 123-8.
Sunday Times, 11 October 1953- The Indian Councillors included 
R. Ramani, V.M.N. Menon, S.O.K. Ubaidullah (Associated Indian 
Chamber of Commerce), P.P. Narayanan and M.P. Rajagopal (Malayan 
Trade Union Congress).
Joint letter of resignation in Sunday Times, 11 October 1953*
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ramani also viewed the apparent neglect of the Indians as a constitutional
error: 'By no act of diplomacy or geometry can you construct a triangle
by elongating two sides. It also makes it more and more difficult for
(59)the third side to reach up to complete the triangle'.
The MIC supported these resignations though all five councillors
belonged to the FICU,^^ The MIC sponsored a public meeting to protest
against the Government's attitude and submitted a memorandum to the High
(61)
Commissioner. However the Malayan Indian Association felt that the
(62)resignations were too hasty. Tengku Abdul Rahman watched with
interest. After many years of being attacked by Indian politicians
for being communal, the Indians themselves were now behaving in an
outrageously communal fashion. He concluded that the resignations
'prove that all talk about non-communal parties is an absolute sham'.
Two of the councillors who resigned were P.P. Narayanan and
M.P. Rajagopal, both trade union representatives. The Labour Party and
the Malayan Trade Union Congress were appalled that they should resign
(6A)
over a purely communal issue. Indeed Lee Moke Sang, the Selangor
representative on the Malayan Trade Union Congress resigned when the
(65)Congress refused to censure both men. Lee pointed out that their
Ibid.
Malay Mail, 19 October 1953*
Straits Times, 19 October 1953* See also, Letter from President,
MIC to the High Commissioner, requesting an Indian Member in the 
Cabinet, 29 October 1953* This letter is reproduced in the Annual 
Report of the MIC, 1953-195^ Appendix C (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Malay Mail, 11 October 1953-
Singapore Tiger Standard, 12 October 1953#
Ibid.
Ibid.
(59)
(60) 
(61)
(62)
(63)
(6*4-)
(65)
action had far reaching consequences because P.P. Narayanan and
M.P. Rajagopal had been members of a number of important Government
committees, notably the Unemployment Code Division, the Federal
Elections Committee and the Committee to Consider Ways and Means of
(66)
Replacing Expatriate Officers with Asians. Lee feared that the
resignation of the Trade Union representatives o^er this issue would 
'give rise to distrust by workers of other communities as to whether 
they can truly serve their interests irrespective of race, creed or 
colour'.(67)
In reply the Indian trade unionists argued that they occupied
communal seats since 'of the six seats allocated for labour, two were
(62)
for Indians, two were for Chinese and two were for Malays'.
P.P. Narayanan continued defensively, 'we are being sacrificed at the 
altar of this muddle of communal representation. The whole issue is 
Constitutional. As long as I sit in the Federal Council as an Indian, 
that community can ask me to get out*.^^ Ramani supported this 
interpretation. 'The position is that of the labour group councillors 
who are Indians, neither of them would have gone into the Legislative Council 
if they had not been Indians. Primarily they must be Indians before they 
are labour representatives* Therefore the Indian representation was
(66) Ibid.
Ibid.
(68) T... Ibid.
(6q)
Singapore Tiger Standard, Ik October 1953• 
Malay Mail, 14 October 1953*
One favourable consequence of this raging controversy was that
it produced a considerable measure of unity in an otherwise divided Indian
society. In December 1953* the Government invited the MIC to submit
names for appointment to the Federal Council, an unprecedented move
since previously appointments had been made without prior consultations
(71)with the Indian community. The MIC submitted the names of
K. Ramanathan, K.L. Devaser and V. Manickavasagam, from whom the
(72)Government selected Ramanathan. The issue of an Indian Cabinet
member was finally defused in late 1953 when V.M.N. Menon was appointed
(73)as Member for Posts and Telegraphs.
(iv)
Perhaps the major political change in the period after 1950 was
the introduction of elections, first for local and municipal councils
and subsequently for the Federal Council. The first elections to be
(7h)
held v/ere for the Georgetown municipality in December 1951- As the
councils still had one-third of their non-official members nominated 
and also contained a substantial number of official members, the 
Government maintained an automatic majority. Moreover elections were 
limited to parties acceptable to the Government and the MCP remained 
outlawed. The significance of the election was still further reduced
Tamil Nesan, 18 December 1953*
Annual Report of the MIC, 1953-5^ approved at the Eighth Annual 
Session of the MIC at Prai, April 195^» P* 6.
Ibid.
G. Hawkins, Report on Introduction of elections in the Municipality 
of Georgetown, Penang, 1951, Kuala Lumpur, 1953» PP* 20-21.
(71)
(72)
(73) 
(7k)
by the fact that the councils exercised limited powers.
In Penang the elections were for nine seats. Issues were purely
local and the results depended more on personalities than upon parties 
(75)or programmes. A rather surprising feature of the elections was the
high proportion of Indian candidates who stood either on UMNO, Labour
(76)Party or Radical Party tickets. The MIG had decided to boycott the
(77)elections, arguing that they should be fought on non-communal lines.
However the Party allowed their members to participate under the
sponsorship of other parties. The UMNO selected Indian Muslims to
augment its appeal in a cosmopolitan Penang, while the Labour Party
and Radical Party successfully fielded prominent Indians such as
N. Ponnudurai who had achieved fame in 19^8 campaigning for the secession
( 98)
of Penang from the Federation, Dr. N.K. Menon and Meera Husain.
It is clear from the Penang elections that the Indians stood for office 
as non-communal candidates, not from any ideological conviction but simply 
because their social and personal status made them attractive candidates. 
Furthermore since the majority of the non-communal parties were 
composed in the main of Chinese, the promotion of Indian candidates 
protected them from the charge of Chinese communalism.
(75)
Indian Daily Mail, 8 December 1951*
(76) Ibid. Among the Indians who contested the Penang elections were 
A.M. Abu Bakar (merchant), Dr. S.M. Baboo (medical practitioner), 
both on UMNO tickets, Dr. N.K. Menon (medical practitioner),
E.M. Meera Husain (lawyer) as Radical Parijy candidates, and 
A. Balakrishnan (Insurance Manager), N. Ponnddurai (Clerk), A. Raja 
Gopal (Insurance Agent), Jaswant Singh (Petition Writer) and 
P. David (teacher) as Labour Party candidates.
Indian Daily Mail, 18 August 1951-
G. Hawkins, Report on Introduction of elections in the municipality 
of Georgetown, Penang, 19515 P« 21.
(77)
(78)
The Kuala Lurapur municipal elections of February 1952 had major
political consequences. Firsft;, they saw the emergence of inter-communal
(79)co-operation at the polls in the form of an UMNO-MCA alliance.
Second, they tested the significance of Indian communal voting and the 
appeal of Indian candidates in both Indian dominated and non-Indian 
dominated constituencies. Third, rather paradoxically, the elections 
marked the transformation of Dato Onn from an avowed multi-racialist 
into a Malay fanatic. This in a sense marked the 'beginning of the end 
of his IMP'.(80)
As early as November 1950 the All Malayan Indian Congress Committee
had decided that the MIC should contest municipal and town council 
( 8*1)elections. However it recognised that inter-community cooperation
was necessary for electoral success, '^ he MIC Working Committee confirmed
( 82)the above decision in January 1951* A few months latef, K. Ramanathan,
President of the MIC urged the UMNO and the MCA to join the MIC in an 
(8 )^
electoral pact. He suggested the formation of an electoral board
(8A)which would choose the candidates and their seats. He declared
that,
any party which refuses to put up candidates, foregoes a valuable 
right, neglects a responsibility and miserably misses a great 
opportunity for co-operation and service .... I am constrained 
to feel that it would be the highest blunder and silly self- 
effacement if any party were to decide to sit with folded hands 
when elections come off.(85)
(79) Malay Mail, 9 January 1952.
(Rn')
See, Vasil, op.cit., pp. 80-81.
Minutes of All Malayan Indian Congress Committee Meeting,
19 November 1950 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur); Tamil Nesan,
20 November 1950.
Straits ^imes, 26 January 1951*
(8^  Tamil Nesan, 8 June 1951.
Address by K. Ramanathan at the Fifth Annual Session of the MIC,
9 June 1951 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur); Straits Times, 10 June 1951.
^8^  Address by K. Ramanathan, Fifth Annual Session of the MIC, 9 June 1951 
(MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
This view was prompted by an awareness that in 1951 Indians formed
(ft^i'l
a large percentage of the registered voters. The folly of the
Constitutional boycott of 19^8-50, was a sharp lesson to the Indians.
Indeed it was Ramanathan himself who had brought the boycott to an
end.^^ However the Tamil Murasu and the Indian Daily Mail remained
critical of MIC participation in the elections, arguing that the MIC
was an ethnic organization and that by participating in elections it
(8ft 1
would inject communalism into politics.
But whilst the MIC prepared itself for an electoral alliance with
the UMNO-MCA, a more attractive proposition appeared on the scene with
the formation of the IMP in September 1951• K.L. Devaser who had
replaced Ramanathan as MIC President, committed the MIC to Onn's IMP.
In February 1952 Devaser himself contested the Kuala Lumpur municipal
elections on an IMP t i c k e t . T h e  Indian Daily Mail was highly
critical. It condemned the action as an attempt 'to fly a national flag
on a communal mast'.^^ However the IMP's hopes were crushed by the
formation of an electoral alliance between the UMNO and the MCA in
(91)Selangor on 9 January 1952. The IMP and the MIC had predicted
that cosmopolitan Kuala Lumpur would respond to the multi-racial 
slogans of the IMP, augmented by the charisma of Dato Onn. Though 
the MCA leaders had supported the IMP, this had not dampened their 
enthusiasm for the Alliance at the polls.
Ibid.
See chapter IV, pp. 136-137*
Tamil Murasu, 26 November 1951; Indian Daily Mail, 5 December 1951. 
Indian Daily Mail, 29 February 1952.
Ibid.
Vasil, op.cit., pp. 56-59*
(86)
(87)
(88)
(89)
(90)
(91)
The UMNO-MCA coalition was a brilliant tactical move to exploit the 
communal sentiments of the electorate. Sentul, a Malay area was left to
the UMNO, while the Chinese-dominated Imbi and Petaling wards were left
(92) (9'5)to the MCA. 7 The Alliance won nine out of the twelve seats.
The IMP secured two seats and the remaining seat went to an Independent 
(9*0Indian. The IMP's two successful candidates were both Indians from
(95)the Bungsar ward, an Indian stronghold. The Independent Indian
(96)candidate was also from this area. Hence the only defeats the
Alliance suffered were in Indian areas. The implications were clear. 
Communalism was to be an entrenched feature of Malayan politics. The 
success of the UMNO-MCA pact spelt ruin for the IMP. The UMNO-MCA had 
fielded twelve candidates, five UMNO, six MCA, with one Indian woman
(92)
(93)
(9*0
(95)
In the 1952 Kuala Lumpur municipal elections, the racial 
composition of voters was as follows:
Constituency
Sentul
Bungsar
Imbi
Petaling
Malay
2,730
780
510
310
Chinese
720
390
1»**50
1,300
Source; Indian Daily Mail, 23 February 1952. 
Ibid.
Ibid. Vasil, op.cit., p. 58.
Bungsar Ward Elections, 1952
Indian
approx. 500 
2,8*1-2
no figures available
n
Candidate 
S.C.E. Singham
Party
Independent
Votes polled 
719
Result
won
Ethnic group 
Ceylon Tamil.
K.L. Devaser IMP 577 won Punjabi Hindu.
Mrs.
Devaki Krishnan IMP 570 won Ceylon Tamil.
Ahmad Mohd UMNO-MCA 517 lost Malay.
Raja Mohd Raja 
A Hang UMNO-MCA 508 lost Malay.
Mrs.
Karala Singham Labour *+66 lost Ceylon Tamil.
T. Rajendra IMP *+22 lost Ceylon Tamil.
Mrs.
E. Somasundaram UMNO-MCA 232 lost South Indian 
Tamil.
Source: Straits Times, 18 February 1952.
( ?6) ibid.
who was an associate member of the MCA and whose husband in the MIC
(97)was a staunch advocate of the MIC's participation in the Alliance.
Dato Onn, marching on the ticket of non-communalism had looked around 
to see that only Indians were in his army.
(98)
The Tamil Murasu saw the critical weakness of the IMP. It was
of little value to include prominent persons in the Party who merely
(99)rendered lip service to it and who had no mass support. This
limited support for the IMP from Malays and Chinese reduced it to an 
Indian organization. This was reminiscent of the position of the AMCJA 
in 19^8 when desertion by Chinese and Malay organizations left the 
Indians isolated. The MIC failed to see the writing on the wall. It 
stubbornly maintained a non-communal stance, and criticized the 
UMNO-MCA coalition as 'perpetuating communalism in a collective way'.^^"^ 
The sole MIC supporter of the Alliance, V.J. Somasundaram had resigned 
from the IMP in December 1991* dismissing it as a party'for the personal
glorification of a few nominated legislative, state and municipal
, , (101) members'•
The MIC also refrained from contesting the second municipal elections
in Kuala Lumpur held in December 1952. Instead it called upon the Indian
voters to support either the IMP or the Labour Party and to boycott 
(102)the UMNO-MCA. Somasundaram opposed this policy, fearing that it
( }
would arouse racial dissension. In retaliation Devaser suspended
Ibid.
Tamil Murasu, 20 February 1952.
Ibid.
Tamil Murasu, 27 February 1952; Tamil Nesan, 28 February 1952. 
Straits Times, 20 December 1951*
Tamil Nesan, 15 November 1952.
Ibid., 19 November 1952.
(97)
(98)
(99) 
(100) 
(101) 
(102) 
(103)
158.
(10M
him from the MIC for three months. The electoral success of the
Alliance in Selahgor encouraged the UMNO and MCA to extend their co­
operation to elections in Johore Bharu, where they won all the nine 
seats and then to Muar where they were successful in three out of the
( ‘I C\ Gv
four seats. In Malacca they suffered only one loss out of the
three seats contested. jn August 1953 in Seremban the Alliance
swept home with a total of ten out of twelve sdats. The two losses
were to Indian candidates, one a Labour Party member, the other a
powerful Independent.^
Until 195^ Indian organizations kept their distance from the UMNO-
MCA coalition. The only exception was in Penang where Indian Muslim
League candidates were pleased to contest on the Alliance ticket.
However in 195*+ certain MIC state branches and the Perak Progressive
Party negotiated with the Alliance to contest elections under the
latter's sponsorship. Therefore in late 195*+1 the Alliance candidate
in Batu Pahat was S.C. Macintyre, in Bungsar, K. Gurupatham, in Penang,
(109)S.M. Mohammed Idrus and m  Ipoh D.JR. Seenivasagara. All were
either Indians or Ceylon Tamils. All won their seats. When
D.R. Seenivasagam abandoned the Alliance in early 1955 it cost him his
(110)seat in the July Federal Elections. He returned to office only
with the aid of the extreme Chinese communal vote in a by-election
. (111) 
m  1956-
(10*+)
(105)
(106)
(107)
(108)
(109)
(110)
(111)
Straits Times, 13 January 1953.
Indian Daily Mail, 22 December 1953*
Ibid., 2h August 1953*
Ibid.
See chapter II, pp. 55**5^ «
Straits Times, 17 August 195*+? Tamil Nesan, 28 December 195*+*
K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and the political process in Malaya, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1965» p. 200.
Ibid.
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(v)
By May 1953 the MIC had begun to agitate for Federal Elections
to be held in 195*+- It is possible that the MIC had been
( ' l  'l
influenced by a similar decision by the UMNO in April 1953*
Meanwhile in July the Government had established a Federal Elections
Committee on which Dato Onn's National Conference was heavily 
(11*+)represented. The MIC submitted a memorandum to the Committee
(  SI <"1 IT \
in October 1953? demanding elections the following year. It
further argued that all portfolios, except Defence and Finance, be
held by elected m e m b e r s . W h e n  the Federal Elections Committee
Report appeared in February 195*+ the MIC sent a further memorandum
asking that reserved seats be created in plural constituencies and
(117)that these seats be contested only by Indian candidates. It
demanded that ten percent of the seats in the Legislative Council,
except those representing special interests, be reserved for Indians.
In explaining this demand the memorandum cited the insurmountable
electoral disadvantages facing the Indian community. 'The preponderance
of the voters of other communities would never furnish a chance to the
Indian community, though the higher and educated strata of society may
(119)be inclined to be non-communal'.
Resolutions of the Seventh Annual Session of the MIC at Ipoh,
10 May 1953 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Straits Times, 8 April 1953*
G.P. Means, Malaysian Politics, London, 1970, p. 67* footnote 46. 
Annual Report of the MIC, 1953-5*+» P* 2 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur). 
Ibid.
Annual Report of the MIC, 1953-54, 'Memorandum of 26 March 195*+*» 
Appendix B (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur); Malay Mail, 28 March 195*+*
Annual Report of the MIC, 1953-5*+1 'Memorandum of 26 March 195*+'* 
Appendix B (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid., Tamil Nesan, 2 April 195*+*
(112)
(113)
(114)
(115)
(116)
(117)
(118) 
(119)
This memorandum stands as one of the major turning points in the 
political history of the Malayan Indian community in this period*
Faced with political extinction, the apostles of non-communalism, had 
joined the scramble for reserved communal seats* In April 195*+ the High
(120) riCommissioner rejected their demands* rl’he MIC then turned to Oliver
(121)Lyttleton, the Colonial Secretary, but here too they were rebuffed.
(122)The MIC, becoming more desperate, now turned to the Malay Rulers.
They met the Sultan of Selangor in July 195*+ who promised to raise the
matter at the Hulers* Conference later that month. The following month
the MIC received a joint refusal from the High Commissioner and the 
(1P"3))
Rulers. It was pointed out that the reserved seats issue had not
been raised by the MIC in their first memorandum in October 1953*
Moreover though the publication of the committee's report had been in
February 195*+1 the MIC had not made representations on the issue until
27 March. Finally the authorities rather sanctimoniously declared that
they were loathe to deviate from the principle that 'no racial or
communal limitations or reservations should be introduced into the
electoral contests and the candidates and voters alike should be free
from any such limitations or reservations'
The MIC demand had been supported by Ramani, who like the MIC had,
(125)so recently, been a fervent supporter of non-communalism. But
Padi Krishnan of the Malayan Indian Association attacked the demand as 
being 'insincere' and V.J. Somasundaram condemned the move as 'the
(120) Tamil Nesan, 27 April 195*+*
(121) Singapore Tiger Standard, *+ May 195*+
(122) Straits Times, 10 July 195*+*
(123) Ibid., 11 August 195*+*
(12*+) Ibid., 12 August 195*+*
(125) Tamil Nesan, 15 July 195*+*
brainwave of one or two leaders who wish to warm seats in the
(126)Legislative Council*. Another regular critic, Jagjit Singh,
President of the Penang MIC, denounced the demand as 'unrealistic1,
and he was suspended from the Party for his scurrillous comments on the
ic
(128)
(127)ambitions of the MIC leaders. Meanwhile the MIC held a publ
meeting on 23 August 195*+ to protest at the authorities' refusal.
But the MIC's attempt to resurrect the principle of communal
representation was short-lived. It was an attempt, bred, in the main,
by frustration at the failure of the evolving political system to
protect the interests of minority communities.
Indian fears of political oblivion were proved to be unfounded when
the MIC joined the Alliance in 195*+- In the General Elections of July
1955» though Indians formed only 3*9 per cent of the electorate as
against 11.2 per cent for the Chinese and 8*+. 2 per cent for the Malays,
and though Indians were not in a majority in any one constituency, two
Indians were elected, Macintyre in Batu Pahat and Sambanthan in
(129)Kinta Utara. Both won on MIC-Alliance tickets. The absence of an
(126)
(127)
(128)
(129)
Straits Times, 6 May 195*+, 23 August 195*+• 
Straits Times, 13 September 195*+•
Malay Mail, 2k August 195*+•
Ratnam, op.cit., p. 187, table 8 and p. 191.
Kinta Utara (Perak)
V.T. Sambanthan (MIC-Alliance)
(National Action 
Party)
(Labour Party)
Cik Mohd Yusuf bin 
Sheik Abdul Rahman
(Perak Malay 
League)
K.R.R. Choudhary
Mohd. Ramly bin 
Abdullah
Total electorate
Turn out
Batu Pahat (Johore)
Chelvasingham Macintyre (Alliance)
Dato Haji Syed Abdul Kader (Party Negara) 
bin Mohd
Total electorate 
Turn out
Source: Ratnam, op.cit., pp. 221, 223.
7,900 votes.
1,832 votes. 
357 votes.
21*+ votes. 
12,30*+
85.9^
18,968 votes 
2,717 votes
27,323
80.*$
effective opposition to the Alliance was striking. Dato Onn and his 
Party Negara, confronted a Malay electorate weary of his continually 
changing political stance and a Chinese populace increasingly concerned 
over his anti-Chinese posture. The Perak Progressive Party made its 
electoral debut with the rather amateurish Seenivasagam brothers, who 
at this stage showed little sign of the._.ability to manipulate Chinese 
communalism that was to be such a feature of their political careers in 
Independent Malaya. The extremist Malay parties, the Pan-Malayan 
Islamic Party and the Perak Malay League, isolated from the Chinese, 
Indians and the British were eliminated with ease from the formal 
political scene.
It is therefore relatively easy to account for the victory of the 
Alliance-supported Indians in Batu Pahat and Kinta Utara. It was a 
triumph of party over communalism and personality, particularly when 
one remembers that Macintyre's opponent in Batu Pahat was the powerful 
ex-Chief Minister of Johore. In 1955 Independence was clearly imminent 
and it was essential for the authorities to find a party with an 
efficient multi-racial leadership to carry the country into self- 
government. The Alliance had mastered communal politics; they were 
committed to the principles of democracy and the Commonwealth, and 
crucially,their relations with the British were excellent. In the 
circumstances the Indians desperately needed the patronage of the 
Alliance. The immediate post-independence years were to witness the 
rise of charismatic, populist Indian politicians, triumphant at the 
polls through sheer force of personality. This genre of leadership 
could not be achieved in 1955 within an Indian society, handicapped by 
the political boycott of the late 19*+0's, confused and muddled by the 
constantly changing political alignments of the early 1950's and the 
growing communalism of the middle of that decade.
163.
(vi)
In contrast to the mainland, Singapore's political life was 
dominated by Indians from 1948-54. The principal reason for this 
was that the 1948 Singapore Elections Ordinance conferred universal 
adult suffrage on all British subjects, residing in the Colony.
This was highly advantageous to the Indians, as is shown by the 
following table.
Table 1
Composition of Registered Voters in 1948
Ethnic Groups Voters on the roll Percentage of voters
Chinese 5,62? 25
Indians 10,141 45
Malays 3,146 14
Others 3,481 16
Total 22,395 100
Source: Yeo Kim Wah, Political Development in Singapore,
1945-55, p. 255.
(130) yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., p. 255.
Indians dominated the list of candidates who stood for election in
(1 'KO ^
1948, and they formed a majority of the successful candidates*
The Indian candidates were mainly professionals and many were born in 
(133)India* The elections therefore led to the rise of a political
faction dominated by the rich and educated. Their party programmes 
were not impressive. The issues debated at the polls were 
Malayanization of the civil service, improved social services, the 
institution of an elected majority in the Legislative Council within
(134)three years and whether Governor Franklin Gimson should be replaced.
The Malayan Democratic Union was highly critical of these Indian
(135)candidates. It accused them of being stooges of the British.
The MIC boycotted the election because it argued that it was undemocratic
/ si 7/' \
and indeed the MIC expelled its members who defied this decision.
Moreover the Malayan Democratic Union asked the Indian Government to 
prevent these Indians from participating in the elections, this 
presumably at the suggestion of the MIC. The Malayan Democratic
Ibid., p. 265, table 12
Results of 1948 elections by ethnic group
ethnic group seats won percentage of seats won percentage of
Indians 3 50
voters polled
45.3
Chinese 1 16.3 25*1
Malays 1 16.3 14.0
Others 1 16.3 15*6
Total 6 100 100
Ibid., p. 266.
Ibid., p. 264.
(135) Ibid., p. 263.
Indian Daily Mail, 7 October 1949*
Union in its telegram to Nehru accused . Indian candidates of
'opportunism and personal aggrandizement1, and 'of cooperation with
(”1 "57 ^the British in its scheme to perpetuate Colonialism in Malaya*.
The elections did not reveal any overt communal voting pattern
/ /j 7O \
except in the Malay area of Geylang which elected Sardon bin Jubir. ^ 
The dominance of Indians in Singaporean politics and their success at 
the polls can be attributed to the following factors. First, the 
Indians, unlike the Chinese, saw in the ballot box an instrument with 
which they could assert power in a predominantly Chinese state.
Second, the Indians constituted a highly literate political group.
Third, the Indian elite was skilled in debating the general issues of 
democracy and administrative reform rather than in populist politics, 
with its preoccupation with the specific issues of citizenship, language 
and Independence. Such a political style thrived in Singapore in the 
late 19^ +Os. It was discredited by the anti-colonialist movements of 
the mid-1950s.
In the 1951 Legislative Council elections the Indians again
demonstrated their influence in the Colony's politics, when fifteen out
(139)of a total of twenty-two candidates were Indian. The Indians
won four out of the nine seats. The Indian success was due in the
main to the fact that voting remained non-communal. But after 1953 the 
political atmosphere in Singapore was transformed with the rise of 
populist, Chinese-dominated politics, accentuated by a restless student
V. Thompson and R. Adloff, Minority Problems in South Fast Asia, 
Stanford, 1955* P* lO^ f.
Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., p. 26^.
Ibid., p. 266, footnote *+3*
Ibid.
(137)
(138)
(139)
(140)
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body and with the increasing tempo of anti-colonialism, marked by the
(141)emergence of the Peoples Action Party# In the 1955 elections,
fifty-six of the candidates were Chinese, only thirteen were Indian.
-n r, (1^3)Fifteen Chinese and four Indians were elected. Though voting still
remained basically non-communal, it was apparent that the political
decline of the Indians was due in part to the preponderance of Chinese
(144)voters in the Colony. In this respect it is important to note that
the Rendel Constitution of 1954 bad removed the electoral privileges 
that the Indians had enjoyed as British subjects from 1948.
In the post-1954 era the Indian politicians survived only through 
personal charisma and revolutionary zeal. The political careers of 
S. Rajaratnam, Devan Nair, Jamit Singh, S. Woodhull and J.J. Puthucheary 
were built upon non-racialism, youthful dynamism and volatility.
Ibid., pp. 281-282.
(142) ibid., p. 269, table 14.
Straits Times, 4 April 1955; Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., p.273i table 15. 
(144) yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., p. 273. 
ibid., p. 281.
(146) S. Rajaratnam, born in Ceylon; educated in London University; 
journalist; founder member, Peoples Action Party; Minister in 
Singapore Cabinet sincd 1959*
Devan Nair, born in Malacca; educated in Malaya and Singapore; 
Assistant Secretary, Singapore Teachers Union in 1946. Detained, 
1951-1953 For membership in the Anti-British League; member of 
People's Action Party; Member for Parliament, Bungsar, 1964-1969#
Jamit Sjngh, born in Ipoh; founder member, University Socialists 
Club; official, Pan-Malayan Socialist Front; joined Trade Union 
Movement in 1954; Secretary, oif Singapore Trade Union Working Committee, 
1956; Legal Adviser to various Trade Unions.
S. Woodhull, born in Federation; educated in University of Malaya; 
trade unionist; founder member, Socialist Club and Peoples Action 
Party; Secretary Naval Base Labour Union; Assistant Secretary,
Singapore Factory and Shop Workers Union; detained, 1963-64; retired 
from politics; banished to Malaya, where he is practising as a lawyer.
J.J. Puthucheary, born in Federation; educated in University of Malaya; 
trade unionist; founder member, Peoples Action Party and University 
of Malaya Socialist Club; assistant secretary, Singapore Factory and 
Shop Workers Union; detained 1951-52, 1956-59 and 1963-64; leader, 
Barisan Socialis; retired from politics; a lawyer in Malaysia; 
banned from Singapore.
Compiled from Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., pp. 293-295 and J.V. Morais,
The Leaders of Malaya and Who's Who. 1959-60. Kuala Lumpur, n.d.
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In the case of Woodhull, Jamit Singh and Puthucheary, their revolutionary 
excesses eventually led them into areas sensitive to the indigenous
(147)ruling oligarchy. In the 1960s they were all banished to the mainland.
(vii)
As formal Malayan politics moved from the advisory councils of 1945 
to the Federal elections of 1995? the British were anxious to create 
or engender a stable and loyal Malayan population. In this context the 
issues of citizenship and education were crucial. The issue of citizen­
ship was introduced into the political arena by the Malayan Union Plan 
of 1946. The Federation of Malaya Agreement two years later imposed 
stringent citizenship qualifications on the Indians and Chinese so that
by 1950 only approximately half a million Chinese and a quarter of a
(*1 UR}
million Indians were citizens of the Federation. These figures
represented approximately 20 per cent and 30 per cent of the Chinese
(149)and Indian populations respectively.
To the Indians citizenship was a perplexing issue. Many Indians
were undecided as to whether they should belong to India or to Malaya
and cherished hopes of maintaining dual citizenship. In June 1946
the Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce appealed to the Government
of India to support proposals for dual citizenship but with little 
("1 *->0
result. In May 1948 Macdonald had private discussions with Nehru
("147)
Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit., pp. 293-295*
/■
Annual Report. Federation of Malaya, 1950, p. 24.
(149) Total population in Malaya in 1950 - 5»226,549
Malays - 2,579,914
Chinese - 2,011,072
Indians - 564,454
Annual Report, Federation of Malaya, 1950, p. 24*
(1 ^
Jananayagam, 11 June 1946.
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(1 m  'j
on this issue, and in February 19^9 Budh Singh, President of the
MIC, during a visit to India petitioned for dual citizenship, on the
grounds that Malayan citizenship did not include the concept of 
('I s? ^
nationality* In August of the same year Ramani submitted a
memorandum to the Indian Constituent Assembly, requesting an Amendment
whereby Malayan Indians could retain Indian citizenship along with that
of Malaya. He argued that, 'whenever you become a Federal citizen,
it does not detract and it does not subtract from your nationality,
(15*0whether as an Indian, Chinese, British or any other nationality'.
This statement exposed him to severe criticism from the Chinese, Malays
(155)and certain Indian groups in Malaya, But citizenship legislation
passed on 1*f August 19^9 in India finally ended all hopes of dual
(156)citizenship for the Malayan Indians.
Apart from this agitation for dual citizenship, the Indians unlike 
the Chinese, failed to see citizenship as a serious issue in the politics 
of survival in Malaya. The Indian community at large was generally 
apathetic, whilst Indian politicians, when they did speak on this issue, 
tended to be indiscreet and often reckless. For example, in December 1950 
the Malaya Tribune reported a rush for Malayan citizenship by Indians, 
caused perhaps by legislative changes in Indian citizenship in 19*+9»
/ A fr<7 *\
Ramani cautioned the Indians against any such haste. Then in
January 1951? K* Ramanathan, President of MIC, described Federal 
citizenship as similar to 'wearing a silk shirt. There is no difficulty
Tamil Nesan, 12 May 19*+8.
(152)
(153)
(15*0
(155)
Tamil Nesan, 22 February 19^9* 
Malaya Tribune, 11 August 19^9- 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Tamil Nesan, 18 August 19^9-
(157) Malaya Tribune, 18 December 1950.
and there is nothing to lose* The silk shirt may be worn here; when 
we go back to India, the khaddar shirt may be worn. However one should 
see that the silk shirt is carefully preserved against decay1 .^^8)
In this he was implying that citizenship bestowed privileges but no 
obligations.
When J. Griffiths, the Colonial Secretary, arrived in June 1950»
the MCA petitioned him for jus soli in citizenship, whereas Indian
(159)representations made no mention of this issue. Again when Oliver
Lyttleton visited Malaya in December 1951» the Indians submitted two
(160)separate memoranda. Only on the citizenship issue, did their
demands differ. The MIC demanded a five years residence qualification
for citizenship. The Federation of Indian Organizations requested that
citizenship rights be accorded to Ceylonese and Indians on easier terms
(161)than to the Chinese because the former were British subjects*
Therefore the Indians displayed neither great concern nor any consensus
of opinion on the citizenship question.
In contrast the Chinese were keenly aware of this issue as was
reflected in their reactions to the Communities Liaison Committee's report
of 1950 which recommended the introduction of state nationality. This
recommendation on citizenship was embodied in an Ordinance introduced
(162)in the Legislative Council in June 1951- Devaser was 'suspicious', 
whilst the MCA was disappointed and called for a Royal Commission on
/ xi ^
citizenship. Until August 1951t the MCA and the Associated Chinese
Minutes of MIC working committee's emergency meeting, 11 February 
1951 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur); Tamil Nesan, 27 January 1951-
Indian Daily Mail, 4 June 1950-
Malay Mail, 10 December 1951-
Ibid.
Malaya Tribune, March 1951- 
Malaya Tribune, 10 June 1951-
(158)
(159)
(160) 
(161) 
(162) 
(163)
Chamber of Commerce opposed the Ordinance while the Indians were vague 
in their reaction, The Ordinance was later referred to a Select
Committee, where the Indian and Ceylonese members were- R. Ramani and
(165)Dr, A,E, Duraisamy respectively. In 1952 the Select Committee made
its recommendations which were embodied in the Federation of Malaya
Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance, 1952. Under this ordinance, citizenship
could be claimed by those who had resided for at least ten years in the
Federation, by those who had been born in the Straits Settlements or a
British Colony, and by those who had one local-born parent. But
there was no question of jus soli which was most urgently sought by the
non-Malays. It was estimated that between 50 - 60 per cent of the Chinese
and 30 pei’ cent of Indians were now eligible for citizenship.
The most important aspect of the ordinance was that it introduced
state nationality. However this implied nine nationalities, not one and
this clearly could not satisfy eithei the Indian or the Chinese. The
Indians, in particular, complained that state nationality was a divisive
concept and the MIC immediately established a committee to examine the
i s s u e . T h i s  committee recommended single nationality and a five
(169)years' residential qualification for citizenship. The immediate
Tamil Nesan, 16 August 1951; Singapore Tiger Standard, 11 July 1951* 
Tamil Nesan, 10 February 1952.
Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance, 1952, article 
125? see Ratnam op.cit., pp. 86-91•
By the end of 1953» 1,1571000 Chinese and 222,000 Indians were 
citizens while another ^33*000 Chinese and 186,000 Indians were 
eligible for citizenship. Ratnam, op.cit., p. 92.
MIC sub-committee on citizenship, 5 May 1951» Press release (MIC 
Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
(16*0
(165)
(166)
(167)
(168)
(169)
Chinese response was to invite Victor Purcell to study the position of
the Chinese in Malaya, with a view to pressing for a liberalization of
(170)the citizenship laws* This greatly annoyed the UMNO and the
Malays.(1715
In October 1955 Chinese militants from Perak led by Lau Pak Khuan,
demanded five instead of ten years as the residential qualification for
citizenship, and also insisted on the abolition of the language 
(17?)
requirement. These demands embarrassed the moderates in the MCA
and led to a crisis in the Party in April 1956, though it was still
possible for the MCA extremists to send a delegation to the Colonial Office
(173)to present their position on citizenship. Meanwhile the Chinese
guilds, school-teachers and some Party extremists, who were behind these
agitations, made plans to hold mass meetings to coincide with the
(17*+)arrival of the Reid Commission in June 1956. Indeed the MCA drew up
a memorandum on .jus soli and requested the MIC and other Indian
f si rnp* N
organizations to submit their views on this question.
At first the MCA decision to submit a separate memorandum to the
(176)
Reid Commission threatened to divide the Alliance. However the MIC
soon made it clear that though it would submit a memorandum on citizenship
it 'would not bypass but go through the Alliance1, and by August 1956 a
(177)compromise between the Alliance members had been reached. The
(170) Tamil Nesan, 21 August 1952. See M. Roff, 'The M.C.A. 19^8-1965*, 
JSEAH vol. 6, No.2 September 1965, p. *+6.
^71) Straits Times, 26 March 1953*
^72) Indian Daily Mail, 6 October 1955.
^73) Tamil Nesan, 1*t April 1956, 18 April 1956. Straits Times,
17 April 1957. See also Means op.cit., pp. 200-201.
(^ 7*+) Tamil Nesan, 12 April 1956, 1*+ April 1956.
^75) ibid., l*f April 1956; Straits Times, 22 March 1956; 28 April 1956*
(17 6)
Tamil Nesan, 22 June 1956; Means, op.cit., pp. 193-19*+.
( nn )
Tamil Murasu, 2 June 1956.
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principle of jus soli was accepted, but it was to be implemented only after
(178)
independence. There was division only over the number of years of
residence required for citizenship - the UMNO wanted a minimum of ten, 
the MCA seven, and the MIC five, though it was prepared to accept seven,
(viii)
In the plural society of Malaya it was inevitable that the related
issues of language and education would be politically contentious. There
was an unavoidable conflict of interest between, on the one hand
communal newspapers, cultural societies, and communal leaders and on
the other the British authorities attempting to foster a Malayan identity
through a national system of education in which the two main media of
instruction were to be English and Malay. As a result the perennial
question was whether the various races should be encouraged to assimilate
or integrate, whilst preserving their separate identity. The language
and education issues were not as serious for the Indian community as
they were for the Chinese simpjy because a relatively greater number of
( 1 80 }
Indians spoke English, Yet, as will soon be clear, it would be
(178)
Indian Daily Mail, 19 September 1956.
(179)v Ibid.
(180)
Literacy Rates - West Malaysia, 1957
Language English Malay Chinese Tamil
Race
Malay 5# W
Chinese 11# 5# 53$ -
Indian 16# W - 57%
All races 10# 2!5# ** -
Source: Federation of Malaya, Population Census Report,
1957, p. 21: — “
wrong to suggest, as both Margaret Clark and ^ictor Purcell have done,
1 (181) that these issues caused no stir in the Indian community in the 1950s.
The first postwar Government statement on educational policy was 
(182)made in 1946. It was proposed that there would be six years of
free primary education either in the mother tongue (in practice Malay,
Chinese or Tamil) or in English.^8-^  However English was to be taught
(184)even in the vernacular schools. At a secondary level, again
(185)instruction could be given in either Malay, Chinese, Tamil or English. 
However in the racially-tense atmosphere of the postwar period this 
laissea-faire policy could not prevail for long. With the establishment 
of the Federation in 1948, a new educational policy was urgently 
required. Towards the end of 1949 a Central Advisory Committee on 
education was established and the Committee presented its findings in 
May 1950.^^^ Somewhat surprisingly it proposed relatively few changes 
to. the existing structure and as a result major objections were raised
(187)to the Report in the Legislative Council in July. The Report
v, i <188> was shelved.
But major changes were imminent. In 1950 Xj.J*. Barnes, Director of 
Social Training at Oxford University, was appointed to investigate Malay 
education. His report, published in 1951» proposed the gradual trans­
formation of all existing schools into National schools in which children
M. Clark, 'The Malayan Alliance and its Accommodation of Communal 
Pressures, 1952-62*, p. 14?. Purcell, 'Notes and Comment - 
The Crisis in Malayan Education1, Pacific Affairs, vol. XXVI, No.l, 
March 1953* P- 74.
Malayan Union Advisory Council Paper No.53 of 1946 (M.U. 
Confidential 162/46).
Ibid., p. 1-2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Tamil Nesan, 28 May 1950.
Tamil Nesan, 22 July 1950.
Ibid.
(181)
(182)
(183)
(184)
(185)
(186)
(187)
(188)
/ *i oq\
of all races would be taught only in English or Malay. The Chinese
rejected this attempt to foster a Malayan nationality through the
education system, as pandering to Malay nationalism and as being resentful
(190)of the Chinese heritage. In order to present their own views,
the Chinese put pressure on the High Commissioner^Henry Gurney^  to appoint
another committee, this time to consider Chinese education. The resulting
(191)Fenn Wu Committee proposed a trilingual education system. It argued
that while Malaya's educational policy should be directed towards creating
a strong Malayan nation, a sense of belonging to Malaya could most
effectively be fostered through the different cultures and diverse school
(192)systems of the three communities.
The Indians condemned both reports. Critics of &he Barnes Report
(193)included the Tamil school-teachers, the Tamil Press and R. Ramani.
Indeed Ramani condemned both the Barnes and Fenn Wu Reports as 'avowedly
the products of sectionalism and therefore cannot by themselves form
the basis of a scheme of education for the whole of Malaya'. Even
the MIC which until then had taken a moderate line on the language and
education questions, sponsored a meeting of Indian organizations in
(195)
Malaya to consider these issues.
The MIC was particularly annoyed by the fact that the Government 
had not established a committee to investigate Tamil education. It
/ yj O n \
Report of the Committee on Malay Education, Chairman, L.J. Barnes,
Kuala Lumpur, 1951* chapter XII.
^19°^ Clark, op.cit., p. 133-
(191) Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malayans. The Report of a 
Mission invited by the Federation Government to study the Problem of the 
Education of the Chinese in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, June 1951* chapter VII.
(192) ibid.
(^93) Straits Times, 10 July 1951; 13 August 1951? Tamil Nesan, 6 July
19515 Tamil Murasu, 10 July 1951*
^94) straits Times, 13 August 1951*
^95) Indian Daily Mail, 6 July 1951; 15 July 1951-
therefore decided to form its own committee to consider the Barnes
Report's recommendations and the position of Indian schools.^^6)
this it was supported by Indian political and cultural organizations, and
(197)by labour unions particularly those in Lower Perak* The Indian
Education Committee, established in June 1951* recommended that the
(198)first three years of education should be m  the mother tongue.
(199)In the fourth year, English and Malay would be introduced. The
ultimate objective was that eventually the medium of instruction would 
be English though the mother tongue would still be taught as a subject.
In addition the Committee also accepted Malay as the national language 
of the state.
These recommendations were moderate, seeking the use of Tamil as the
medium of instruction only in the primary schools and accepting English
in the secondary schools. In fact the committee's educational proposals
were merely a statement of the status quo, for existing Tamil schools
(201)were all primary schools. Even these schools faced problems of
insufficient funds, unsuitable textbooks and equipment and a lack of
. . (202) qualified teachers. Their only active supporters were the Dravida
Kalagam, the Tamil Press and the Tamil school-teachers.^95)
Ibid., 15 July 1951.
Ibid.
Memorandumon Indian Education in the Federation of Malaya by the 
Indian Education Committee under the auspices of the MIC, Kuala 
Lumpur, 31 August 1951* P*3 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid., p.A.
Ibid.
Saravanan Gopinathan, Towards A National Bystem of Education in 
Singapore, 19^5-731 Singapore, 197A, p. lA.
Ibid., p.15.
Ibid., p.lA.
(196)
(197)
(198)
(199)
(200) 
(201)
(202)
(203)
In short the Government was faced with a diaspora of conflicting
and confusing reports. In September 1951 it decided to attempt to
reconcile all groups by establishing a Central Advisory Committee on
Education which would include members of all r a c e s . T h e  Indian
member was originally R. Ramani but he was replaced by V.M.N. Menon 
( )
in August 1952. The recommendations of this committee followed
Barnes rather than Fenn Wu though the committee accepted that the mother
(206)tongue would be taught in the Malay or English 'National’ schools.
It emphasized that the Government had no intention of withdrawing assistance
from vernacular schools until there v/ere sufficient national schools to
replace them.^20^  The report also assured vernacular school-teachers
that they need not fear unemployment. The Federal Legislative Council
considered the three reports, Barnes, Fenn Wu and that of the Central
Advisory Committee on 19-20 September 1951 and then referred them to
(P08)
a special committee under the Attorney General. The resulting
legislation was introduced by E.E.C. Thuraisingham, the Member for 
Education, as the Education Ordinance of 1952. The Ordinance adopted 
from Barnes the concept of the 'national school' but provided facilities 
for instruction in Chinese and Tamil where fifteen or more pupils 
requested it.(2°9)
(20k) Tamil Murasu, 22 September 1951* 'Report of Central Advisory 
Committee on Education1, 10 September 1951* Chairman L.D. Whitfield 
(Tan Cheng Lock Papers, item 1^3, N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
^^5) Tamil Nesan, 2 August 1952.
(206) 'Report of Central Advisory Committee on Education', L.D. Whitfield, 
p.2, Clark, op.cit., p.136.
(207)
'Report of Central Advisory Committee on Education', L.D. Whitfield,
p.2.
Federation of Malaya, Annual Report on Education for 1957n p. 19*
(209 ) Federation of Malaya, Education Ordinance, 1952, No.63 of 1952,
p.2.
This was not popular with the Indians and was vehemently opposed by 
(210)the Chinese. The Indians feared that with the introduction of the
'national schools', the Government would immediately withdraw the grants
given to vernacular schools. This would be particularly serious for the
Indian community for the Tamil schools survived principally on financial
assistance from the Government. On the other hand, a privately financed
Indian education system was impossible, partly through an absence of
Indian philanthrophy (in contrast to the Chinese community) and partly
because the management of Tamil schools was often interfered with by rival
political factions such as the Tamils Representative Council and the 
(211)Dravida Kalagam.
Fully aware of these implications for Tamil education in Malaya, the
(212)MIC embarked on a campaign against the 1952 Ordinance. Here it
attracted the hostility of the Malays most notably that of Tunku Abdul
Rahman. The UMNO leader doubted the sincerity ' of the MIC on this issue
and saw the campaign as an attempt to force a breach between the UMNO
and the MCA. His suspicions were aroused by the fact that the MIC had
invited the MCA to join with it in the campaign against the 1952 
(213)Ordinance. In a letter to Tan Cheng Lock on 23 September 1953*
Tunku Abdul Rahman attempted to reassure the Chinese by stating that the
implementation of the Ordinance would be postponed because of the need
(21 if)for financial stringency. He asked Tan Cheng Lock to ensure that
(210) Clark, op.cit., p. 137; Tamil Murasu, 10 December 1952.
(211) Federation of Malaya, Annual Report on Education for 19511 P* 15* 
Annual Report, Department of Education, Colony of Singapore. 19^8, 
pp. 32-38.
Tamil Nesan, 2 August 1953*
( 213)
Letter from MIC Secretary to Wen Tien Kuang, Secretary-General, 
Chinese Education Committee, 1*f July 1953 (Tan Cheng Lock Papers, 
N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(21
Letter from Tunku Abdul Rahman to Tan Cheng Lock, 23 September 1953 
(Tan Cheng Lock Papers, N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Chinese protest was channelled through its literary circles and that
( s')
the MCA should never 'seek the help of the Indians’* In reply the
MCA confirmed that the MIC had indeed invited it to cooperate in its
campaign. Following the intervention of Tunku, the MCA quickly
(217)abandoned any thought of working with the MIC.
It should be noted however that the Indian community was not united
in its response to the 1952 Education Ordinance. Some sections of the
community, most notably, the Singapore Regional Indian Congress, saw
(218)possible long term benefits m  the Ordinance. As the Ordinance
proposed the teaching of Chinese and Tamil in 'national schools' where there
was sufficient demand, the possibility arose thatTamil children could
receive better Tamil instruction in essentially English-language schools
(219)than in financially-handicapped Tamil schools* This view was
severely criticized by Tamil organizations in the Federation and the 
Colony and eventually led to a serious split between the Tamil militants
( OOQ \
and the non-Tamils in the Singapore Regional Indian Congress. The
(221)result was a strong reassertion of Tamil dominance in the MIC.
Ibid.
Letter from Wen Tien Kuang, Secretary-General, Chinese Education 
Committee, to Tunku Abdul Rahman, 28 September 1953 (Tan Cheng Lock 
Papers, N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Letter from Wen Tien Kuang, Secretary-General Chinese Education 
Committee to MIC Secretary, 1 October 1953 (Tan Cheng Lock Papers, 
N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Indian Daily Mail, 10 October 1953.
The 1951 Annual Report on Education in Singapore mentioned that 
'it appears that the Indian parent himself will not send his children 
to a vernacular school if he can find places for them in an English 
school'; this was understandable in the light of the vastly inferior 
Tamil schools facing insurmountable difficulties in staff and text­
books. Saravanan Gopinathan, op.cit., p. 16.
Indian Daily Mail, 10 October 1953*
See chapter II, pp. 61—63*
(215)
(216)
(217)
(218) 
(219)
(220)
(221)
Effective co-operation between the Indian and Chinese communities 
over language and education issues was made impossible not so much by 
differences of opinion within the Indian community, but by the fundamentally 
different approaches adopted by the two communities as a whole. The MIC 
accepted Malay as a national language. They sought simply to preserve 
Tamil education at the primary level. In contrast the Chinese demanded 
that their language be afforded equal status with Malay and English.
The Indians sought to guarantee the opportunity for their children to 
receive their basic education in Tamil. The Chinese demanded a multi­
lingual Legislative Council and a Chinese University.
However, the fact that the MIC and MCA pursued radically different 
objectives did not prevent occasional cooperation between the two Parties
in opposition to the 1952 Ordinance. For example in mid-1953 they agreed
to mount a campaign against the Ordinance, on the grounds that it was a 
denial of the principles of education in the mother tongue, and that it
was opposed to the equal development of the language and culture of each
(222)of the three races. Again Tunku AbdaLRahman intervened. In a letter
to Tan Cheng Lock on 10 October 1953* be expressed fears that the
MIC-MCA campaign could drive a wedge between the M(3A and the UMNO.^^^
He explained that 'I am under fire in my own community. You must win
over the China-born Chinese', that section of the Chinese community who
(224)stood to lose most by a withering away of Chinese education.
The Government rejected the protests of the MIC and the MCA. In 
reply to a letter from Tan Cheng Lock stating that the non-Malays feared 
that the Education Ordinance was a 'death-verdict on vernacular schools',
MCA Chinese Education Committee Minutes, Kuala Lumpur, 13 August 
1953i p.11.
Letter from Tunku Abdul Rahman to Tan Cheng Lock, 10 October 1953 
(Tan Cheng Lock Papers, N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
(222)
(223)
(224)
Gerald Templer argued that such fears were simply unfounded,
Government accepted the role of vernacular schools; furthermore it was 
not inevitable that the Chinese language would disappear if the Chinese
C 226)schools were closed. He continued, 'there has been no suggestion that
the Chinese language and culture should not be preserved and given its
rightful place in Malaysian society. What it would seem is being sought at
the moment is that Chinese language, culture and education should be
allowed to continue its exclusive and separatist position in a Malayan
(227)society. Such a proposal is utterly unacceptable*.
Faced with this attitude on the part of the Government, the Chinese
community became enraged over the language issue. The main instigators
of theprotest were Chinese chauvinists, including most prominently the
Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Chinese School-Teachers
Association. In August 195^ the latter organization even went so far as
to petition the United Nations, claiming that the 1952 Ordinance, by
depriving Chinese and Tamil children of vernacular education, was
( 228 )racially - discriminatory. But the Chinese language protest soon
spread beyond the area of education and the Chinese began to demand a
multi-lingual Legislative Council which implied the acceptance of
(229)Chinese as a national language.
Letter from Gerald Templer to Tan Cheng Lock, 6 July 1953- Letter 
from Tan Cheng Lock to Gerald Templer, 12 May 1953 (Tan Cheng Lock 
Papers, N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Letter from Gerald Templer to Tan Cheng Lock, 6 July 1953 (Tan Cheng 
Lock Papers, N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
Memorandum to the United Nations from the United Chinese School 
Teachers, Federation of Malaya, l^f August 195^ (Tan Cheng Lock Papers, 
N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Letter from T.H. Tan to Tan Cheng Lock, 25 August 195^ (Tan Cheng 
Lock Papers, N.A. Kuala Lumppr); Straits Times, 20 December 195^ •
(225)
(226)
(22?)
(228)
(229)
The Malays reacted strongly. The Party Negara, particularly in
Kedah and Johore, accused the MCA of demanding that Chinese be made an
official language; it also accused them of regarding the Malays as being
without a c u l t u r e D r<> Ismail of the UMNO, anxious to maintain
the Alliance, toured Kedah and Johore in an attempt to allay Malay 
( ^
fears. At the same time he wrote to Tan Cheng Lock, that 'our
first objective must be to gain independence, and once that has been 
achieved, through victory at the national elections, side issues like
( 070^
vernacular education can be settled'. However the MCA was unable
to contain the more extreme elements in the community who, into 1955»
continued to demand a Chinese language University and a multi-lingual
Legislative Council.
The Indians viewed this controversy with bewilderment. The MIC
leadership, a partner in the Alliance from late 195^» opposed the concept
of a multi-lingual Legislative Council, arguing that only Malay and
(23^)English should be regarded as official languages. However the
Penang and Province Wellesley MIC branches did, for a time, support 
the Chinese demand but their support was short-lived. ]paceci with
national elections in 1955* the Alliance attempted to defuse the issue.
In its election manifesto, it pledged itself to re-examine the 1952
Singapore Tiger Standard, 23 August 195^•
Letter from Dr. Ismail to Tan Cheng Lock, Zh August 195^ (Tan Cheng 
Lock Papers, N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
Straits Times, 19 February 1955*
Straits Times, 23 February 1955*
Straits Times, 10 March 1957, 7 September 1957*
(230)
(231)
(232) 
(233) 
(23^) 
(235)
Ordinance and 'to establish, a type of national school that will be
acceptable to the people of Malaya and will promote their culture,
economic, social and political development as a nation so far as to
facilitate the fulfillment of the Alliance's aim to adopt Malay as
the national language of the country'
Following their success in the Federal Elections in July 1955*
the Alliance established a committee under Dato Abdul Razak to study
the education issue. The Razak Report recommended for primary
education, the establishment of 'national schools* in which the
(
medium of instruction would be either English or Malay. Chinese
and Tamil primary schools would continue to exist, but both Malay and
( P~*>R ^
English would be compulsory subjects in those schools. At the
secondary level, Razak proposed the existence only of 'national schools'
open to all races in which either English or Malay would be the medium
of instruction. Though the Kazak Report specifically recognized
the need to continue Government financial assistance to the Chinese
and Tamil primary schools, the suspicion remained that the ultimate
objective of the Government was to phase out Chinese and Tamil
primary education. Non-Malay fears were further aroused by the
Report's recommendation that proficiency in Malay be regarded as a
pre-requisite for entry into secondary schools, for the award of
(2 0^)scholarships and for entry to the Civil Service.
Alliance Manifesto for the Federal Elections, June 1955» cited in 
Clark, op.cit., p. 138.
Federation of Malaya, Report of the Special Committee on 
Education, 1956, Kuala Lumpur, 195$, par&. 5^-58»
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., para. 22-23.
(23b)
(237)
(238) 
(239) 
(2 0^)
These criticisms were expressed by a committee established in
(241)
August 1956 by the Selangor MIC to examine the Razak Report. In
response the committee proposed that the first three years of education
should be in the mother tongue, and that vernacular teaching should be
(242)available throughout primary and secondary education. However the
MIC committee did not oppose the Razak Report's proposal that Malay
(2V3)should be made the national language. Inevitably this moderate
MIC response was opposed by militant Tamil chauvinists, principally 
the Malaya Tamil Pannai, whose chairman announced that 'we are following
the lead of Chinese educationists who are fighting to protect their
(244) 
culture' . J
The Razak Report formed the basis of the National Education Bill
(245)unanimously passed by the Federal Legislative Council in early 1957-
The Chinese extremists remained profoundly angry over the education
policy and indeed by exploiting this disenchantment were able to ensure
the success of the Perak Progressive Party against the Alliance in the
(246)by-election in Ipoh in November 1957. The MIC leadership remained
silent, but the Selangor MIC, and in particular the Kuala Lumpur
(247)branch, agitated strongly against the new legislation. Furthermore
at the twelfth annual session of the MIC in July 1958, the Penang MIC 
submitted a resolution proposing that Tamil and Chinese be made official
(241)
(242)
(243)
(244)
(245)
(246)
(247)
Report of The Education Committee appointed by the MIC, Selangor 
State, 25 August 1956 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid., p. 5*
Ibid.
Straits Times, 18 August 195&.
The Alliance had a majority of out of the 52 elected seats in the 
Legislative Council to facilitate this unanimous decision.
Straits Times, 10 December 1957; Clark, op.cit., p. 144.
Tamil Nesan, 6 December 1957.
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(248)languages. Resolutions were also passed demanding the
(249)establishment of secondary Tamil schools. The Federation Malay
School Teachers Association reacted sharply to these Indian complaints.
'If the Indians were truly loyal to the country they should not
hesitate to learn the Malay language and stop suggesting unwanted ideas
which would only retard the progress of Malaya to an independent
nation'.^^0) jn an pac;[fy ^he UMNO, the MIC leadership
under Sambanthan, refrained from taking up the complaints from the 
(251)branches. This was of considerable comfort to the UMNO which was
already facing a rebellious MCA over this issue* But the MIC paid
dearly for its compromising stance, for it explains, at least in part,
the defeats of MIC candidates in the militant Bungsar ward in
municipal elections in 1957 and 1958.^'^
In conclusion, it is clear that the Indian community's concern
over the issues of language and education in the 1950s was not as strong
(253)as that of the Chinese. Nevertheless, the Indian community m  this
period constantly recognised the importance of maintaining the opportunity
(248)
(249)
(250)
(253)
Twelfth Annual Session of the MIC, July 1958, p.2 (MIC Papers, 
Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
Malay Mail, 1 April 1959j D.E. Moore, ’The United Malays National 
Organization and the 1959 Malayan Elections: A Study of a 
Political Party in Action in a Newly Independent, Plural Society', 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, I960, p. 248.
'Parcil Murasu, 1 December 1958.
Straits Times, 11 July 1959; Moore, op.cit., p. 250.
While the Chinese campaigned for a multi-lingual Legislature and a 
Chinese University, the Indians campaigned simply for a Department 
of Indian Studies in the English-language University of Malaya.
The Department was finally established in 1958 - see S. Arasaratnam, 
•Indian Studies in the University of Malaya* Tamil Oli, Tamil 
Language Society, University of Malaya, 1966-87,' p. ^35• For further 
details on the campaign for a Chinese University, see Letter from 
Lee Kong Chian to Tan Cheng Lock, 9 February 1953? Memorandum on 
Chinese University in Malaya n.d; 1953 Radio debate between Tan 
Cheng Lock and Sydney Caine on the proposed Chinese University,
30 January 1953 (Tan Cheng Lock Papers, I.S.E.A.S. Singapore).
for its children to receive their education in Tamil and occasionally
they reacted with considerable vigour in defence of their language.
Hence Margaret Clark’s view that 1 throughout the course of this linguistic
controversy, no parallel Indian voice was raised to demand special
status for the Tamil tongue or special concessions for the Indian
(254)schools’, cannot be sustained.
(ix)
If liberal citizenship provisions and a national system of
education were seen as the basis of a newly-created Malayan identity
then its formal political aspect would be in the development of non-
communal parties. Within such parties Indian involvement tended
to be dominant. For example, those Indian intellectuals who found
that the MIC did not meet their aspirations for a democratic and
egalitarian society tended to join the Malayan Democratic Union in the
period up to 1948, and the Malayan Labour Party in the 1950s. Both
parties were multi-racial left-wing organizations. The Malayan Democratic
Union was initially a liberal organization which campaigned for citizenship
with nationality whilst at the same time accepting the Malay language
(255)as the national language. However by 1948 Communist influence
within the Party had become Communist domination, and when the MCP revolt 
occurred in June 1948, followed by repressive legislation, the Malayan
^^4) ciark, op.cit., p. 147.
(255)
For a detailed account of the Malayan Democratic Union, see 
Cheah Boon Keng, ’The Malayan Democratic Union, 1945-1948',
M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, 1974.
Democratic Union dissolved itself. Indian influence in the Party was
concentrated on its extreme left-wing faction. Most notable here was
P. Sarma, the President of the Singapore Teachers Union, who succeeded in
bringing into the Malayan Democratic Uniop the majority of teachers in
(256)Singapore and the Federation. He was closely involved with the
Singapore Teachers Union's representation to the Carr-Saunders Commission 
on Higher Education in 19^7 and was also active in the Singapore Cooperative 
Society. In 1951 he was detained on account of his connections with the 
MCP-led Anti-British League and was repatriated to India two years later.
He then made his way to Peking where he now lives as head of the Malayan
/ qrQ \
National Liberation League.
Another prominent left-wing Indian in the Malayan Democratic Union
was 'Jacko* Thumboo. He was a graduate of the Agricultural College at
Serdang, Selangor, and was initiated into left-wing politics by Quok
Peng Cheng, a member of the wealthy Kok family of Johore Bharu. Both
fled to the jungle in June 19^8, but were soon killed by the Malayan
security forces. Indian intellectuals such as Sharma and Thumboo
became closely associated with the MCP essentially because their
moderately left-wing convictions brought them into contact with hard-line
(259)Communists who then entwined them into extremist politics.
For further details on P. Sarma see Straits Times, 16 March 1951*
28 November 1952, 2 December 195^* 26 May 1956; Indian Daily 
Mail, 21 December 1952.
Cheah Boon Keng, op.cit., pp. 119-120.
Ibid., p. 120.
Indian intellectuals’ involvement in the Malayan Democratic Union's 
extremist faction was facilitated also by their earlier involvement 
in either extremist Trade Union activities or in the Indian National 
Army. For example, the Democrat, a semi-official publication of the 
MCP and Malayan Democratic Union was edited and published by 
S.A. Das formerly of the Indian National Army. He, was pro-MCP and 
was co-author with K.B. Subbiah of Chalo Delhi, an Historical account 
of the Indian Independence Movement in East Asia, Kuala Lumpur, n.d. 
Later Quok Peng Cheng became the editor of the Democrat.
(256)
(257)
(258) 
(259)
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Indian involvement in left-wing parties, particularly the Malayan
Labour Party was responsible for the emergence of an Indian elite which
was truly non-communal and commanded the allegiance of all working
class communities. The Malayan Labour Party had its origins in Penang
when the Penang Labour Party was formed in May 1951 & Selangor
branch was established in December of the same year.^^^ Both branches
were formed by English educated Government servants and trade unionists
(26?)and were composed predominantly of Chinese and Indians. They were
anti-colonial and anti-communist. The Indians who were prominent here
were D.S. Ramanathan and V. Veerappen, both teachers from Penang and
V. David, a railway employee from Selangor.
The electoral successes of the Malayan Labour Party were concentrated
in Penang, essentially because there it attracted protest votes over the
Government's education and citizenship policies particularly from more
extremist elements. During the period 1951-19551 the Malayan Labour
Party had widespread support from the Indian workers, particularly the
(264)English-educated white collar workers. However after 1955* its support
came increasingly from the Chinese New Villages and urban Chinese workers,
and as a result the Party came under increasing extremist Chinese
• xn (265) influence.
Straits Echo, 16 May 1951.
(^61) Straits Times, 24 December 1951.
(262) vasii^ op.cit., p. 9&-99i P* 110.
p.s. Ramanathan, born in India; school-teacher; Chairman/Malayan
Labour Party; Mayor of Penang; Member, Penang Municipal Council.
V. David, born in Kuala Lumpur; railway employee; Secretary-
General of National Union of Factory and General Workers; Founder
Member of Selangor Labour Party; Member, Municipal Council Kuala 
Lumpur, Selangor State Assembly and later Member for Parliament.
V. Veerappen, born in Malaya; teacher; Executive Committee Member 
of Malayan Labour Party; later Member for Parliament.
(264)
Vasil, op.cit., p. ”110.
(265) Ibid., p. 115.
Being members of a minority community, Indians were attracted to 
non-communal parties, not only the Malayan Democratic Union and the 
Malayan Labour Party, but also the moderate Independence of Malaya Party.
The IMP was formed in September 1951 by Dato Onn following his failure
. (266) to transform the UMNO into a multi-racial organization. The
emergence of the IMP coincided with an important phase in the politics of
the Indian community, for with the announcement of elections, Indians
were forced to seek electoral partners. On its side the IMP welcomed
Indian support, in the light of its failure to attract the Malays and
the growing estrangement of the Chinese. As was noted earlier, the IMP'S
success in the Kuala Lumpur municipal elections of February 1952, was
(267)confined to Indian candidates in Indian areas.
Within the Indian community, only Padi Krishnan of the Malayan 
Indian Association had serious doubts about Onn.*'2^ ^  The MIC, the 
Federation of Indian Organizations, the Indian Chamber of Commerce, and 
the Ceylon Federation of Malaya each supported the IMP, the latter 
because its President, Thuraisingham was a senior official in Onn's 
Party. was an organization comprised of elite Malayans who
favoured inter-racial cooperation. Their commitment to the latter was 
clearly seen in their support of the Barnes Report of 1951 which
(270)advocated both English and Malay as the national medium of instruction.
But by August 1952 the IMP was weakening, following the exodus of prominent
(271 )Chinese, which left the party with only Indian support. Indians
Straits Times, 30 September 195'! • Fo** more details on the IMP see 
Vasil, op.cit., pp. 4-7-81.
(267) See pp. 136-157.
(268) Tamil Nesan, 14 June 1951.
(269)v y j  Ibid., 17 September 1951.
(270) ibid.. See also, Vasil, op.cit., pp. 71-72.
^71) Straits Times, 16 September 1952. Tamil Nesan, 5 August 1952.
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faith fully followed Onn into the National Conference in April 1953 and 
only withdrew after disagreement over the issue of Federal elections 
in 1954.(272)
Even when the Party Negara was formed in February 1954, as a 
successor to the IMP, many Indians continued to offer their loyalties to 
Onn.^7^  This was very surprising for the Party Negara stood for militant 
Malay demands - the rejection of Chinese and Tamil languages, the
establishment of Islam as the state religion and severe restrictions on
(274)Chinese and Indian immigration. Indeed it is virtually impossible to
discover any logical explanation for the continual support of Onn by 
Indian stalwarts such as R. Ramani, V.M.N. Menon, S.O.K. Ubaidullah,
S. Shanmugam and E.E.C. Thuraisingham.
In Singapore the Progressive Party and the Singapore Labour Party were
( )
both dominated by Indians in the period 1948-53- In this period the
(272) cjee copter VII, pp. 238—240•
(273) Tamil Nesan, 1 August 1954.
(274) yas-Q, op.cit., p. 85; Straits Times, 6 July 1955- 
^ 7-^  The Singapore Progressive Party Leadership, 1945-55
Ethnic group
Chinese 9
Indians 5
Malays 1
Others 5
Birthplace
Singapore 9 
Federation 4 
Other 
countries 7
Language
Monolingual
(English)
Bilingual
Occupation
Business 7
Profession 11
Office 
workers 2
Others 0
Total: 20 20 20 20
The Singapore Labour Party Leadership, 1948-53
Birthplace 
Indians Non-Indians
Education 
Indians Non-Indians
Singapore 1 4 Secondary 
School Leavers 10 4
Federation 2 0 University/
Other countries 7 4 College 0 4
Total: 10 8 Total: 10 8
Occupation 
Indians Non-Indians
Trade Uni&n 
Indians Non-Indians
Business 3 1 Army and
Profession 1 5 Services Union 6 1
Office Workers 6 2 Other Unions 5 3
Others 0 0
Total: 10 8 Total: 11 4
Source: Yeo Kim Wah, Political Development in Singapore 1945-55»
p. 102, table“31 p. 'l08, table 5-
political scene was dominated by moderate, English-educated, essentially
pro-British elites, free of communal chauvinism and militancy. However
the Rendel Constitution of 195^ secured a Chinese majority in the
electorate and this coupled with growing student militancy and the
emergence of Chinese communalism and anti^colonialism led to the
( 276)
political eclipse of the Indians, After 1955* the Peoples Action
Party attracted almost all the Indian vote in the Colony as well as
charismatic Indian leaders such as Jamit Singh, C’.V;, Devan Nair,
(277)S. Woodhull, C. Rajaratnara and J.J, Puthucheary.
In conclusion, the Indian political role in Singapore was far more 
decisive in the period 19*1-8-53 than in the years after 1953* With the 
rise of communal and mass politics, in the 1950s, Indian political 
leadership was at a discount. To survive, the Indian community was 
forced to join the Alliance on the mainland and the Peoples Action Party 
in Singapore, The Indians succumbed to communal politics, at least 
in Malaya. Even where Indian political leaders held on to the principles 
of non-communalism and socialism, ironically those parties thrived only 
on the basis of rising Chinese communalism. For example,the Malayan 
Labour Party led ostensibly by D.S. Ramanathan and V. David, was in 
effect manipulated by Chinese communalists and Communists who provided 
the mass of the electoral support. It is difficult to escape the
Yeo Kim Wah, op.cit,, pp. 253-259*
(277) Pang Cheng Lian, Singapore^ People’s Action Party: its History, 
Organization and Leadership, Singapore, 1971* P* 52.
(278) English educated liberals in the Malayan Labour Party since 195*1- 
were D.S. Ramanathan, V. Veerappen, N. Patkunam, S. Sathappan and 
they were gradually losing influence to Chinese-educated militants, 
Tan Kai Hee, Wee Lee Fong, Ng Ann Teck. Among this latter group of 
Chinese dominated militants, two Indians gained access, Dr. Rajakumar 
and V. David purely through their intimate contacts with Chinese 
workers in Kuala Lumpur and in the surrounding Chinese New Villages 
in Selangor. See Labour Party of Malaya, Annual Report, 1961-62, 
cited in Vasil, op.cit., p. l4o.
conclusion that the Indian ’leadership' was little more than a facade,
protecting the party from the charge of being Chinese, Communalist and
Communist, This device was also evident in the Perak Progressive Party
where the Seenivasagam brothers provided respectability to what was
(279)really a Chinese communal party.
(279) The Perak Progressive Party was divided into two distinct groups, 
on the one hand, the Seenivasagam brothers and a small number of 
moderate Ceylonese, Indians and Chinese who were completely loyal 
to them, and on the other, an extremist Chinese group led by Khong 
Kok Yat and Chan Swee Ho. According to R.K. Vasil, the Seenivasagam 
brothers had considerable support though there were doubts as to 
whether they commanded a sustained loyalty. See Vasil, op.cit., 
p. 247.
S.P. Seenivasagam, born in Ipoh; lawyer; Member, Perak State 
Legislative Assembly and Malayan Parliament; founder member of 
Perak Progressive Party, later to be the People's Progressive 
Party.
D.R. Seenivasagam, born in Ipoh; lawyer; Member, Ipoh and 
Menglembu Municipal Council 195^-1957; elected to Federal 
Legislative Council in 1956; Member for Parliament 1959“ ;
founder member of Perak Progressive Party and later Peop3.e's 
Progressive Party.
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Factionalism In The Indian Community In Malaya, 19^5-57
(i)
The Indian community in postwar Malaya was, as it is now,
(1)
heavily fragmented. The lines of cleavage were many. There
were divisions into formal political parties - the Malayan
Indian Congress, Malayan Indian Association and the Federation of
Indian Organizations; there were ethnic divisions between the
Ceylonese, the South Indians and North Indians, and there was a
division between local-born and foreign-born, Indian politics
were further fractured by innumerable clashes of personality
between leading political figures. Inevitably therefore, on each
of the major issues facing the Indians, a united response was
difficult to achieve.
Political consciousness amongst the Indians, activated by the
Indian National Army during the Japanese Occupation, remained high
in the immediate postwar period. In order to consolidate this
increased consciousness, Indian leaders sought to revive dormant
political organizations. One such organization was the Central
Indian Association of Malaya (CIAM) which from its formation in 1936
until the outbreak of the Pacific War, had been an effective
(2)spokesman for the Indian community. During Nehru’s visit to
(1)
S. Arasaratnam, 'Social and Political Ferment - the MIC, 19^5-55'j 
Proceedings of the First International Conference Seminar of 
Tamil Studies, KualaLumpur, January1968, Vol, 1, pp. 141-136.
(2) For more details on the activities of the CIAM, 1936-^1, see 
S. Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, London, 1970, 
pp. 96-102; M.R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, London, 
1970, pp. 28-30, 122-123; R. Ampalavanar, 'Social and Political 
Developments in the Indian community of Malaya, 1920-^1', M.A. 
Thesis, University of Malaya, 1969? PP- 86-9^.
Malaya in March 19^6, the revival of the CIAM was discussed, and there
can be little doubt that the Indian National Congress in Delhi was
(3)eager to see the organization revived. The inauguration of the 
Malayan Union in April 19^6 provided the immediate impetus for the
(if)
revival of the CIAM. That same month the Association invited all
Indian organizations in Malaya to submit to it their views on the
Malayan Union citizenship proposal. The response was very poor and the
CIAM quickly faded from the scene.
In Singapore, A.N. Mitra and R. Jumabhoy attempted to resurrect
the Singapore Indian Association in order to consolidate Indian 
(5)political opinion. But this attempt proved abortive as the
(6)powerful Tamil elites preferred to form a new party. Most Indian
elites were alarmed by the growing Communist influence on the
(7)Indian working classes. For example,the trade unions were
(8)Communist dominated. Moreover, there were overt Communist
organizations such as the New Indian Democratic Youth League, 
formed in October 19^5, and the Indian Communist Party formed in 
Singapore later the same year. In September 19^5 a large and 
enthusiastic gathering of Indians met at Ipoh to discuss the 
Malayan Communist Party's 'Eight Proposals' for Malaya's future
( 3) Indian National Congress Executive Committee meeting, New Delhi,
17 April 19^6, cited in Tamil Nesan, 26 April 19^6.
(U')
Tamil Nesan, 27 April 19^6. See Chapter IV, p. 106,
^  Tamil Nesan, 22 May 19^6, lA June 19^6, lA July 19^6.
Ibid., 1^ July 19^6.
See Chapter III, pp. 68—73*
See Stenson, op.cit., pp. 60-63, 103-10^, 108-110.
government - This rising tide of Communism had to be checked.
In August 19^6, John Thivy, who had been active in the Indian
National Army, arranged an open conference for all Indians to discuss
the formation of a new association. The conference was open in
order to prevent the proceedings from being dominated by ambitious
individuals or factions, as well as to ensure a semblance of communal
unity. Thivy was aware that this newly-formed MIC would attract the
opposition of existing Indian organizations, fearing that they would
(11)
be eclipsed. Therefore he emphasized that these organisations,
principally the Indian Chambers of Commerce, trade unions, ethnic and
linguistic associations would retain their individual, functional 
(12)importance. But a clash of interests was inevitable. For example,
when the MIC established a Labour department in 19^6, this was opposed
by the trade unions who feared that the MIC would inject communalism
(13)into industrial relations. Moreover, the MCP strongly resisted
the MIC, fearing that Indian labour in the Communist-dominated PMFTU
(14)
would now defect to the MIC. However, at its first annual
session in June 19^7, the Congress converted its Labour section into 
an Economics department, partly because it had not attracted trade 
union leaders and partly because the Congress had been intimidated
V. Thompson and P. Adloff, Minority Problems in South-East Asia, 
Stanford, 1955, pp. 100-101.
Draffe Proposals for an All Malaya Indian Organization to be 
inaugurated at the All Malaya Conference, Kuala Lumpur,
3-5 August 19^6 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Presidential Address at First Annual Session of the MIC, Kuala Lumpur, 
7-10 June 19^7 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid;, ... Sunday Tribune, 29 September 19^6.
Tamil Nesan, 25 August 19^6.
Stenson, op.cit., pp. 123-12^.
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
( W
by the strong censure from the United Planters Association of Malaya
and British officials over the Party’s inquiry into the Kedah Strikes 
(15)earlier that year.
In addition in its first year of existence, the MIC had to
accommodate the demands of separatist groups in Singapore, These were
(16)met by the establishment of a separate Singapore branch. A.N,
Mitra who had been active in the revival of the pre-war Singapore
Indian Association was hurriedly appointed Chairman of the Singapore
(17)Regional Indian Congress, Soon after its formation, the MIC
(18)established local branches throughout Malaya. Delegates from
each of these branches attended a national Annual Session, each
branch being entitled to send one delegate for every two hundred 
(19)branch members. In addition, representatives from the local
branches formed State Regional Congress Committees; one quarter of 
these Regional Committee members .were selected for the All Malayan 
Indian Congress Committee.Therefore, at its lower levels, the 
MIC structure was essentially democratic. However at its highest 
levels it was unmistakably autocratic. The MIC President though
(15) Presidential Address at First Annual Session of MIC, Kuala Lumpur,
7 June 19^7 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
(1 Draft Proposals for an All Malaya Indian Organization, to be 
inaugurated at the All Malaya Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 3-5 August 
19^6, p. 5 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Indian Daily Mail, 1 August 19^8.
Within nine months of its inauguration, the MIC had fifty-two 
branches and a total membership of 20,000 - see Annual Report, MIC, 
19^ +6-^ 7, p. 2 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur); Indian Daily Mail,
10 June 19^7.
(1'|) Draft Proposals for an All Malaya Indian Organization, Kuala Lumpur, 
August 19^6, p. 5» Kor more details on aspects of the MIC 
Constitution, structure of the Party and formation of branch 
organizations, see S„ Subramaniam, ’Politics of the Indians in 
Malaysia, 19^5-55', M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, 197^ +, 
pp. 73-82.
Draft Proposals for an All Malaya Indian Organization, Kuala 
Lumpur, August 19^ +6, p. 6.
elected by the Annual Session, worked through a Working Committee
composed of sixteen members of the All Malayan Indian Congress 
(21)Committee, This Working Committee was nominated by the President
himself. As a result in both policy-making, and day to day adminis-
(22)tration, the MIC was dominated by the character of the President.
Furthermore, though the execution of the resolutions adopted at the
Annual Session was in theory the responsibility of the All Malayan ilndian
Congress Committee, in practice only the Working Committee had the power
(23)to execute these resolutions.
The autocratic leadership of the MIC inevitably led to conflicts
with the regional and local branches. These conflicts were exacerbated
by splits within these local groups themselves, and by divisions between
the Regional Congresses. For example, the Singapore Regional Congress,
with a membership of five thousand, was a dominant influence in the MIC
in its early years, partly because it had considerable influence over
the Tamil Press and also because the Serangoon and Seletar branches in
(2 )^the colony controlled the Singapore trade unions. However in the
Ibid.
(22) The only check on the President's powers was the Annual Session 
which examined the Party's policies and financial statements.
However even then, the President could in practice postpone the 
Annual Session indefinately. This was a popular tactic with both 
K.L. Devaser, President from 1951-55» and V.T. Sambanthan, President 
from 1955-73» in order to avoid open conflicts within the Party.
Indian Daily Mail, 13 July 1950.
( 2 f^) Membership of the Singapore Regional Indian Congress,
August 1946 - December 1947.
Branches 19^ 6 Increase in 
June 19^7
Increase in 
December 19^7
Total
Serangoon 1,225 320 266 1,811
Joo Chiat and 
Changi 3^0 257 76 673
Tanjong Pagar 220 555 10 785 
1,210 "Seletar If 19 1,015 76
Town -^25 180 - 605
Source: Indian Daily Mail, 5 May 19^8.
late 19 +^Os the Singapore Congress declined in influence essentially
because of conflicts with the MIC leadership and opposition from the
(25)powerful Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce.
The Selangor Regional Congress, though strongly represented in the
MIC leadership, also contained highly volatile branches most notably
in the Bungsar-Brickfields district. This area was an impregnable
Indian stronghold and therefore attracted the electoral interest not
(26)only of the MIC but also the IMP and the Malayan Labour Party.
In contrast, the rural areas of Selangor provided a very conservative
MIC membership who often came into conflict with the radicals from
(27)Bungsar-Brickfields. In addition, the Malacca Regional Congress,
being dominated by Chettiars and Tamil conservatives, was also
(
opposed to the radical policies of the MIC in the late 19^ 0,s.
The Perak Regional Congress was also heavily fragmented having to
reconcile the more radical branch in Ipoh with the moderate factions
(29)from Sungei Biput, Krian and the Chettiar-dominated Kuala Kangsar.
The Johore Regional Congress had a close rapport with caste and 
ethnic associations in that state and concentrated on social reform. ^ 0 ')
Indian Daily Mail, 9 March 19^9-
(26) See Chapter V, pp. 155-156.
(27) Interview with S. Govindaraj, General Secretary of the MIC, 
19^9-52, and Executive Member, Selangor Regional Congress,
1953-59» Kuala Lumpur, 16 January 1975* See also D.E. Moore,
'The United Malays National Organization and the 1959 Elections:
A Study of a Political Party in Action in a Newly-Independent, 
Plural Society1, Ph.B. Thesis, University of California, 19&0, 
pp. 2^ +2-2^ 5.
Tamil Nesan, 2 March 19^8, y\ January 1950; Indian Daily Mail,
9 March 19^9.
Straits Times, 18 February 1955- 
Indian Daily Mail, 25 April 19^8.
Finally the Penang and Province Wellesley Regional Congress was
( 31)a vitriolic opponent of the MIC leadership. From 195*+ it was
augmented by a strong Tamil faction, which embarrassed the MIC
leadership by demanding that Tamil be made an official language
in Malaya, though the MIC had accepted Alliance policy, making
(32)Malay the only official language. In addition, in 1956 the
Penang branch mounted a campaign for jus soli in citizenship and
(33)for severe limitations on Malay privileges. To the despair
of Sambanthan, the MIC President, the Penang-Province Wellesley 
MIC rebelled against the leadership and supported opposition
( 3*+)parties in the rural and town board elections in December 1957*
In short, the MIC was fragmented by a lack of co-ordination 
between the leadership and the regional and local branches, by 
ethnic divisions within the Regional Congresses, by the 
uncompromising position of the MIC leadership over the 
Constitutional issue between 19*+8-50, and by the vulnerability 
of local branches to poaching by non-communal parties such as 
the IMP and the Malayan Labour Party.
(3^ Straits Times, 23 February 1955? 10 March 1957?
7 September 1957.
Tamil Nesan, 15 September 1956, 26 September 1956.
(33) Ibid., 26 September 1956.
(3^ ) Straits Times, 20 December 1957? 2A December 1957#
199*
(ii)
By 19^9 the MIC was afflicted not only by serious divisions at its
branch level but also by the stigma of an early political partnership
(35)with left-wing organizations such as the AMCJA. The boycott of the
Federation Agreement from 19^8 byfthe MIC had produced still further
(36 )divisions within the party. But above all, the MIC had to struggle
against accusations from the Malays that it was dominated by foreign- 
(37)born Indians. In the circumstances it was inevitable that"the MIC
leadership began to have doubts whether the party could be regarded as
a legitimate spokesman of the domiciled loyal Indians. This became a
crucial issue following the attempt by the UMNO in May 19^9 to open
membership to non-Malays. A further important development in this
respect was the formation in February 19^9 of the MCA, 'to foster and
safeguard the social, political, cultural and economic welfare of the
(39)Malayan Chinese by legitimate and constitutional means'.
In the face of these major political changes, the MIC leadership 
felt that a radical reform of the Party was urgently required. The 
subsequent changes aimed at 'emphasizing the national character', of 
the MIC.^^ Membership was to be restricted to loyal Malayan Indians,
(35) See Chapter IV, pp. 117, 120-123.
See Chapter IV, pp. 128-132.
Majlis, 23 November 19^ +6, 3 December 19^6; Utusan Melayu,
20 November 19^ +6; UMNO circular, 29 November 1950* in UMNO/SG, 
File 113/50, circular No. 6/50 (UMNO Papers, N.A. Kuala Lumpur).
(^8)
Straits Times, 30 May 19^9* This was of course simply associate 
membership.
Vasil, op.cit., p. 2*+: Means, op.cit., p. 120; Straits Times,
28 February 19^9-
Indian Daily Mail, 21 June 19^9*
including Pakistanis and Ceylonese, and the MIC was to campaign for 
citizenship for all those 'who regard Malaya as their real home and
(V i)object Of their loyalty'. This decision to include in the MIC
only Indians loyal to Malaya arose from Budh's conviction that 'alien'
Indians 'had blurred and confused the policy of the Congress and thus
(i+2)considerably weakened the organization'. This view was echoed by
N.T.R. Singham, President of the Selangor Regional Congress who
condemned the meddling of 'alien' Indians in Malayan politics, as
(V?)'aggression against the Malayan people'. 'We cannot', he stated,
'fly foreign flags, shout foreign slogans, sing foreign national
anthems, give our loyalties to a foreign countty and at the same time
want to meddle in the affairs of Malaya. To continue to do so is
(i|4 )
to arouse the hostility of the Malayan People'.
This sudden change in attitude in favour of excluding non­
domiciled Indians from the Party was somewhat startling since at its 
formation the MIC had declared itself as representing all Indians in
(V?)Malaya. What made the change of policy all the more disconcerting
was that Budh Singh, the man who pressed for this reform, had during
Ibid., 22 June 19^9.
Ibid., 21 June 19^9- 
Tamil Nesan, k July 19^9- 
Ibid.
Tamil Nesan, 8 August 19VS. Resolution adopted at the 
inaugural meeting of the MIC in 19^6 to 'include all Indians 
whether citizens or not' was reiterated at the first annual 
session of the MIC in June 19V7 - Indian Daily Mail,
1.0 June 19V?.
(V I)  
(if 2) 
(*K5) 
(VO 
(if5)
his visit to India in early 19^ +9 attempted to secure an assurance from 
the Government of India that the acquisition of Federal citizenship 
would not involve the loss of Indian citizenship. One possible
explanation for this sudden shift of policy was that in the late 19^0s, 
nationalist governments in Burma and Ceylon were expelling Indian 
migrants who had failed to show sufficient attachment to the local
-4. ( Wcommunity.
A furthei* important aspect of the proposed new MIC constitution
(48)was the inclusion of Pakistanis and Ceylonese in the Party.
In fact, the Pakistani community was not unduly concerned about MIC 
(i+9)
membership. In contrast, the attempt to include Ceylonese had
serious repercussions. Hitherto the Ceylonese had been admitted to 
the MIC only as 'Indians' and in this they had to forego their 
Ceylonese n a t i o n a l i t y . A s  a result only a few Ceylonese had 
joined the Party, the most prominent being S. Ratnam, the first joint 
Secretary of the MIC, Swami Satyananda, a member of the Working
Tamil Nesan, 26 February 19^9? Singapore Free Press, 26 February 
19A-9- The MIC had formally stated that it was essentially 
opposed to dual citizenship but until Federal citizenship 
conferred nationality, Indians were advised to retain Indian 
nationality. In a special memorandum to the Indian Government 
in April 19^9* the MIC had requested that Indians in Malaya 
be regarded as a special case and be allowed to retain Indian 
Nationality since the Federal citizenship legislation was 
ambiguous and Indians found themselves in an anomalous position 
with respect to nationality. MIC Memorandum to the Government of 
India, 27 April 19^9 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
N. Chakravarti, Indian Minority in Burma, London, 1971? pp* 177-lSO.
MIC New Draft Constitution, June 19^9» P* 1 (MIC Papers, Kuala 
Lumpur)? Indian Daily Mail, 21 June 19^9*
Indian Daily Mail, 3 July 19^ +9-
(30) Tamil Nesan, 8 October 19^6.
Committee, and N.T.R. Singham. In June 19**7» Thivy had made a clumsy
attempt to include the Ceylonese in the Party by referring to the
individual 'Ceylonese, who aware of his past ties and future destiny,
identifies himself with the oneness of the Indian race politically and
(51)socially, economically and culturally'.
The Ceylonese certainly did not regard themselves in this light.
E.E.C. Thuraisingham's caustic advice to Thivy was 'to leave us alone to
enjoy the rights we have obtained through our own efforts' and look
(52)elsewhere for members. Ceylonese in their letters to the Malaya
Tribune reminded Indians of the earlier divisions between the two
communities in Malaya, particularly the furore that had ensued over
Ceylonese representation of Indian interests in the Government councils 
(53)in the 193Gs. The Indians too were angered by Thivy's proposal.
Chitics here ranged from R. Jumabhoy of the Singapore Regional
(5*0Congress to the Indian Daily Mail and the Tamil Nesan. The
latter believed that so long as the Ceylon Federation of Malaya had 
not considered it fit to merge or amalgamate with the MIC, 'it would
( cir'S
not be proper to include the Ceylonese into the Indian body'.
(SI)
Indian Daily Mail, 2*f June 19^7-
Malaya Tribune, 25 June 19^7«
^3) jbid., 7 July 19*<-7* 1*1- July 19^7* For more details of this
controversy over Ceylonese representation of Indian interests 
on the Federal and State Councils in the 1930s, see Arasaratnam, 
op.cit., p. 87; Ampalavanar, op.cit., pp. 295-297.
Indian Daily Mail, 28 June 19^7, 1 July 19^71 7 August 19*+7; 
Tamil Nesan, 17 October 19^71 13 March 1948, 24 May 19*f8.
(55)
Tamil Nesan, 7 August 19*+7*
Therefore, when the MIC attempted to revive the question of
Ceylonese membership in 19*+9, it was re-opening a highly controversial
issue. Indeed, it can be argued on several grounds that the MIC would
have been well-advised to have avoided this question altogether.
First, in 19^9 the Party was already involved in a fierce controversy
over 'alien' Indians. Second, it seems clear that the inclusion of
the Ceylonese in the MIC would add considerably to the number of
divisions within the Party. Though at the 19^7 Census, Ceylonese had
numbered only 22,700, they were divided into Sinhalese, Tamil,
(
Eurasian and Muslim groups. The majority were English-educated
government servants, who avoided active involvement in politics. In
the pre-war period a few had accepted nominations to Federal and state
councils but the community as a whole had not joined the CIAM or
(57)indeed any other Indian organization. During the Occupation,
almost all Ceylonese had remained aloof from the Indian National Army,
though some journalists including V. Saravanamuthu, editor of the
Straits Echo, Penang, and Francis Cooray, editor of the Malay Mail
( ^
had been drawn into active association with Bose's movement.
In the immediate post-war period there were clear indications that the
Ceylonese were deeply concerned about their political future in
Malaya. V. Coomarasamy, a Ceylonese sent to Malaya in 19*+6,
reported that the Malayan Ceylonese were, in general, undecided as to
(59)whether they should return to Ceylon or remain in Malaya.
(56) M.V. Del Tufo, Malaya, A Report on the 19**~7 Census of Population,
London, 19**9, P* 80*
(57) j .r. Vethavanam had been appointed to the Selangor State Council 
in 1932 followed by the appointments of Dr. S. Muthuthamby to the 
Johore State Council and L. Seenivasagam to the Perak State Council
in 1935 - Arasaratnam, op.cit., p. 87-
(58) Ramachandra, op.cit., pp. 228-230.
(59) V. Coomarasamy, 'The Position of the Ceylonese in Malaya', 
report of 15 June 19*+6, in Tamil Nesan, 18 June 19*+6.
In this period an attempt was made by E.E.C. Thuraisingham to
mobilize the Malayan Ceylonese community, but with little success.
His Ceylon Federation of Malaya had branches only in Kuala Lumpur and
Taiping.^^ The Ceylon Federation found it difficult to survive
essentially because a large proportion of the community were government
servants and therefore forbidden to engage in political activity.
Moreover the Ceylon Federation of Malaya was rent by serious internal
rivalries between E.E.C. Thuraisingham, the rather dictatorial
Chairman, and R.P.S. Rajasooria, a prominent Kuala Lumpur lawyer, and
(6l)also by conflicts between Tamils and Sinhalese. A crucial source of
conflict was undoubtedly Thuraisingham's high-handed attitude. He was
a rich lawyer, a protege of Macdonald and an intimate of both Onn bin
Jaafar and Tan Cheng Lock. He moved with ease in the corridors of
power and cared little about his relationship with his own 
(
organization. Eventually these divisions became so serious that
another Ceylonese political organization was formed, by an alliance of 
the Selangor Ceylon Tamils Association and a number of disenchanted 
Sinhalese. ^
Registrar of Societies File V?l/^9» 'Ceylon Federation of Malaya' 
(Registry of Societies, Kuala Lumpur).
Tamil Nesan, 25 March 1952. A vote of no confidence was passed by 
the Ceylon Federation of Malaya against its President, E.E.C. 
Thuraisingham, in March 1952, alleging that he was 'not working 
for the welfare of the community'. Here the grievances stemmed 
from his arbitrary method of nominating Ceylonese representatives 
to the state councils and his repeated postponement of annual 
elections for office in the party in 1950 and 1951*
(62) jje was appointed to the Federal Council in 19^7 and became Member 
for Education in October 1951*
Tamil Nesan, 28 January 19^8. This was the Malayan Ceylon Congress 
led by M.W. Navaratnam. The rivalry between the Malayan Ceylon 
Congress and the Ceylon Federation of Malaya was to remain a high 
point in the politics of the community throughout the 1950s. On 
5 August 1957i with Independence being imminent, both organizations 
approached the Alliance for membership there but were rejected and 
were advised by Tunku Abdul Rahman to unite before seeking 
partnership with the Alliance. Interview with E.E.C. Thuraisingham, 
Kuala Lumpur, 20 February 1975*
In view of this, the Congress's crude attempt to entice the 
Ceylonese into the Party was bound to fail. Moreover, it can be 
argued that from the point of view of the MIC, the failure was to the 
Party's benefit. Budh's attempt in 19*1-9 to revive an MIC organization 
which had become weakened by serious internal divisions, by incorpor­
ating within it all 'Indians', would in practice have simply meant the 
addition to the Party of yet another faction-ridden segment. The MIC 
Constitution of 19*1-9 set as the principal objectives of the party, a 
campaign for an independent democratic Malaya, universal adult
suffrage, full employment with a 'living' wage, basic civil liberties
(6*0and Malayan citizenship for all 'loyal1 Malayans. The reformers
also hoped to liberalize the MIC, essentially by increasing the power, 
and independence of action of the Working Committee at the expense of 
the P r e s i d e n t . T h i s  was to be achieved by increasing worker 
representation on the Working Committee, so making the committee more 
representative of the party as a w h o l e . H o w e v e r  the encouraging of 
worker involvement in the MIC hierarchy would prove difficult to 
achieve, for the trade unions and left-wing parties had already firmly 
entrenched themselves in the Indian labouring classes and would firmly 
resist MIC attempts to dislodge them. Moreover, it could be argued that 
a powerful, virtually dictatorial, Presidency was the only means by which 
the MIC could achieve a semblance of unity and that by increasing the 
power of the Working Committee, the Party could disintegrate.
Indian Daily Mail, 22 June 19*19- 
Ibid.
Ibid.
(6*0
(65)
(66)
All regional branches except Selangor, rejected the proposed 
constitution.Indeed, the Singapore Regional Congress was so
/ r o \
indignant that in July 19*+9 it began to agitate for autonomy.
The Tamil Press was particularly vehement in denouncing the MIC
leaders and their proposed reforms. For example, in the period from
2*+ June to 7 July 19*+9» the Indian Daily Mail carried eleven editorials,
criticizing the Working Committee which it referred to as the ’Wrecking
Committee' jndlan Daily Mail could not disguise its disgust
at what'., appeared to be a North Indian-Ceylonese conspiracy to gain
(70)influence in a Tamil dominated party. Budh, a Sikh and N.T.R.
Singham, a Ceylonese were clearly the moving forces behind this
’conspiracy*, ihe Indian Daily Mail also saw dqngers in the request of
the MIC to the Government for proportional representation in national
elections, for it would relegate the Indians to the position of ’a
perpetual minority, with all the dangers attendant upon such a
condition, instead of absorbing them into the body politic of Malaya
(71)and making them a part and parcel of the Malayan nation’.
Eventually Budh’s leadership came under fire from within the MIC.
It was alleged that he was responsible for the deterioration of the
(72)Party and for the confusion within the community. In October 19*+9»
Tamil Nesan, ^ July 19*+9*
Ibid., 9 July 19*+9-
^9) Indian Daily Mail, 2*+ June 19*+9» 27 June 19*+9T 28 June 19*+9»
29 June 19*+9, W  June 19*+9, 1 July 19*+9, 2 July 19*+9, 3 July 19*+9,
*+ July 19*+9, 5 July 19*+9, 6 July 19*+9 and 7 July 19*+9-
Ibid., 6 July 19*+9-
Ibid., 1 July 19*+9.
(72)J Ibid., 5 July 1939.
N.T.R. Singham, President of the Selangor Regional Congress and a
close colleague of Budh Singh, resigned over the rejection of the new
constitution, and was succeeded by B. Athinahappan, a Chettiar and
(73)editor' of the Tamil Nesan. In early 1930 Budh himself was replaced
as MIC President by the conservative Tamil K. Ramanathan, and retiring
(7*0from Malayan politics, Budh left for India. In his farewell speech
at the fourth annual session of the MIC in Kuala Lumpur in April 1950,
Budh lamented that 'there was no word of encouragement, if not of
praise from his colleagues that one had been true to the policy of the
(75)MIC chalked out by them1. This was a reference, in particular, to
the Party's policy of constitutional boycott between 19^8 and 1950.
Therefore the collapse of the movement for a new constitution 
produced a major realignment within the party, and the departure of 
Budh and Bingham left the way open for increased Tamil influence in 
the MIC leadership. This transitional atmospherd within the MIC was 
reflected in a speech by B. Athinahappan in December 19^ +9? in which 
he stated,
At present Congress is neither right nor left. Once it was 
associated with leftist bodies. Due to the Emergency some 
of them have gone into the jungle, some have liquidated 
themselves. Others have taken new shape. Congress is 
still the same with its negative attitude. This should
change.(76)
It did change. Early 1950 saw the MIC abandon its policy of
constitutional boycott and throw itself into the maelstorm of
(77)elections and alliances.
Tamil Nesan, 25 December 19*1-9*
Indian Daily Mail, 30 April 1950.
Farewell Address by out-going President at the Fourth Annual Session 
of the MIC, Kuala Lumpur, 29-30 April 1950 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Tamil Nesan, 25 December 19^9*
See Chapter IV, pp. 136-137•
(73)
(7*0
(75)
(76)
(77)
Though in 19^9 the MIC had failed to restrict its membership
to local-born and domiciled Indians, there is clear evidence that
many Malayan Indians of long residence were eager to secure separate
representation, ^ 8  ^ Most notably, in August 19^7 the Malayan Indian
Association, which purported to represent only domiciled and local-
(79)born Indians, was revived. The MIA had been formed in 1932 by
G.V. Thaver in order to organize those Indians who wished to remain
permanently in Malaya, This was at a time when the Depression had
thrown into sharp relief the political and economic vulnerability
of the community in Malaya. The MIA was led by professionals though
(81)it contained a minority of merchants. Its counterpart in Penang
was the Penang Malayan Indian Association which had existed since 
192^ and was under the strong influence of the Straits Chinese 
British Association and the Lost Souls Club of Penang.(82) The 
Penang Malayan Indian Association was in fact a rather curious body 
of Indian Anglophiles, obsessed with proving their local ties, and 
fearfully opposed to Nationalist Indians.
(78) In 19^7, 51.6 per cent of tbe.Indians in the Federation and 
Singapore were local-born (del Tufo, op.cit,, p. 15). In 1957* 
this ratio of local-born had risen to 63 per cent - Federation 
of Malaya, The 1937 Census, A Preliminary Report Based on 'First 
Count ^otal* Returns, Kuala Lumpur, 1937? p. 15 •
^9) Malaya Tribune, 17 August 19^7.
(80) mThe MIA aimed 'to promote and safeguard the general interests, 
rights and welfare of Malayan Indians and Indians of Malaya'.
They defined a 'Malayan Indian as one who has made Malaya (Singapore 
included) his permanent home or who has qualified himself for 
Federal citizenship within the meaning of the Federation of Malaya 
Constitution^ 'Rules of the MIA', MIA File 10^/50 (Registry of 
Societies, Kuala Lumpur).
^81  ^ Ibid.
^8^  Malaya Tribune, 3 September 1932. See also MIA (Penang) File'll 11/^9 
(Registry of Societies, Kuala Lumpur). For an account of the 
Straits Chinese British Association, see Lee Yong Hock, 'A History 
of the Straits Chinese British Association, 1900-1959'? B.A.
Academic Exercise, University of Malaya in Singapore, i960. For 
further details on the Lost Souls Club of Penang, see D. 0oi,'The 
English-Speaking Chinese of Penang, 1900-^1® M.A. Thesis,
University of Malaya, 19&7? PP* 87-88.
However the MIA was at a considerable disadvantage compared with
(flx'i
the MIC when it came to attracting members. This was partly
because the 'local-born' or 'domiciled* identity was, in practice, a 
very vague concept, and partly because political instability in 
Malaya particularly aftef 19**1 and the continuing appeal of India 
constantly undermined the loyalty of many Indians to Malaya. In fact 
the MIA was influential only in Kuala Lumpur, the branch in Penang 
operating i n d e p e n d e n t l y . i t  would appear that the MIA existed 
essentially to provide a public platform for an Indian leadership 
denied a place in the MIC. This was certainly true of G.B. Thaver who 
opposed the MIC leadership in the late 19*+0s as he had opposed the 
CIAM before the war.^"^ To him the MIC and the CIAM were simply 
nationalists, socialists and to all appearances blind followers of 
Nehru and the Indian National Congress.
(83)
MIA MIC
date membership date membership
29*9*^9* 100 31.8.51. 7,98*+
25.1.50. 120 31.8.52. 12,833
31.8.51. 108 30.6.53. 20,187
31.8.52. 108 31.3.5**. 19,820
30.9.53. 1*+1 31.12.5**. 27,200
31.12.5*+. 220 31.12.55. 26,050
31.12.55* 193 25.10.56. *+0,000
31.12.56. 223 31.12.57. if A, 000
31.12.57. 105 29.9.58. if if, 000
Source: MIA File 10i+/50; MIC File llif/58 (Registry of Societies 
Kuala Lumpur).
(8*f) 'Inspection Report of officer of the Registry of Societies, 
December 1955* » in MIA File 10if/50 (Registry of Societies,
Kuala Lumpur).
(
Interview with S. Govindaraj, 16 January 1975*
The MIA played a significant role only in agitations for land 
settlements on behalf of domiciled Indians* On all other issues
it was the party of compromise and moderation* It insisted on 
exposing what it saw as MIC dogmatism over citizenship and nationality. ^ 8*'7^ 
The MIA was a party dominated by one man, its creator, G.V. Thaver, 
and inevitably it projected Thaver's ideology. He was consistently 
loyal to Onn, in the IMP, in the National Conference and in the Party 
Negara. The MIA echoed Onn and the National Conference in arguing 
that Federal elections should be delayed until 1956, and therefore that 
independence should be postponed.(88) It was argued that delay would 
give the local-born additional opportunities to assert themselves in 
Malayan politics.
The real influence of the MIA can be said to have lain in the' ‘fact 
that it acted as a check on the policies of the MIC. Important here 
was Padi Krishnan who was active in the MIA until September 1951*
For example, as the MIA took a firm stand on non-communalism and in 
this it refused even to support the campaign for reserved seats, the 
Indian community was madd to think carefully before it embarked on any 
communal a f f l i a t i o n . M I A  added to the divisions within the
/ O/'N
One of Thaver’s land-settlement projects was the ! Kamnathapuram 
Settlement started in 1932 near Port LickSOn in Negri Sembilan.
See K.K. Jain, 1Ramnathapuram Experiment: Paradigm of an Estate - 
Farm - Factory Community in Malaya', Proceedings of the First 
International Conference - Seminar of Tamil Studies, Kuala Lumpur, 
January 1966, vol. 1, pp. 16^-196. ""
8^<^  Straits Times, 22 February 1955* A senior official of the MIA,
K.V. Thaver, who was also President of the Kuala Lumpur Party 
Negara, advised Malays in February 1955 to oppose the principle
jus soli and to reserve automatic citizenship and nationality 
only for those born in the country and with a long residencejfchere. 
This was a reactionary stand, particularly in the light of the 
controversies over citizenship in Indian and Chinese political 
circles in this period. Sevika, 13 February 1955*
Tamil Nesan, October 1953*
(89)
Padi Krishnan resigned . from the MIA in September 1951 
following a clash with G.V. Thaver. Tamil Nesan, 9 September 1951*
(90) See Chapter V, pp. ffco - ( M ,
the community, it can on the other side be said to have engendered
a more thoughtful approach amongst the Indian leadership. The
usefulness of the MIA in this respect faded in the mid-1950s when the
MIC became more positive and indeed communal. At the annual general
meeting of the MIA in February 1955* it was resolved to dissolve the
organization as a political party but to continue as a social welfare
(91)
body. Its members were permitted to join other organizations
(92)including the MIC. The MIA finally dissolved itself in April
(93)1959* It was in the final analysis a party of G.V. Thaver and
(9*0when he retired from politics, his organization inevitably faded.
It is ironic that the MIC, which aimed to represent all Indians 
in Malaya, in fact prompted the formation of splinter organizations 
when it aligned itself with extremist parties in the late 19*K)s. For 
example, the alliance of the MIC with the AMCJA in 19*t8 caused 
conservative professional and merchant Indians to seek an alternative 
political organization. Moreover, between 19^+8-1950 when the MIC 
was engaged in its constitutional boycott, the Indian councillors 
though formally representing Indian interests in the councils, were 
excluded from the MIC, the major Indian organization. Moreover, 
far too often, the MIC and the trade unions by their obsession with 
socialism and workers’ politics, gave the impression that the Indian 
community was composed solely of estate labourers. Hence the years
Sevlka, 13 February 1955*
Ibid.
(93) Tamil Nesan, 27 April 1959-
(Qif) 0
G.V. Thaver: born December lo95 m  Kuala Lumpur; educated in 
Kuala Lumpur; Cooperative Officer, Negri Sembilan; President, 
Negri Sembilan Indian Association, MIA, and Tamils Representative 
Council*Member, Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council and State War 
Executive Council, Selangor.
19*1-7 to early 1950 saw a sudden upsurge of new political ventures by
the Indian elite who were aware that there was a disconcerting absence
of Indian political leaders who were acceptable to the British.
A group of prominent Indians led by R* Ramani and Major A.S. Roman
made a few clumsy attempts to form a separate political body in 19*+9 but
(95)were easily blocked by Budh and Thivy. However in July 1950 with
considerable pomp, the Indian councillors led by Ramani and supported
by the Indian Chamber of Commerce and certain Sikh associations,
formed the Federation of Indian Organizations (FIO) as a parallel
(96)organization to the MIC. Their aim was to bring into a federation
all the existing Indian organisations. It was not intended to replace 
the MIC or indeed any other party, but rather to provide an organizational 
framework within which all Indian bodies would work as best suited
(97)their specific interests. Representatives from the MIC attended
the inaugural meeting of the FIO in July 1950 but they opposed the new 
(98)body. Subsequently the MIC held a protest meeting condemning the
FIO as being detrimental to communal unity, and as an 'apple of 
(99)discord'. This protest meeting was supported by the MIA and by
large numbers of Chettiars and Tamil businessmen. it should be
noted in passing that despite occasional disenchantment with the 
policies and actions of the MIC among the Chettiars and the Tamils, 
these communities remained intensely loyal to the Congress and were 
largely responsible for the failure of other Indian political bodies 
to challenge effectively the MIC.
Tamil Nesan, 15 February 19*+9, 17 April 19*+9-
(96) Ibid., July 1950.
(97) Ibid.
Tamil Nesan, 23 July 1950.
Indian Daily Mail, 26 July 1950.
(100) Ibxd.
The response of the Indian Daily Mail to the FIO was predictably
self-righteous. It condemned the new organization as the 'conspiracy
(101)of the thirteen musketeers'. Its denunciation of V.M.N. Menon,
one of the founders of the FIO was particularly brutal. He had been
a committee member of the MIC in 19*+6-47, Vice-President of the MIA
until 1950 and was now active in the FIO. To the Indian Daily Mail
(102)he was a political mercenary. The FIO brought together an impressive
array of conservative Indian leaders. Its initial objective of admitting
whole organizations, rather than individuals, had to be swiftly modified
for the response from other Indian organizations was very poor. As
late as September 1951 only nine organizations had declared their
allegiance to the FIO.^^^ From May 1951 the Federation began to
(10A)admit individual members. The FIO also failed to offer a substantially
alternative policy to that of the MIC. This was shown by its memorandum
to Oliver Lyttleton in December 1951i which differed from that of the
(i m  ^
MIC, only over its proposals for citizenship.
In 1951 the FIO attempted to emphasize its local orientation by 
supporting conscription of all males in Malaya between the ages of 
18 - 25.(106') This was a burning issue for the Indian community for 
it was being accused of sending its young males back to India in order 
to avoid conscription. At the same time the local forces were under 
severe strain as a result of the Emergency. This patriotic stand of the 
FIO was therefore unlikely to prove popular in the Indian community
Ibid., 5 July 1950, Editorial, 'The Thirteen Musketeers', in 
reference to the 13 Indian Councillors and merchants who promoted 
the FIO.
Ibid.
Indian Daily Mail, 3 September 1951- 
Straits Times, 2 September 1951- 
See Chapter V, p. 147*
Straits Times, 2 September 1951-
(101)
(102)
(103)
(10*+)
(105)
(106)
particularly when it was known that Ramani was zealously retaining his
(107)Indian nationality and passport. The FIO did not seek support from
the Indian labouring classes. In fact the two trade union representatives 
in the Federal Council, P.P. Narayanan and M.P. Rajagopal, who attended
the inaugural meeting of the FIO were not considered for office in the
, (108) party.
The FIO was a weak organization. It was acceptable to the 
authorities largely because it contained prominent Indians but it never 
caused a major political realignment within the community. Like the 
MIC and the MIA, the FIO adhered to non-communalism which in practice 
meant for the FIO an irresistable urge to support Onn in the IMP, the 
National Conference and the Party Negara. The FIO achieved political 
importance only because its leading members constituted the majority
(109)
of nominated Indian representatives on the Federal and State Councils.
It faded with the arrival of elections and mass politics. In 1959 the 
FIO was dissolved and Ramani retired from politics to concentrate on 
his law practice.
(107)
(108)
(109)
(110)
Interview with S.Gbvxndaraj, 2 March 1975- 
Indian Daily Mail, 5 July 1950.
The thirteen Indians who promoted the FIO in July 1950 were 
R. Ramani, V.M.N. Menon, M.P. Rajagopal and P.P. Narayanan 
(members of the Federal Legislative Council), S.O.K. Ubaidullah, 
Dr. J. Samuel (Negri Sembilan State Councillors), Dr. N.K. Menon 
(Penang Settlement Councillor), 0, Shanmugam (Member, Malacca 
Settlement Council), C.J. Doshi, R.K. Pannikkar, C.M. Seth 
(prominent Indian merchants) and S. Seenikatti and A.S. Nair. 
Indian Daily Mail, 4 July 1950.
R. Ramani: Brahmin; born in Madras; educated in Madras 
University; lawyer, partner of legal firm, Braddell and Ramani; 
Later Malaysian Representative to the United Nations and 
achieved fame in the legal dispute with Philippines over Sabah 
in East Malaysia.
(iii)
For the Indian community the dangers inherent in its political
divisions came into sharp focus as the country moved towards its
first elections in 1951* In April of that year, Padi Krishnan, one
of the few political realists in the community, began to agitate for
the amalgamation of the three major political parties, the MIC, MIA
and FIO and preliminary discussions were held between the three
(111)Presidents that same month. The MIC working committee met in late
(112)April and agreed to accept amalgamation. On 13 May a meeting of
fifteen representatives from the MIC, MIA and FIO agreed that the
(*1 *1 *0proposed new body would include both organizations and individuals.
This was in order to accommodate the FIO which at that point had only
organizational membership.
A major difficulty in these discussions was that.the MIC had the
(11*+)highest membership and hence demanded special privileges. But
despite this, Devaser of the MIC, Ramani of the FIO and Padi Krishnan
of the MIA strongly supported the merger. Unexpectedly, the Singapore
Indian Association also pressed for merger, perhaps because its
President, R. Jumabhoy, who had withdrawn from the Singapore Regional
Congress in August 19*+7, was now eager to regain political prominence
(115)through the new organization. The negotiators agreed not to make
any distinction between citizens and non-citizens when it came to
Malay Mail, 22 April 1951; Indian Daily Mail, 27 April 1951.
See also letter from S. Govindaraj to K.L. Devaser, 16 April 1951 
(MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
(112) Minutes of MIC working committee meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 29 April 
1951 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Indian Daily Mail, 1*+ May 1951.
(11*+)
The MIC had a membership of 20,000, while the MIA had only 108 
members and the FIO included nine organizations. Tamil Nesan,
31 August 1951*
Indian Daily Mail, 15 May 1951*
m e m b e r s h i p . O n  this point, pressure had to be applied to the MIA
for initially that party had insisted that if the new organization was
to be essentially a political body, then membership and voting rights
(117)should be restricted to those who had made Malaya their home.
However if it was to be an organization with prominent social functions,
then all Indians and Indian organizations, irrespective of loyalty,
(118)could be included. But Ramani was adamantly opposed to any such
(119)
distinctions being made between citizens and non-citizens.
The Tamil Nesan supported the merger but the Indian Daily Mail
was an ardent opponent, though its opposition was based more on a
paranoid fear of Ramani and G.V. Thaver, than on a clear analysis
(120)of the benefits and disadvantages of the issue. Strangely the
Indian Daily Mail interpreted the merger issue as a struggle between 
citizens and non-citizens and appears to have believed that non­
citizens would not be allowed equal rights with citizens in the new 
party. In an emotional outburst, it pleaded that the MIC should be 
saved 'not merely for the sake of non-citizens who form the large bulk 
of the community but particularly for the sake of the citizens who 
ard ignorant and are being misled by their self-styled leaders.
For when a crisis comes, nobody is going to see whether you have a 
citizenship certificate or not and an Indian will continue to look
Nesan, J>1 August 1951-
(117) Letter dated 12 August 1951 from Padi Krishnan of the MIA, in 
Straits Times, 15 August1951« See also letter from General 
Secretary, MIC to all branches, 16 April 1951 (MIC Papers, Kuala 
Lumpur).
Straits Times, 13 August 1951*
(119) Malay Mail, 2 September 1951*
(<1 pQ)
Tamil Nesan, 15 May 1951; Indian Daily Mail, 16 May 1951*
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(121)an Indian whether he becomes a citizen or remains a non-citizen'.
(122)The Indian Daily Mail attacked the MIC leaders, particularly Devaser.
The Singapore Regional Congress, slavishly following the Indian Daily
Mail, also opposed merger and threatened to secede if the proposed
(123)merger became a reality.
At the fifth annual session of the MIC in June 1951, it was agreed
that the membership of the proposed new body should be restricted to 
(12*+)individuals. This decision reflected pressure from influential
("1 PR)
MIC branches in Selangor and Perak. ^ The insistence on individual
membership inevitably produced an impasse in the negotiations between
the three organizations, because it implied the exclusion of the FIO,
(126)and Ramani accused the MIC of sabotaging the merger. Relations
between the FIO and the MIC deteriorated further when in December 1951 
each organization sent a separate memorandum to Oliver Lyttleton, the 
Colonial Secretary. The following May, Devaser attacked the FIO at
(121)
(122)
(123)
Indian Daily Mail, 16 May 19511 Editorial, 'Save the MIC from the 
Executioners'.
Ibid., 22 May 1951.
Ibid., 7 June 1951. This threat by the Singapore Congress to 
secede from the MIC continued into late 1951 when serious internal 
schisms wrecked the party and the leadership considered . secession 
as a possible solution to end these rifts. In 195^ the Singapore 
Congress became increasingly involved in the politics of the 
island and thereby became estranged from the growing communalism 
in the MIC on the mainland. Finally with the attainment of 
Independence in August 1957) & formal break was made but the 
Singapore branch found it difficult to survive as an ethnic 
political organization in the highly competitive and ideologically 
infused political atmosphere of Singapore in the late 1950s. By 
1959 the Singapore Congress merely survived as a rump faction 
within the Indian reformist organizations on the island.
(12*+) -oMinutes of the iifth Annual Session of the MIC, Johore Bharu,
5-10 June 1951 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur); Tamil Nesan, 23 June 1951<
025)
026)
See MIC File 'Merger, further replies from branch Congresses to 
the circular by S. Govindaraj' (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Letter from Devaser to Ramani and G.V. Thaver, 5 August 1951 (MIC 
Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Straits Times, 13 August 1951. See also Ramani's reply to MIC 
President, in MIC Annual Report, June 1951 - May 1952, p. 5* 
Ramani complained, 'It [primary membership] cuts the ground under 
our feet as our membership at the moment is only organizational'.
the MIC annual session. 'The Congress wants uniform rights for all
Malayans. The FIO has been asking for special rights for Indians and
Ceylonese being British subjects ... the Congress is taking a far
sighted policy and it will be fatal to this country if the people go
(127)on having special rights exclusive to themselves'.
The merger can be said to have failed for the following reasons.
First, it attracted little support from within the major party, the MIC.
Devaser, Balakrishnan, President of I3enang Regional Congress and
S. Govindaraj, General Secretary of the MIC, were the only influential
(1 ?8)
members of the Party who favoured merger. Moreover opposition from
the influential Tamil Press in Singapore, which had an almost fanatical 
dislike of Ramani and Thaver, made it almost certain that the Singapore 
Regional Congress would secede from the MIC rather than participate 
in the proposed merger. Second, as has been demonstrated earlier, 
there were fundamental differences of ideology and organizational 
structure between the MIC, MIA and FIO, Third, therd were pronounced 
personality differences between Devaser, Ramani and Thaver. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, politics in Malaya in the early 1950s 
was already seriously complicated by a search for political alliances 
between the vafious communal groups. For example, the MIC was being 
wooed by the seemingly impressive Dato Onn and his IMP, and while 
this courtship continued, the pressure on the MIC to merge with the 
FIO and the MIA was considerably reduced. In the late 1950s as the 
prestige of the MIC grew, the other two Indian organizations were 
eclipsed and finally disappeared.
Presidential Address at Sixth Annual Session of the MIC, Klang,
31 May 1952 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Interview with S. Govindaraj, 2 March 1975«
(127)
(128)
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(iv)
As already stated, in the period under review, the MIC was a
severely fragmented organization, though to some extent this simply
reflected the divided and politically volatile character of the
community it purported to represent. This fragmentation can perhaps
be most clearly demonstrated, and its major determinants most easily
uncovered by a review of the successive MIC Presidents in this period -
their careers, personalities and the policies they pursued. The first
President of the MIC, John Thivy, was local-born. He was educated
in Ipoh, Madras and London and had a law practice in Ipoh in the 1930s.
During the Occupation, he was attracted to the Indian National Army
(129)and thence, in 19^ +6, into the MIC. His term as President
(1
coincided with a period of relative unity in the Indian community.
Thivy was a forceful, though not controversial character, and he
successfully stamped his personality on the MIC. During his
Presidency, the MIC acquired the socialist, nationalist and non-
communal character that was to mark its outlook, to a greater or
(131)lesser degree, in the 1950s.
His successor^ Budh Singh, President from 19^7-1950, was, like 
Thivy, a follower of Nehru and the Indian National Congress. However 
under his influence, the MIC became increasingly left-wing and this 
provoked the first major ideological rift within the organization.
(129) J. Thivy was initially President of the Perak Indian Independence 
League in 19^ +2 but was soon made Chairman of the Malayan branch 
of the Indian Independence League and Secretary in Bose’s Cabinet. 
His rapid promotions were a reflection of his flexibility in 
contrast to the dogmatism of N. Raghavan and S.C. Goho in the 
Indian Independence League. J.A. Thivy, A Short History of the 
Indian Independence Movement, Hanoi, 19^57 "PP* "6-16 "(photostat 
copy in the University of Malaya Library, Kuala Lumpur).
(13°) Chettur, Malayan Adventure, Mangalore, 19^8, p. 25^.
Indian Daily Mail, 9 July 1950, 13 July 1950.
The opposition to Budh Singh came mainly from the MIC branch in
Malacca, which was dominated by conservative Chettiars and Tamils,
(132)the Negri Sembilan Regional Congress, and the Tamil Nesan.
This opposition was prompted essentially by the Party's boycott of 
the Federation Constitution from 1948. Indeed, the Malacca branch, 
having failed to persuade the leadership to end the boycott, resigned
( 'I
en bloc from the MIC in August 1948. Discontent over this issue
(134)was also evident in the Negri Sembilan branch. There the main
agitation came from the Indian councillors who had been expelled from
/ /i 7r \
the MIC in mid-1948 for retaining their Government appointments.
Budh's leadership also faced serious opposition in Singapore 
where, in July 194?, R. Jumabhoy, President of the Singapore Regional 
Congress and a member of the Singapore Legislative Assembly supported 
a Bill proposing elections to the L e g i s l a t u r e . T h e  MIC leader­
ship considered this Bill inadequate, since it provided for the 
election of only six out of the twenty-three members, it restricted 
the franchise to British subjects and it did not envisage the union of
/ a -zn \
Singapore with the . mainland. Jumabhoy was also opposed to the
hartal of 20 August 1947» though the MIC leadership strongly favoured 
C1 ^
it. Indeed, four days before the hartal took place, Jumabhoy
resigned from the Congress. However Jumabhoy1s departure did not quell
the controversies within the Singapore branch and a significant faction
(139)decided to register party members on Singapore’s electoral roll.
Tamil Nesan, 11 April 1948, 5 August 1948; Malaya Tribune,
2 1 July 1948.
Tamil Nesan, 24 August 1948.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Tamil Murasu, 29 July 1947*
Yeo Kim Wah, Political Development in Singapore, 1945-55i Singapore, 
1973, P. 252.
See Chapter IV, p. 13i„
Indian Daily Mail, 1 March 1948.
(132)
(133)
(134)
(135)
(136)
(137)
(138)
(139)
This was in defiance of a decision by the All Malayan Indian Congress
(140)
Committee not to participate in the elections.
, Budh's dogmatism was in a large measure responsible for defections
of prominent MIC figures from the Party and for the continuing internal
rifts. By 1950 there was considerable internal pressure for a change
in leadership and policy. At the fourth annual session of the MIC,
there was a barbed conflict between Budh Singh and K. Ramanathan, the
President-elect over the constitutional boycott, the result of which
was a decision to abandon Budh's policy and return to active politics.^
Ramanathan argued that henceforth the MIC would cooperate with any
political party, including the MCA and the UMNO, to consider matters
(142)of common interest. The Indian Daily Mail suspected that this
reversal of policy was due essentially to the rising influence of
(*] if3)
Chettiars and the merchant elite. It is worth noting that , apart
from the abandonment of the constitutional boycott, this session 
debated only an Accounts Bill which required businessmen to keep their 
accounts in English or.Romanized Malay, an issue which seriously
(144)affected Chettiar businessmen. Moreover, O.A.R. Arunasalam
Chettiar whose personal feud with Budh Singh was notorious in MIC 
circles, used his influence over the>Chettiar dominated branches of
Minutes of All Malayan Indian Congress Committee meeting,
Kuala Lumpur, 29 February 1948 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Minutes of Fourth Annual Session of the MIC, 29- 30 April 1950 
(MIC Papers,,Kuala Lumpur); Indian Daily Mail, 8 May 1950.
Minutes of All Malayan Indian Congress Committee Meeting, Kuala 
Lumpur, 19 November 1950 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumper).
Indian Daily Mail, 12 May 1950.
Ibid. Minutes of Fourth Annual Session of. the MIC, 29 - 30 
April 1950 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
(140)
(141)
(142)
(143)
(144)
Malacca, Negri Sembilan and Selangor to gather support for 
(1^5)Ramanathan,
A further major factor accounting for the chronic divisions in 
the MIC in this period was its organizational structure. This 
ensured that a relatively few branches were able to achieve a 
disproportionately large representation on the All Malayan Indian 
Congress Committee and the Working Committee. In this way they
secured easy access to the President and to the inner circles of 
the MIC. For example, in 1950* five out of the nine members of the
( "I V7)All Malayanlndian Congress Committee were from Selangor.
It should also be noted that of the six Presidents who have served the
(1 +^8)MIC in the period 19^6-77, four have been from Selangor.
The very close links between the President, the All Malayanlndian 
Congress Committee and the Working Committee, tended to isolate
(1^5) Letter from A. Balakrishnan to k. Govindaraj, 25 December 1953 
(MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur). O.A.R. Arunasalam Chettiar: born in 
India? came to Malaya in the 1920s. In 1933 Re formed the 
Chettiars Merchants Association. In 1936 he founded the 
Tiruvalluvar Library in Malaya, which was a focus of Tamil literary 
movements in Malaya. In 193^ he started the Tamil Kody, as a 
monthly journal and later it appeared as a weekly paper. The 
emphasis in the Tamil Kody was on a Tamil cultural and literary 
revival. In the late 1930s the paper carried a regular column on 
labour problems edited by R.H. Nathan, the trade union leader and 
Tamil Nesan editor who was banished following the Klang Strikes 
in 19A1. O.A.R. Arunasalam Chettiar was also active in the Indian 
Independence League and was a founder member of the Malacca 
Congress in 19^6. In 1950 he was crucial in the organizing of the 
Tamil Pannai, an active literary and cultural body. He was a close 
friend of Tan Cheng Lock.
See Draft Proposals for the MIC, August 19^6, p.5 (MIC Papers,
Kuala Lumpur).
OV?) jn 2.950 the All Malayan Indian 0Ongress Committee Members were 
S. Govindaraj, V. Manickavasagam, K.L. Devaser, K. Gurupatham, 
Gurubaksh Singh Sambhi all of whom were from Selangor, while 
A. Balakrishnan (Penang), Me^appan (Johore), Fred David (Perak) and 
Kehar Singh (Negri Sembilan) were the remaining members. Annual 
Report of the MIC May 1950 - May 1951* P» 2 (MIC Papers, Kuala 
Lumpur)•
(1^8) Thivy, 19*f6-^ 7 - Perak.
Budh Singh, 19^7-50 - Selangor.
K. Ramanathan, 1950-51 - Selangor.
K.L. Devaser, 1951-55 - Selangor.
V.T. Sambanthan, 1955-73 - Perak.
V. Manickavasagam, 1973 - Selangor.
the President from the ordinary membership and to bestow a
dictatorial character to the leadership. This was particularly
evident during the Presidencies of Devaser and Sambenthan. In short,
criticism of the leadership from the lower levels of the MIC was
constantly stifled and contained. However, inevitably the pressure
of criticism would build up over several years and periodically
explode upon an unsuspecting President and his sycophantic colleagues.
For example, during his Presidency, between May 1951 - May 1955?
Devaser came increasingly into conflict with the Tamil dominated
o (1^9)branches of Penang and Singapore. Indeed, in December 1955? these
branches attempted to organize an opposition to Devaser's re-election 
(150)as President. In this they exploited an earlier court conviction
of Devaser for providing false evidence in a Chinese application for
/ ^ cr/1 \
citizenship. Devaser^ aware of these machinations, sought to
undermine the dissident Balakrishnan faction in Penang, by enlisting
the aid of Dr. N.K. Menon and wealthy Chettiars in Penang and Province 
("1 s? 1
Wellesley. With their support, he engineered the election of Jagjit
^ingh as President of the Penang branch. However Jagjit Singh was
certainly no supporter of the MIC President and later he was to prove a
(153)considerable annoyance to Devaser.
The contest for the MIC Presidency in April 195*+ was a heated one.
Originally there were eleven candidates of whom four withdrew before
(154)the elections took place. Only four contested the final ballot.
See Chapter VII, pp. 241-242.
Letter from A. Balakrishnan to S. Govindaraj, 31 December 1953 
(MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
Tamil Nesan, 28 January 195*+. Letter from A. Balakrishnan to 
S. Govindaraj, 13 January 195*+ (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
See Chapter VII, p. 241»
Tamil Nesan, 15 January 195*+* A. Balakrishnan (Penang),
Gurubaksh Singh Sambhi (Selangor), Jagjit Singh (Penang),
Devaser (Selangor) were the four contenders.
(149)
(150)
(151)
(152)
(153) 
(15*0
In fact Devaser was able to retain his post though only twenty-eight
(155)
of the fifty-two branches actually voted. Indeed Devaser was re­
elected essentially because he had the support of the Selangor branch,
C1 S6)
particularly the powerful Bungsar-Brickfields Congress. However
Devaser's re-election did not stem the rising tide of Tamil resentment
against him. The President'a suspension of Jagjit Singh and V.J.
Somasundaram from the Party, simply for criticising him on the reserved
seats issue, led an All Malayanlndian Congress Committee meeting in August
("1 1
195^ to censure Devaser's 'dictatorial actions'.
In the election for the MIC Presidency in May 1955* Devaser's 
prot^g^s, V. Manickavasagam and Kehar Singh were badly beaten. The
/ /i rQ \
new President was V.T. Sambanthan who narrowly defeated A. Balakrishnan.
One of the first actions of the new President was to announce a change
in the MIC representatives on the Alliance National Council. The
complaints against the existing representatives were that they were
mostly Selangor nominees, and that they had failed to protect Indian
(■I59)
interests m  the Alliance. These retiring representatives were
(160)predominantly North Indian, their replacements were Tamil.
Sambanthan was soon facing difficulties. First, he had a tempestuous 
relationship with the MIC Youth and with the Bungsar-Brickfields branch 
throughout his entire period of office. Second, barely six months after 
assuming the Presidency, Sambanthan was confronted with a crisis in
Tamil Nesan, 12 April 195^*
Ibid.
Minutes of the All Malayan Indian Congress Committee Meeting, Kuala 
Lumpur, 26 August 195^ (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Straits Times, 1 May 1955; Tamil Nesan, 2 May 1955*
Tamil Nesan, 2 May 1955*
MIC representatives on the Alliance National Council, 195^-55 were 
A.B. Dings (Malayalee), K. Gurupatham (Tamil), Kehar Singh 
(Punjabi Sikh), Gurdial Singh (Punjabi Sikh), Devaser (Punjabi 
Hindu), V. Manickavasagam (Tamil). The new nominees were 
K. Pamanathan (Tamil), A. Balakrishnan (Tamil), V.T. Sambanthan 
(Tamil). Tamil Nesan, 2k May 1955*
(155)
(156)
(157)
(158)
(159)
(160)
225*
Perak where elections for the state council were due in December 1955/'161)
The Alliance awarded the MIC only one out of the twenty candidatures for
the elections and in disgust, the Perak Regional Congress Chairman
resigned from the Party. Moreover, two MIC members who had hoped
to contest the elections threatened that henceforth they would stand as
Independents, though Sambanthan ultimately forced them to withdraw.
As a result of this, Sambanthan alienated an influential group in the Ipoh
MIC who later joined forces with the Perak Progressive Party in Ipoh
to challenge the Alliance in that state.
Then in early 1956, Sambanthan was criticised by factions within the
MIC for compromising the Party's position in the Alliance memo to the Reid
(165)
Constitutional Commission. The President was accused of failing to
insist on jus soli and multi-lingualism in education and for failing to 
insist on an amendment of the Malays' special privileges clause.
Sambanthan's failure to maintain the support of the branches and his 
failure to protect Indian interests in the Alliance were to mar his 
political career. More seriously, Sambanthan's failure to secure MIC 
Interests in the Alliance, frustrated factions within the MIC so severely 
that eventually they defied the MIC and supported G.V. Thaver of the MIA
Tamil Nesan, 20 December 1955*
Ibid.
Ibid., 31 December 1955-
See Moore, op.cit., pp. 240-2^1.
Straits Times, 20 April 1956; Tamil Nesan, 20 June 1956. 
Straits Times, 20 April 1956.
(161)
(162)
(163)
(16*0
(165)
(166)
in sending a separate memo to the Colonial Secretary asking for the 
original recommendations of the Reid Commission to be implemented.^^7)
In spite of the alienation of MIC Youth and factions in Selangor, 
Perak and Penang, Sambanthan was re-elected President in April 1956.^^^ 
However, after the election Devaser and MIC Youth continued to attack 
Sambanthan, criticising him for being obsessive over temperance reform,
(
yet neglecting the serious political issues of language and citizenship.
The feud between Devaser and Sambanthan became particularly bitter in
August 1956 when Sambanthan dropped Devaser from the list of MIC nominees
to the Alliance Coramittee on the Constitution, replacing him with 
(170)
K. Ramanathan. As Devaser was the Alliance nominated member in the
Federal Council, his removal from the Committee was impolitic if not 
irregular. The feud between Devaser and Sambanthan eventually led to 
the suspension of the former from the MIC. In addition, the All 
Malayan Indian Congress Committee warned that 'the objectionable 
activities of Devaser and the Selangor MIC Executive Committee will be
(  si C j n  \
Tamil Nesan, 29 May 1957* This memo, dated 9 May 1957» was signed 
by the All Malaya Chettiars Chamber of Commerce, the Malayan 
Tamils Association, the MIA and by prominent individuals from 
Selangor. The Reid Commission's original recommendations had 
included l) that Malay privileges should be reviewed within 
fifteen years with a view towards abolition of these preferential 
rights and 2) that Federal citizenship would be synonymous with 
Commonwealth citizenship and this was highly favourable to Indians. 
(Report of the Federation of Malaya, Constitutional Commission, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1957, pp. 87, 183 Article 157). Hence the MIA 
preferred these above recommendations to certain of the proposals 
in the final Merdeka Constitution formulated by the Working 
Committee between March - May 1957 - Straits Times, 2 May 1957*
Straits Times, 29 April 1956. 
Tamil Nesan, 2 June 1956. 
^^0) Straits Times, 5 August 1956.
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(171)investigated'• In this investigation Sambanthan marshalled
sufficient support from the rural branches of Selangor to suppress the
(172)
volatile Bungsar-Brickfields branch. However, Devaser's political
career came to an end in June 1959 when he resigned from the MIC
(17~z>)
because of 'the unconstitutional manner' of the party.
In February 1957 factions within the MIC decided to challenge 
(17*0Sambanthan in the forthcoming Presidential elections. The
opposition was led by K. Annamalai, V. Manickavasagam and K. Dass, all
(1 7*~i) (176)from Selangor. However Sambanthan retained the Presidency.
It should also be noted the K. Annamalai was behind a hostile reception
(177)given to Sambanthan when he visited the Ipoh branch in 1959*
At the same time, the Perak MIC passed a motion of no confidence in the
President. But having stirred up considerable hostility towards
Sambanthan in the President's home state, K. Annamalai then defected
to the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) and stood as a candidate for the
(179) PPP against Sambanthan in the 1959 Parliamentary elections.
Indian Daily Mail, 26 September 1956.
Ibid.
Singapore Tiger Standard, 2*f June 1959; Moore, op.cit., p. 256. 
Tamil Nesan, 2 February 1957.
Ibid.
Ibid., 5 April 1957.
Straits Times, 26 April 1959; Moore, op.cit., p. 255*
Straits Times, 26 April 1959*
K.J. Ratnam, Communal&sm and the Political Process in Malaya, 
p. 223* The Perak Progressive Party changed its name to 
Peoples Progressive Party of Malaya on 15 March 1956.
Straits Times, 16 March 1956.
(171)
(172)
(173) 
(17*+)
(175)
(176)
(177)
(178) 
(179)
Sambanthan won, helped by the efficient Alliance elections machine
(180)and by defections from the PPP itself.
The most critical rift within the MIC occurred in December 1957
over local elections in the Bungsar ward. The local MIC officials were
disappointed with the Alliance nominee for the seat, I. Gurdial Singh,
and the Alliance leadership suspected them of covertly aiding the Labour
(*18 "1)Party candidate, V. David. The primary suspects were K. Gurupatham,
President of the Bungsar MIC, K* Annamalai, a Working Committee member 
and A. Iharmalingam, Secretary of the Selangor MIC. Indeed an
angered Selangor UMNO demanded the expulsion of the MIC from the
/ *>*| O *2 \
Alliance. Sambanthan was in some measure responsible for this
crisis, for his conflict with the MIG Youth and his lack of rapport 
with the Selangor MIC had led him to foist the hapless I. Gurdial Singh
(180) Moore, op.cit, p. 278.
1959 Federal Elections.
Sungei Siput (Perak):
Total electorate 
Malays 
Chinese 
Indians
17,157 
5,962 
8, ^ 27 
2,768
V.T. Sambanthan Indian .. Alliance .,
K. Annamalai .. Indian •. PPP
Choy Kok Kuan .. Chinese .. Independent
• 4
Turn-out
7,317 votes
votes
1A8 votes
70 per cent
(181)
Source: K.J. Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in
Malaya, p. 223 •
Sunday Times, 5 January 1958. V. David had been a member of the 
MIC and of the Selangor Labour Party till 195^• In fact he 
attended the eighth annual session of the MIC in April 195^ as a 
delegate of the Klang Road MIC branch. But in July 1953 the 
Labour Party introduced the regulation that members should not 
belong to other political parties, so David resigned from the 
MIC in mid-195^.
Sunday Times, 5 January 1958; Means, op.cit., p. 209« 
Straits Times, 20 August 1958.
on the Selangor MIC in the first place. Sambanthan^having failed to 
contain the MIC Youth, finally abolished it in June 1958* As a
result after 1958 the troublesome Bungsar-Brickfields branch lost its
/ >i Q \
influence in the MIC. From 195^-1958 the branch, working closely
with the MIC Youth, had been a significant pressure group in the party.
It had succeeded in forcing the leadership to demand more concessions
from the Alliance, a success which rarely pleased the UMNO and
frequently disturbed the unadventurous MIC leadership.
The strained relationship between the Bungsar-Brickfields branch
and the MIC leadership was largely responsible for the defeats suffered
by the Party in all the elections in Bungsar between 1955-1958.
In December 1958, the officials of the Bungsar-Brickfields branch led by
V.J. Sojnasundaram, resigned en bloc from the Party in frustration at
(18?)the leadership's lack of political vigour. The conflict between
the Bungsar-Brickfields branch and the leadership had one further
important consequence. It resulted in the drift of a significant
proportion of the Indian working class in Selangor away from the MIC
( ^
and towards the Labour Party.
laroil Nesan, 26 June 1958.
Straits limes, 19 May 1958.
(”186) ]v[oorei op.cit., p. 2^9.
(187’)
Malay Mail, 2 December 1958.
(-jgg) and Milne, R.S.,
Vasil, op.cit., p. 13^• K.J. Ratnam^ The Malayan Parliamentary 
Election of 196^ -, Singapore, 1967, pp. 388-9*
Indeed, it is a noticeable feature of MIC politics in the 
period 1955-1959, that some of the most able leaders defected to other 
parties, principally the Labour Party and the Peoples Progressive 
Party. As a result, Indian leadership was dangerously dispersed 
amongst numerous, often opposing political parties. Moreover, the 
MIC was left denuded of forceful leaders, capable of holding their 
own with the UMNO and the MCA elite. Consequently all too often 
the MIC was the weak and exploited partner in the Alliance.
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The MIC And The Alliance: Transition To Communal Politics
In May 1950 the MIC announced its intention to abandon its 
constitutional boycott and re-enter formal politics. However, two 
of the most prominent characteristics of the evolving Malayan 
political scene in the early 1950s were the emergence of mass 
politics (inevitably as the country moved towards elections) and 
the development of communalism, exemplified in the UMNO-MCA 
Alliance. The MIC, lacking mass support within the Indian 
community, and staunchly opposed to communalism, found it 
extremely difficult to adjust to this political environment.
The MIC lacked mass support essentially because, as has 
been explained at length earlier, the Indian community itself 
was so divided. Its strong stand against communalism needs 
further explanation. Essentially it derived from the Party’s 
attachment to the ideology of the Indian National Congress, 
which had itself from its earliest days espoused non-communalism. 
The horrors of Partition in 19V? merely reinforced that belief, 
in both the Indian National Congress and the MIC. The experiences 
of the MIC as a member of the non-communal AMCJA, further 
strengthened this outlook. Finally, there was an important 
practical consideration. Were politics to be set along purely 
communal lines, the MIC would inevitably be condemned to 
electoral oblivion. On the other hand, given the political 
experience and educational achievements of the Indian political 
elite, they were in a strong position to influence effectively, 
if not dominate, political parties organized along non-communal 
lines.
By early 1950 the MIC was, of course, acutely aware of the
vulnerability of its political position and the Party began to
search for electoral partners. For example, in August 1950 Thivy
urged the MIC to co-operate with the UMNO-MCA in the forthcoming
municipal elections, a call which was repeated by the All Malayan
(1)Indian Congress Committee the following November. Then, at the
annual general meeting of the MCA in April 1951* Tan Cheng Lock
proposed the formation of a 'new united Malayan national organization
or party with a new constitution in which members of all races'
(2)would be included. But though some sections of the MIC
(3)responded enthusiastically to this proposal, nothing came of it.
As an alternative to the creation of a new, non-communal party,
embracing all three races, the three established parties occasionally
attempted to open their ranks to members of the other communities.
Indeed, as early as May 19^9» the UMNO, under pressure from Dato Onn,
(k)had accepted the principle of associate membership for non-Malays.
However, in November 1950, the UMNO rejected further proposals by
( 5)Dato Onn to admit non-Malays on equal terms to the Malays. At 
this point, Data Onn left the UMNO to establish the IMP. Meanwhile
(1) Tamil Nesan, 12 August 1950, 20 November 1950; Minutes of All 
Malayan Indian Congress Committee Meeting, 19 November 1950 
(MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
(2) Presidential Address at annual general meeting of the MCA, Kuala 
Lumpur, 21 April 1951 (Tan Cheng Lock Papers, Kuala Lumpur); 
Malaya Nanban, 23 April 1951#
Minutes of fifth annual general meeting of the MIC branch in 
Kuala Lumpur, 17 May 1951 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur); Straits 
Times, 19 May 1951#
(k)
Straits Times, 30 May 19^ +9#
(5) Ibid., 21 November 1950.
in March 1950, the MCA,ever watchful of the UMNO and its ambitions, 
had begun to admit non-Chinese as associate members with limited 
rights.
Inevitably the MIC soon began to consider proposals for enticing
members of other races into its organization. In April 1950, the MIC
was urged by the Bungsar branch to admit all races but this was
(7)rejected as ’premature'. However, m  January 1951* the MIC 
working committee unanimously decided that non-Indians be admitted 
to the Party, but it was not until October 1952 that this decision
/• O \
came into effect. It cannot be said that the inclusion of non-
Indians substantially affected the organization or programme of the
MIC. However, at heaart, the MIC remained committed to non-communalism.
Therefore, when Dato Onn established his non-communal IMP in
September 1951* the MIC immediately abandoned all thoughts of an
alliance with the UMNO and MCA, and threw its weight behind the
new party. The MIC gave its support to Dato Onn, essentially on
ideological grounds, most notably his commitment at this stage to
non-communalism and to a democratic, egalitarian society. But in
practical terms, the alignment was a disaster. Between 1951 and 1953
(9)the IMP suffered humiliation at the polls. Moreover, as the MIC
^  Tamil Nesan, 20 March 1950.
(7) Indian Daily Mail, 2? April 1950.
/ o >
Minutes of MIC Working Committee Meeting, Seremban, 6 January 1951 
(MIC Hqrs. File 25A); Straits Times, 2? October 1952. By 
September 1953 the associate membership of the MIC had reached 
1000 - Presidential Address at All Malayan Indian Congress
Committee Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 13 September 1953 (MIC Papers, 
Kuala Lumpur).
^  Vasil, op.cit., pp. 58-60, 81-82.
allowed its members to stand for elections only on IMP or
independent tickets for fear of arousing communal feelings, the
Party lost the opportunity to gain valuable electoral experience,
and direct familiarity with politics at a national level.
Important factions within the MIC saw all too clearly these
dangers. V.J. Somasundaram, an executive of the Selangor MIC,
predicted that the almost universal disenchantment with Dato Onn
would soon reduce the IMP to ’just another Indian organization’ .
He argued strongly that the MIC could survive only by joining the 
(11)UMNO-MCA Alliance. Such warnings went unheeded by Devaser
and his advisers, for the MIC working committee were deeply
suspicious of the Alliance ’which will only perpetuate communalism
(12)in a collective way’. In a letter to the Straits Times, John
Jacob, Secretary of the Singapore Regional Congress, alleged that
the Alliance was ’only a device to consolidate Chinese political
and economic power’, for which charge he was severely attacked by
(13)Tan Cheng Lock.
No matter how clearly Somasundaram and his associates outlined 
the dangers of the MIC remaining outside the UMNO-MCA Alliance, the 
Party leadership found it extremely difficult to embrace 
communalism. The scattered, though frequent, communal disturbances 
in India, throughout these years served as a constant reminder of
Straits Times, 29 February 1952.
(11) Memorandum by V.J. Sojnasundaram, Lecturer, Technical College, 
Kuala Lumpur and MIC Working Committee member, on 'Formation 
of a new Party', n.d. (possible date, late 1952 or early 1953, 
MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
(12) Minutes of MIC Working Committee Meeting, Kuala Lumpur,
2k February 1952 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
straits Times, 18 July 1953, Tamil Nesan, 20 July 1953*
the potential excesses of racial identity. In fact, at this time the
(14)MIC saw its role essentially as a leader of minority communities.
The Indians constituted about eleven per cent of the population; in
alliance with other minorities, for example, the Ceylonese and the
Eurasians, they formed fourteen per cent. In his Presidential
Address to the annual session of the MIC in 1953, Devaser argued that
no Government could afford to ignore such a substantial minority and
he suggested that the Party 'might call a meeting of the minorities
so that we could take a united stand in the national struggle of 
(15)Malaya'. Nothing came of this.
The political isolation of the MIC was increased by the
constitutional and political reforms introduced by the Government
in the early 1950s* Mo Indians were appointed to the Cabinet in 1951
and when two additional members were appointed in 1953, the Indians
(16)
were again passed over. This failure to achieve nomination for
office was compounded by failure at the polls. The Party's
electoral successes in 1951-53 Had been restricted to those
constituencies which had a majority of Indian electors (most
notably, Bungsar-Brickfields) or where there was substantial support
(17)for the Labour Party (most notably Penang). Moreover, those
rare successes had been achieved in the name of the IMP or the 
Labour Party. When, in early 1954, the Government announced the 
constituency boundaries for the forthcoming Federal Elections, it
(14) In May 1953, the President of the Penang MIC declared that the 
minorities needed 'guidance and direction from Indians'.
Tamil Nesan, 2 May 1953*
(15)^ Presidential Address at the seventh Annual Session of the MIC 
at Ipoh, 9-10 May 1953 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
(16) Of the eleven members of the Cabinet, six were Europeans, 
three Malays, one Chinese, one Ceylonese - Indian Daily Mail, 
14 March 1951. In 1953 the two new members were Dr. Ismail 
and H.S. Lee.
^?) See Chapter V, pp.
became apparent that in no constituency would there be a majority of
(19)Indian voters. Immediately the MIC agitated for reserved seats.
Their request was rejected by the Government; they appealed to the
Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttleton and to the Malay Rulers; again
they were refused.
This controversy over reserved seats dealt a major blow to the
non-communal ideology of the MIC. For all its talk of the dangers
of communalism, the MIC, faced with political extinction through the
polls, had instinctively reached for the house remedy of the
communalist - the reserved seat. Moreover, this came at a time
when the Party's association with Dato Onn was under severe strain.
In April 1953» Dato Onqfand Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang (Mentri Besar
of Perak) inaugurated the National Conference, the declared aim of
which was to create a National Front for 'building a united, self-
(21)governing Malayan nation*. Representatives from each of the
major political parties, and many relatively insignificant 
organizations, were invited to attend. The UMNO-MCA refused to 
become associated with a coalition 'dominated by high administrative 
officers of the Government and by individuals who are not the
(22)accredited leaders of any section of the people of this country'.
Z/iO')
See Federation of Malaya, Report of the Constituency Delineation 
Commission, No. 36 of 195^*
(19) See Chapter V, pp. I59-I6I.
(20) ^amil ]\jesaIli 27 April 195^5 Singapore Tiger Standard,
May 195^1 28 May 195^.
(21) Tamil Nesan, 29 April 1953.
(22) Reply of the UMNO-MCA to invitation from Dato Panglima Bukit 
Gantang, signed by Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tan Cheng Lock, n.d.
(Tan Cheng Lock Papers, Kuala Lumpur). This description by the 
UMNO-MCA referred to the fact that the National Conference 
contained seven Mentris Besar.
The MIC agreed with this view but added that 'there should be no
hesitation in making use of individuals if they had political or
(23)intellectual gifts'. On this basis they sent K. Ramanathan and
Devaser to the National Conference.
In August 1953» in opposition to Dato Onn's National Conference,
the UMNO-MCA organized a National Convention to which it invited the 
(2*0MIC. Devaser and Balakrishnan were in favour of accepting this
invitation, provided that the UMNO-MCA were prepared to support
(25)certain constitutional and citizenship reforms. But Devaser's
response was strongly opposed within the MIC, most notably by Jagjit 
Singh, President of the Penang MIC, who was annoyed by the failure 
of the Alliance to attend Dato Onn's National Conference, the previous 
April, despite repeated invitations from the MIC.(26) He was also 
irritated by the fact that the proposed National Convention had been
(27)planned solely by the UMNO-MCA, without consulting minority parties.
This seemed to indicate that at heart the Alliance cared little for 
minority interests. Therefore, the Alliance's invitation was rejected, 
the MIC arguing that two conferences with identical objectives would 
seriously hinder the independence movement. However it was clear
that if the Alliance wished to claim leadership of the independence 
movement, it could ill-afford to neglect the minority races, and indeed
Tamil Nesan, 29 April 1953- 
Ibid., 2*f August 1953*
Minutes of MIC Working Committee Meeting, Penang, 9 August 1953 
(MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Tamil Nesan, 15 August 1953-
(23)
(2*0
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
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Tan Gheng £.ock went out of his way to reassure the minority communities, 
principally the Indians, that the Alliance wished to consult fully 
with them.^^
Meanwhile the MIC and the National Conference were becoming
estranged. Dato Onn who dominated the National Conference, wished to
press for the postponement of Federal elections until late 1956, simply
(30)because the IMP feared severe electoral defeat. The MIC refused
to accept this, partly because such postponement would inevitably delay
(31)the coming of self-government. It rejected an argument put forward
by Onn that the registration of voters would take several years, for
even in India in 194? voter registration had taken only six months;
( 32)the MIC insisted on elections in 1954. The MIC was also annoyed
by the fact that it had been allotted only two seats in the National 
Conference, which placed it on the same footing as such parties as the
(33)Ceylon Federation of Malaya and the Straits Chinese British Association.
In September 1953 the National Conference Working Committee issued a
report which called for, among other things, the postponement of
( 34 )Federal Elections until late 1956. It also suggested that more
(35)than half the members of the Legislative Council should be nominated.
The MIC, which had insisted on Federal Elections in 1954 and on a fully- 
elected Assembly, promptly left the Conference, though this decision
Tan Cheng Lock's address at the Alliance Meeting in Taiping, n.d.
(Tan Cheng Lock Papers, Kuala Lumpur). He emphasised that 'there 
cannot be and will never be any question of the Alliance adopting a dog 
in the manger attitude'.
Straits Times, 24 August 1953*
Malay Mail, 28 September 1953-
Ibid.
Malay Mail, 1 September 1953- It need hardly be reiterated that the 
MlCj^with a membership of 20,000^formed by far the largest political 
force in the National Conference. Malay Mail, 5 September 1953-
Ibid., 28 September 1953? Means, op.cit., p. 143.
Tamil Nesan, 28 September 1953? Means, op.cit., p. 143.
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
(35)
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was criticized by the Singapore Regional Congress and the Tamil Nesan.
The departure of ;bhe MIC from the National Conference came at a
time when the British were also re-assessing their attitude to Dato Onn.
From as early as 195^, Dato Onn had been regarded by the authorities as
the leader of the Malayan peoples, despite his electoral defeats. This
was shown by the fact that in 1953» thirty of the seventy-five nominated
members in the Legislative Council were from the IMP and the fact that
the Federal Elections Committee, appointed by the Government in May the
(37)same year, contained a majority of IMP members. However by late
1953, Dato Onn had become increasingly extreme in his views, adopting 
a strong pro-Malay stance. The Party Negara, formed by Onn in February 
195**, had among its aims the creation of an Islamic state, severe
/ 7O \
immigration restrictions and stringent citizenship regulations.
The fact that both British and Indian support for Dato Onn was at its
height between 1950 and 1953, and that both withdrew their support
after November 1953, is of course not purely coincidental. In the
earlier phase, Dato Onn was the most promising leader in Malaya, while
in late 1953, his extremism forced both the British and the MIC to
(39)disentangle themselves from him.
(36) Tamil Nesan, 28 September 1953? Malay Mail, 1 October 1953*
Straits Times, 25 June 1953; Federation of Malaya, Introduction of 
Elections to the Federal Legislative Council, Council Paper No. 21 
of 195**; Means, op.cit., pp. I*f7-1**9»
(38) Malay Mail, 1 March 195**; Vasil, op.cit., p. 83.
(39) should be noted however that the FIO and the MIA remained 
staunchly loyal to Dato Onn despite his increasing racialism. The 
subsequent move by the British authorities to recognise the Alliance 
as a viable political force was undoubtedly determined by a number 
of factors. Two important considerations were' a) the need to 
nurture Alliance loyalties by early 1953 when the MCP issued a 
manifesto seeking to build a front against imperialism. The MCP'also 
expressed a keenness to collaborate with the indigenous elites 
against the foreign imperialists and capitalists. (Malayan Monitor, 
Vol. 6, No. 6, June 1953, Vol. 7, No. 7, July 195*0; \ b) The 1955 
landslide victory of the Alliance made the ' recognition by the 
British even more inevitable. The Alliance won 8l per cent of the 
total votes cast, that is ten times the votes polled by Onn and his 
Party Negara which collected only 22.*f per cent of the votes cast. 
(Straits Times, 30 July 1955*, Means, op.cit., p. 167) •
Having abandoned the National Conference, it was by no means
inevitable that the MIC would promptly realign itself with the more
powerful Alliance. In October 1953, it was rumoured that Devaser,
having resigned from the IMP, had secretlydiscussed a merger with the
Alliance l e a d e r s . T h o u g h  in general the MIC working committee felt
that the Party now had more in common with the UMNO-MCA, it was
concerned to ensure that discussions between the Alliance and the MIC
took place only after such talks had been formally approved by the
(**1)Annual Session of the Party. It was clear in late 1953 that there
existed a basis of agreement between the Alliance and the MIC. Both
parties supported the principle of .jus soli in granting citizenship;
both wanted Federal Flections to be held in 195**, though the MIC
favoured a fully-elected Assembly whilst the Alliance was satisfied
(**2)with a three-fifths elected body. The main barrier to merger
remained the hatred of communalism, felt by many important individuals 
in the MIC. In addition, to many Party members in late 1953, the 
alignment with Dato Onn now appeared to have been a very serious error. 
Indeed, it seemed to be the fate of the MIC to arrange bad matches, for 
the association with the AMCJA between 19**6-19**8, had similarly been 
to the Party's eventual disadvantage. It was now very wary of 
potential new partners.
Tamil Nesan, 26 October 1953*
(**1) Letter from S. Govindaraj, MIC Working Committee Member to 
Devaser, President, MIC, 17 December 1953 (MIC Papers, Kuala 
Lumpur). Minutes of the MIC Working Committee Meeting, Kuala 
Lumpur, 13 December 1953 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur); Tamil Nesan, 
1** December 1953*
(**2) Presidential Address at Eighth Annual Session of the MIC at Prai, 
16 April 195** (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur). The MIC later accepted 
the Alliance recommendation for a three-fifths elected majority 
in the Legislative Council.
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At the Annual Session of the MIC in April 1954, Devaser pressed
strongly for a merger with the Alliance, ’the most progressive force 
(45)in Malaya’. Without the UMNO-MCA, the Party would be 'doomed to
(44)become a welfare organization'. To many delegates, the President's
unbridled enthusiasm appeared suspicious. For example, Jagjit Singh,
the President of the Penang MIC, accused Devaser of aiming for a 
(45)Cabinet post. John Jacob of the Singapore Congress, and the Teluk
Anson branch of the Party, were perhaps the most outspoken critics of
(46)the proposed merger. The latter had become seriously disenchanted
with the Alliance, following the breakdown of a temporary electoral pact
(47)in Perak, as the result of a dispute over the allocation of seats.
(48) mThe Annual Session voted decisively against merger. The vote went
almost unnoticed in Sino-Malay political circles. All attention was
directed towards the departure of the Alliance leaders to London where
they were to press for the acceptance of the Minority Report of the
(49)Elections Committee.
ibidj Straits Times, 18 April 1954.
(44) Presidential Address at Eighth Annual Session of the MIC, 16 April 
1954, (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur); Tamil Nesan, 18 April 1954.
Tamil Nesan, 29 October 1954.
(46) straits Tjmes, 18 April 1954, 19 April 1954, 4 November 1954.
Ibid., 18 April 1954.
Annual Report of the MIC, April 1954 - April 1955, P* 2 
(MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur). Tamil Nesan, 18 April 1954.
(49) Tamil Nesan, 20 April 1954. The Elections Committee of 46 members 
under the chairmanship of M.J. Hogan, had a majority of IMP members 
in comparison to the UMNO-MCA members. Hence there was rivalry between 
the IMP and the Alliance on the vital issues of proportion of elected 
members in the Legislative Council and the date for first elections 
to the Federal Legislature. Thus two sets of reports emerged, one, 
the Majority Report representing the views of the IMP and second, 
the Minority Report representing the Alliance views. The Alliance 
insisted that in view of its success at the polls, its Minority 
Report should be accepted by the Government. In addition to 
pressing their demands on the Federation Government, the Alliance 
also sent a three-man delegation to the Colonial Secretary in 
London. See Means, op.cit., 147-148.
In August 1954 the MIC, already suffering from severe internal
divisions, and indeed financial difficulties, was humiliatingly defeated
at the Ipoh Town Council e l e c t i o n s . A  meeting of the All Malayan
Indian Congress Committee the following month, gave the Party's Working
Committee a mandate 'to explore the possibility of alignment with other
(51)political parties'. Rather surprisingly, the MIC or rather factions
within it, considered an alignment not only v/ith the Alliance but also
with Dato Onn's Party Negara. Most notably, S.O.K. Ubaidullah, stood
(52)out for a reunion with Onn. However this possibility was effectively
closed by Onn's demands that he would accept an alignment with the MIC,
(53)only if the Indians made a number of radical policy changes. The
Party Negara was not'prepared to sacrifice its principle for the sake of
(54)an alliance with a communal political organization'. The Selangor
MIC, though it did not support a reunion with Onn, remained opposed to
(55)the alternative of an alignment with the Alliance. First, it was
irritated by Devaser's dictatorial attitude, in particular his suspension
from the Party of those who opposed him. Second, the Selangor MIC
was aggrieved by the fact that at first the Kuala Lumpur UMNO had rejected
an electoral partnership with it for the forthcoming Kuala Lumpur
(57)municipal elections, though it later relented.
Singapore Tiger Standard, 8 May 1954; Sevika, 18 August 1954.
Minutes of the All Malayan Indian Congress Committee Meeting, Kuala 
Lumpur, 12 September 1954 (MIC Papers, Kuala Lumpur); Sevika,
13 September 1954.
Straits Times, 18 October 1954; Sevika, 13 October 1954.
Straits Times, 18 October 1954.
Malay Mail, 19 October 1954.
Sevika, 13 October 1954.
Ibid.
Ibid.
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
(57)
In October 195^ the All Malayan Indian Congress Committee voted
/ £“ O \
in favour of the merger, but the decision was far from clear-cut.
Only fifty-five delegates attended the meeting, which meant that only
(59)approximately one-fifth of all branches were represented. Moreover,
of those fifty-five delegates, only twenty-eight voted for merger, 
whilst seventeen had abstained and the remaining ten had absented 
themselves from the meeting when the vote was taken. Though a
number of MIC members regarded the All Malayan Indian Congress Committee 
decision, in these circumstances, as null and void, John Jacob from 
Singapore and Jang Singh from Klang resigned from the Party over the 
vote.^^^ However, the validity of the vote was not formally challenged 
and the MIC was now committed to joining the Alliance.
There remained one further hurdle. In late 195^ Tunku. Abdul 
Rahman hinted that the MIC would be admitted into the Alliance only after 
it had shown that it was -capable of attracting large support at the 
municipal elections in December. In the meantime, the Alliance and
the MIC would cooperate only in fighting those elections. But the MIC 
proved its value in December. The Alliance candidates in Bungsar- 
Brickfields and Tanjong ward, Penang, both essentially Indian 
constituencies, were MIC members, K. Gurupatham and S.M. Mohammed Idrus
Straits Times, 18 October 195^*
Tamil Nesan, 20 October 195^*
Straits limes, l8 October 195^*
Ibid., 22 October 195^» ^ November 195^ • Jang Singh, President, 
Klang MIC and an MIC Working Committee Member was annoyed by the 
refusal of the Alliance in Klang to accept the MIC as an 
electoral partner in the Klang municipal elections, to be held 
in December 195^* Malay Mail, 23 October 195^5 Straits Times, 
November 195^*
Tamil Nesan, 15 October 195^ +«
respectively. They were successful. Consequently, in April 1955*
(6*0the MIC became a full partner in the Alliance.
Predictably these final stages towards merger took place against
a background of incessant criticism from numerous factions in the
Indian community. For example, P. Pamani, President of the FIO,
deplored the terms of the merger as degrading to the political
status of the Indians. The MIA President, G.V. Thaver asked
'what is the MIC? A piece of cake that Mr. Devaser should go about
offering it to p e o p l e T h e  Tamil Murasu, condemned the MIC for
picking the 'crumbs at table' . * It is well known that the Alliance
is disposed to throw one or two seats to small communities and win them
over to its side. The Devaser clique has fallen prey to such a 
/ /'0\
move ....' To the President of the Ceylon Association of Selangor,
(69)M.W. Navaratnam, the MIC had 'sold out the honour of Indians'.
(70)In reply, Devaser told the Ceylonese 'to mind their own business'.
In an attempt to defend his actions, Devaser argued that Nehru
(71)himself had advised the MIC to join the Alliance. This was hardly
Straits Times, 16 December 195*+-
K. Gurupatham: Born in Perak; educated in Kuala Lumpur; merchant; 
General Secretary, MIC, President, Bungsar MIC; Municipal 
Councillor; State Councillor.
S.M. Mohammed Idrus; educated in Penang and Aligarh Muslim College; 
businessman; General Secretary, Malayan Muslim League; Vice- 
President Penang Muslim League; Town Councillor, Penang.
(6k)
Straits limes, 13 April 1955- 
Malay Mail, 19 October 195k.
Ibid., 23 October 195**.
Tamil Murasu, 2k October 195*+-
(68) Ibid., 23 December 195**-
(69) Straits Times, 25 October 195***
Ibid., 26 October 195**.
(71)w  Ibid., 3 January 1955-
prudent, for it gave substance to Malay suspicions that India was
constantly interfering in the affairs of the local Indian community.
(72)
G.V. Thaver v/rote to Nehru to clarify the situation. In reply,
Nehru stated that on his recent visit to Penang, he had advised Devaser
that 'if the UMNO and MCA have a mass basis in their respective
(73)
communities, then this fact has to be recognised'. Though this
could be interpreted as support for the merger, Nehru was careful
to reassure Malayan opinion that 'I don't know the local situation and
(7k)I am not competent to express opinions about it'. Devaser also
justified the merger by arguing that the MIC could not afford to be
left out of the crucial constitutional discussions which were about
to take place. The fundamental issues of language, elections and the
(75)
relations between the Malays and hon-Malays were being decided.
At the beginning, the Alliance-MIC partnership was very
tempestuous. There were two major areas of conflict. First, there
were disputes over the allocation', between the UMNO, MCA and MIC,
of places on the Alliance ticket at elections and second, a severe
disagreement over the Alliance memorandum to the Reid Constitutional
Commission. In February 1955 it was rumoured that the Alliance would
not field any MIC candidates in the forthcoming Federal Elections,
because Indians formed only a small proportion of the electorate.
Instead, the MIC would be given a number of reserved seats in the 
(77)
new Assembly. Devaser denied these rumours and nominated three
Ibid., 7 January 1955-
Letter from J. Nehru to G.V. Thaver, lA January 1955 (Alliance File, 
Alliance Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid.
Straits Times, 16 February 1955- 
Tamil Nesan, 26 February 1955- 
Ibid.
(72)
(73)
(7*+)
(75)
(76)
(77)
MIC members, Dr. N.K. Menon, V.T. Sambanthan and V. Manickavasagam,
as Alliance c a n d i d a t e s . T u n k u  Abdul Rahman countered by
confirming that no MIC members would represent the Alliance in the
(79)forthcoming elections.
This reverse for Devaser provoked another storm of criticism from
anti-Alliance Indians. G.V. Thaver, always adept at pointing out
MIC weaknesses, declared that the MIC had 'sold themselves to the
Alliance just to win a few seats and they have been let down badly'.
Bissidents within the MIC threatened to break away from the Party over 
/ 0-1 \
this issue. Eventually the Alliance allotted two seats to the
MIC, in Sungei Siput and Batu Pahat.^^ Even then, one of the
candidates was Ceylonese, S.C. Macintyre, and hence it was possible
(8^ ^
for the MIC to argue that in fact it had been given only one seat.
The MCA had fifteen seats, the UMNO thirty-five.
Disputes over the allocation of seats continued to plague MIC-
Alliance relations until 1958. For example, of the twenty seats
to be contested in the state elections in Perak in November 1955?
(8**)the MIC requested two, and was given one. As a result the Chairman
of the Perak MIC resigned. In November 1956, the Penang MIC, in
defiance of the Alliance, nominated two of its own members for 
elections in Tanjong East and Kelawei the following month. The
Tamil Nesan, 1 March 1955; Straits Times, 17 March 1955- 
Tamil Nesan, 8 March 1955*
Straits Times, 3^  May 1955*
Ibid., k June 1955.
Ibid., 8 June 1955-
Annual Report of the MIC, May 1955 ” May 1956, p. 3 (MIC Papers, 
Kuala Lumpur).
Tamil Nesan, 6 November 1955- 
Ibid.
Straits Times, 6 November 1956.
(78)
(79)
(80) 
(81) 
(82) 
(83)
(8*0
(85)
(86)
(8?)
Alliance promptly disowned the two MIG rebels# In December the
following year, the Parit MIC put forward its Secretary and Treasurer,
(88)Sheikh Dawood and M.P. Arokiasatny, as Alliance candidates. The
leader of the Alliance in Perak, Mohd. Ghazali Jawi, ignored this
approach, arguing that the local branch of the MIC had been formed
only recently and indeed had submitted its application to join the
Alliance only a few days before nominations for the forthcoming polls 
(89)had closed. To conciliate the MIC branch the Alliance chose as
(90)one of its candidates another Indian, Kanagasmgham. At this
point Sheikh Dawood and M.P. Arokiasamy resigned from the MIC, stood
(91)as independent candidates, and won. The UMNO later accused the
Parit MIC of supporting the two independent candidates against the 
(92)Alliance. The matter was investigated, during which time the
local MIC branch was suspended from the Alliance. It was later
(93)reinstated after an apology.
The most serious dispute over the allocation of seats occurred in 
Bungsar. In October 1957 the Alliance and MIC headquarters announced 
that Gurdial Singh would be the Alliance candidate in the Bungsar ward
(9*0in the forthcoming municipal elections. This caused extreme anger
in the local MIC branch, where K. Gurupatham was the favoured candidate
(95)for this nomination. It was felt that the Selangor MIC, which
(87) Ibid., 30 November 1956.
(88) Ibid., 20 December 1957*
(89) Ibid.
(90) Ibid.
(91) Ibid., 2*f December 1957*
(92) Tamil Nesan, 26 December 1957.
(93) Straits Times, 20 December 1957
(9*0 Malay Mail, 29 October 1957.
(95) Ibid.
contained a strong Sikh faction, had been the prime mover in foisting
Gurdial Singh on their Tamil-dominated constituency. In defiance, the
branch campaigned and voted for the Selangor Labour Party candidate,
( 96)V. David, who was a Tamil. The result was that the Alliance
(97)candidate suffered a crushing defeat. The Selangor UMNO and the
MCA immediately demanded the removal of the Selangor branch from the
MIC and the Alliance.^ 8) jn response the MIC appointed its own
committee to investigate the recent behaviour of the Bungsar branch
and the committee confirmed that the local branch had indeed actively
(99)supported the Selangor Labour Party. Three prominent MIC members
were suspended; K. Gurupatham (President of Bungsar MIC, and a Selangor
State Councillor), K. Annamalai (Working Committee Member) and So
Renganathan (President of Bungsar MIC Y o u t h ) . F o l l o w i n g  these
suspensions, thirty members of the Bungsar branch resigned en bloc 
(101)in 1958, Devaser, arguing the dissident's case, suggested that the
root cause of the dispute had been a failure of communication between 
the MIC Youth and the MIC President, V.T. Sambanthan, which had led 
to the imposition of an extremely unpopular candidate on the Bungsar
Straits Times, 14 December 1957*
Ibid.
Ibid., 20 December 1957. In fact the MIC Constitution contained no 
provisions for the suspension of a whole branch.
Malay Mail, 16 December 1957*
Straits Times, 23 December 1957*
Tamil Nesan, 19 May 1958.
Straits Times, 23 December 1957.
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The Bungsar fiasco led to a temporary campaign in the Malay
Press for the expulsion of the MIC from the Alliance. In addition,
throughout 1958 the Selangor UMNO refused to admit the Selangor MIC
into Alliance councils and committees. The Selangor UMNO was
particularly angered by the fact that the MIC had refused to suspend
the most powerful member of the Selangor MIC, A. Tharmalingam, who had
(10*0been deeply involved in the events of late 1957* The MIC had,
in fact, thought it imprudent to dismiss such a figure, but eventually 
submitted to Malay pressure, and A. Tharmalingam was expelled from the 
Party ' in August 1958. There the dispute ended. At about the same 
time, the MIC Youth, which was particularly strong in Bungsar, was 
disbanded.
The other main arda of conflict between the MIC and its Alliance 
partners was the Alliance memorandum to the Reid Constitutional 
Commission. The memorandum urged that Islam be declared the state 
religion, that the Malays be given special privileges in Civil Service 
entrance, the distribution of business licences, the acquisition of
Singapore Tiger Standard, 23 April 1958. Nor details on the 
campaign by the UMNO and the Malay Press to expel the Selangor 
MIC, see Malayan Press Digest, Vernacular Press Summaries,
15 December - 30 December 1957*
Singapore Tiger Standard, 23 April 1958. See Moore, op.cit., 
p. 2^3. A. Tharmalingam: born in Kuala Lumpur; Contractor and 
General Merchant; President MIC Pudu branch; later General 
Secretary, Selangor Labour Party.
^^5) Malay Mail, 26 November 1958. These controversies led to the
Alliance National Council Meeting in December 1957 to review its 
relations with the component parties in the Alliance. One method 
of control was to strengthen the Alliance powers over the UMNO- 
MCA-MIC in selection of candidates for elections and in direct 
control of dissident groups within the three organizations. The 
Alliance also proposed that all members were to be Federal citizens 
and this was particularly directed at the MIC which had a fair 
proportion of Indian citizens. These draft plans, were heavily 
revised and later ratified by the UMNO, the MCA and the MIC in 
June 1958. 1nhe proposal to include only Federal citizens was 
abandoned for obvious reasons. See Means, op.cit., pp. 210-211.
land and in education, and that Malay be recognised as the national
l a n g u a g e . H o w e v e r ,  the MIC demanded a restriction on Malay
privileges, particularly with regard to the acquisition of land and
(107)appointments to the Civil Service. This last point was of crucial
importance to the Party, for the majority of the educated Indians found 
employment in the Government service, whereas the vast majority of 
Chinese were employed in the private sector. The MIC also demanded
(108)the establishment of a secular state.
In fact, the MIC had initially approved the draft memorandum, on
condition that the MIC President, V.T. Sambanthan, would attempt to
persuade the Alliance National Council to moderate the demands for 
(109)Malay privileges. However, according to Devaser, who was himself
a member of the Alliance National Council, Sambanthan failed to mention 
to the Alliance the reservations of the MIC, and indeed gave the
(110)impression that the Indians fully supported the draft memorandum.
As a result, the MIC in Selangor, Devaser1s home state, accused Sambanthan
of flouting the Working Committee mandate, and in response, the President
(111)suspended Devaser from the Party. In addition, Tunku Abdul Rahman
Straits Times, 20 August 1956.
(107) Ibid., Ik September 1956. The MIC was prepared to accept a ratio 
of one non-Malay to 2 Malays in the appointments to the Civil 
Service, educational scholarships etc.,whereas the Alliance 
Memorandum had called for a ratio of 1 non Malay to k Malays.
However the MIC later accepted the provision in the Constitution 
whereby *Islam is the religion of the Federation ... othef 
religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the
Federation’. Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, Article 3»
Clause 1 - see also Ratnam op.cit., p. 120.
Tamil Murasu, 18 August 1956.
(110)
(111)
Tamil Nesan, 2 September 1956. 
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criticised Devaser for leaking details of the confidential discussions
(112)of the National Council. The suspension of Devaser caused an
uproar in the Selangor and Penang branches of the MIC and also led to 
a long, simmering feud between Sambanthan and the MIC Youth, the latter 
being strongly influenced by Devaser and the militants in the Bungsar-
/  ■'I "I "Z  ^
Brickfields branch.
The MIC leadership also supported the Alliance draft memorandum
with regard to language. The memo argued that only Malay be declared
an official language in perpetuity. However, the position of the MIC
on this was seriously challenged by Tamil extremists principally from
Penang who , from September 1955* began a campaign for Tamil to be
(11*0given equal status with English and Malay. In August 1956, the Pan
Malayan Tamil Conference proposed the sending of a separate memo to
the Heid Constitutional Commission on this issue, though no action was
taken at the time.
Chinese reaction to the Alliance draft memorandum was considerably
more violent than that of the Indians. In October 1956 the MCA General
Committee approved the memorandum, only after considerable difficulty,
and only after two important amendments had been proposed; first, that
the special position of the Malays be maintained for only fifteen years
after independence; second, that both English and Malay be adopted as
(11national languages. In addition, the Perak militants, under
Lau Pak Khuan, campaigned vigorously for the use of Chinese in schools
Ibid.
Ibid., 15 September 1956, 26 September 1956.
Ibid., 26 September 1956.
Ibid., 29 May 1957-
Straits Tjmes, 27 August 1956; Indian Daily Mail, 20 September 1956.
(112)
(113)
(11*0
(115)
(116)
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(117)and in the Legislative Council. It was rumoured that the MCA
intended to submit a separate memorandum to the Commission on the use
(118)of Chinese and Tamil, but this was denied by the Party.
The final recommendations of the Reid Constitutional Commission,
announced in February 1957* demonstrated the influence of these
Chinese and Indian agitations. For example, the Commission recommended
that fifteen years after Independence, the special privileges of the
(119)Malays should be reviewed by the Legislative Council. In addition
it was suggested that for ten years after Independence, Chinese and
Tamil could be used in the Legislative Council, though only under
exceptional c i r c u m s t a n c e s . O n  citizenship, the Commission
recommended that British Commonwealth citizens be allowed to retain
(121)both Malayan and their original citizenship.
Though the Alliance defended the Reid proposals in public, Tunku
Abdul Rahman was totally opposed to the three recommendations of the
(122)Commission noted above. In response to these reservations, the
( ' i  p 'z 'N
High Commissioner appointed a Working Party to consider the Report.
The Working Party under the Chairmanship of the High Commissioner, included
four representatives of the Sultans, four Alliance members, the Chief
Secretary and the Attorney-General. The Working Party accepted the
Alliance's proposals with regard to language and the special position of 
(12*0the Malays. In other words, it was accepted that only Malay would
Straits Times, 28 April 1956.
(1181
Ibid., 19 August 1956.
(119) Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission,
Kuala Lumpur, 1997? P* 1&5? Article 157.
(120) Ibid., p. 87.
(121) Ibid., p. 7*f.
(1^2) Straits Times, 5 April 1957? Means, op.cit., pp. 176-177.
( *1 23 ) Ratnam, op. cit., p. 61.
(12*0 Straits Times, 2 May 1957, 9 May 1957.
be declared a national language, and that there would be no time limit
on the special privileges of the Malays (though the Malay head of state,
elected by the rulers, would from time to time review the situation).
On the issue of Commonwealth citizenship, political pressure and legal
complications forced the Alliance to compromise, though in practice, dual
("1 PR'}
nationality was still not admitted.
Though the Malays and Indians appeared content with these final
recommendations, the Chinese remained i n d i g n a n t . I n d e e d ,  Lau Pak
Khuan announced that he intended to lead a protest to the Colonial
Secretary in London, Lennox Boyd, to demand equal rights for all citizens,
the unqualified right to citizenship by virtue of place of birth, and
(127)multi-lxngualism in the Legislative Council. A Chinese delegation
(i pR’i
went to London, but it returned empty-handed. Chinese intransigence
stemmed mainly from the Chinese-educated members of the community, who 
were determined to preserve their vernacular education and to remove 
their disadvantageous position in a state where political participation 
depended essentially upon fluency in English and Malay. Moreover, they 
were alienated from the English-educated moderates of the MCA who, 
naturally, did not possess the same commitment to the maintenance of 
Chinese education and culture. Finally, to the Chinese as a whole, 
citizenship was a vital issue for political survival in Malaya for, put 
bluntly, they felt unable to return to China.
(125) Means, op.cit., p. 176.
(126) Straits Echo, 3 April 1957.
(1P7)
Straits Times, 20 April 1957.
(128) __ , ..Clark, op.cit., p. 115.
The Indians, in contrast, reassured themselves that if the
Chinese were fighting for non-Malay political and citizenship rights,
these would inevitably accrue to the Indians as well. In these
circumstances, Indian apathy was understandable, though potentially
enervating. The Malayan Constitution, accepted by the Rulers and the
Legislative Council by August 1957? delicately balanced Malay and
non-Malay interests. The acceptance of Islam as the state religion, the
preservation of the special position of the Malays in education,
government employment, and land acquisition and the refusal to permit
the use of Tamil and Chinese languages in the Legislative Council,
ensured the Malay character of the state, while the non-Malays were
(129)at least temporarily appeased with liberal citizenship provisions.
Finally, it is clear that in the period 1955-57, the MIC was the 
least influential member of the Alliance. This was understandable in 
view of the fact that the MIC was the representative of the smallest 
of the three communities, though there were other factors involved.
First, the Party's standing was constantly undermined by the fact that 
significant sections of the Indian community gave their support to non- 
communal parties. For example, the Peoples Progressive Party in Perak and 
the Labour Party in both Selangor and Penang continuously poached 
members away from the MIC. The position of the MIC here was 
unenviable. It lost members to other parties essentially because it 
was a weak and compromising partner in the Alliance; in turn, its 
relatively uninfluential position was partly a reflection of its 
inability to command the full support of the Indian community. Second, 
to the eloquent and educated elite of the Indian community, the 
restricted role that the UMNO and the MCA permitted the MIG in the
(129) See Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, cited in Ratnam, 
op.cit. p. 62.
Alliance, was a constant source of frustration. As a result, the 
most talented leaders of the Indian community could not bring 
themselves to give full support to the Alliance. Third, Sambanthan's 
position within the Alliance was made untenable by attacks on him 
from factions in Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Province Wellesley, Penang and 
Negri Sembilan.^^0  ^ All too often it appeared that the MIC 
President was prepared to neglect Indian rights in the interests 
of Alliance unity.
(130) MeanSi op.cit., p. 209; Moore, op.cit., pp. 243-250. 
Straits Times, 19 February 1958.
CONCLUSION
The twelve years 1945-1957 saw Malaya move from Occupation 
to Independence. The political changes which occurred were 
fundamental, the speed at which they had been effected, quite 
phenomenal. UMNO, MCA and MIC, which, a® the Alliance, assumed 
power in September 1957 had not even existed when British rule 
had been reimposed twelve years earlier. The change in the 
political character of the Indian community was no less dramatic: 
it developed from an essentially India-oriented community to a 
partner in the Government of an Independent Malaya. By treating 
the subject thematically in the preceding chapters, it is possible 
that this dramatic change in the political character of the 
Indian community over this period has been somewhat obscured, 
and therefore needs separate emphasis.
For the immediate post-war years, three particular 
characteristics of the Malayan Indian community should be noted; 
its political extremism, its involvement in industrial unrest, 
and its sensitivity to developments in and ideologies from India. 
Left-wing organizations, but particularly the MCP, found it 
relatively easy to recruit among the economically depressed Indian 
labourers whose political horizons had been greatly extended by 
the Indian National Army. Moreover, the existing sympathies of 
the Indian labourers with populist movements such as the Thondar 
Padai made possible their easy transition to more ideologically 
based organizations like the MCP. However with the outbreak of 
the Communist revolt in July 1948, militant trade unionism
inevitably declined. The period after 1948 marked the rise of 
moderate, ethnically-based trade unions with few political 
pretensions. In this respect it should be noted that the Negri 
Sembilan Indian Labour Union and the government-sponsored trade 
unions in Perak and Johore formed the basis of the conservative 
National Union of Plantation Workers which emerged in 1954.
With regard to the influence of Indian political movements 
on the Malayan Indian community in the post-war years, three 
particular strands can be discerned. First was the influence of 
the Indian National Congress, particularly Nehru and Gandhi, 
which was emulated by the MIC and Indian elite groups, and, to a 
lesser extent, the Indian working class. Second was Jinnah's 
Muslim League which was assiduously followed by Muslim factions 
in Penang, Kedah, Singapore and parts of Selangor. In general, 
the Indian Muslims were conservative and pro-Malay in their 
political stance. For example, they quickly allied themselves 
to the Malay cause during the Malayan Union agitations and when 
the Federation Agreement was implemented in 1948; indeed, many 
Indian Muslims were eager to merge the community into the UMNO. 
But the UMNO could afford to parry the advances of this small 
community and granted the Indian Muslim League only associate 
membership, and even then, not until after independence had been 
achieved. As a result, throughout the 1950s the Muslims either 
campaigned for separate communal representation or, reluctantly, 
attempted to satisfy their political ambitions from within the 
MIC. The MIC was particularly successful in recruiting Muslim 
members after it had become a partner in the Alliance.
Finally, there was the influence of Tamil chauvinism from 
Madras. This took two forms. On the one hand moderate Tamil 
chauvinism was dominant in the Malayan Tamils Representative Council 
and the Tamils Reform Association which sought socio-religious 
reform and proposed moderate political change. These ideas found 
expression among the sub-elites of the MIC, particularly in the 
1950s, and in Tamil journalism, notably in the Tamil Nesan and the 
Indian Daily Mail in Singapore. In contrast, the militant Tamil 
nationalism of E.V. Ramasamy Naicker and the Dravida Munnetra 
Kalagam of Madras found an immediate response among the Tamil workers 
of Selangor, Perak, Johore and Penang. However despite their 
numerical strength and increasing vociferousness, the Tamils failed 
to achieve sustained political eminence within the Indian community 
in the period 1945-1957. In part this was due to the fact that the 
educated Tamil elite was relatively small, but also important were 
serious leadership conflicts within the community and a constant 
tendency towards extreme emotionalism in its political behaviour.
Throughout the period 1945-57, the Malayan Indian community 
maintained a strong commitment to democracy and non-communalism.
In part this reflected the strong influence of the Indian National 
Congress. However there was also a severe practical justification, 
in particular, in the attachment to non-communalism. The Indians, 
as a minority community, would have little chance of securing their 
political survival were political life to be organized along strictly 
communal lines. Therefore the Indians, and in particular the MIC, 
strongly attacked the Malayan Union Plan on the grounds that it was 
undemocratic - the proposed Councils being nominated rqther than 
elected. For similar reasons the MIC opposed the Federation 
Agreement, and indeed carried its opposition to the point of imposing
a constitutional boycott between 1948-1950. However it can be argued 
that in this latter casd the MIC pursued its political idealism to an 
unrealistic extent. The boycott policy severely divided the Party, 
opposition to it being particularly strong in the Malacca and Negri 
Sembilan branches and among the nominated Indian councillors. When 
the authorities proposed the introduction of elections and the 
formation of an appointed, indigenous cabinet in the early 1950s, the 
pressure from within the Indian community to abandon the constitutional 
boycott could no longer be resisted. Even so it seems cl©ar that 
by removing itself from the formal political scene in the period 
1948-1950, the Indian community failed to give its political leaders 
sufficient opportunity to entrench themselves in the evolving 
Malayan political establishment and, perhaps more seriously, devalued 
its political importance in the eyes of the British authorities.
The political standing of the Malayan Indian community was, of 
course, more seriously undermined by its own internal divisions. Not 
only the MIC but also the FIO, the MIA and the Singapore Indian 
Association, sought to mobilize the Indian community. In essence the 
FIO was composed of Indian councillors expelled from the MIC for 
ignoring the constitutional boycott. The MIA, dominated by G.V.
Thaver, attempted to organize Malayan-born Indians in opposition to 
the foreign-born dominated MIC. The Singapore Indian Association led 
by R. Jumabhoy, was founded, in essence, to oppose the constitutional 
boycott of the MIC in the late 1940s. It was therefore inevitable 
that on several major issues the Indians failed to act in a united 
manner: for example when Oliver Lyttleton visited Malaya in 1951 he
was presented with petitions from both the MIC and the FI04 The 
standing of both parties was hence seriously devalued, particularly 
as the substance of the petitions differed only in their attitudes 
to the issue of citizenship.
But not even the dominant Indian organization, the MIC, could 
avoid serious internal divisions. Almost from its very beginnings 
the MIC was affected by chronic rank and file disaffection with the 
leadership. For example, Budh's dogmatism and extremist policies 
alienated the conservative branches in Malacca and Negri Sembilan 
as well as the moderate Tamil Nesan. Devaser, President from 1951-1955, 
though supported by the powerful Selangor branch, was the victim, 
and also to some extent the instigator^ of Tamil ill-feeling.
However, it was Sambanthan's Presidency from 1955 which produced 
the most turbulent reaction within the MIC. This was in part due to 
the President's failure to defend adequately Indian interests within 
the councils of the Alliance. In addition Sambanthan's main support 
came from rural Perak, whilst his critics were concentrated in the 
powerful Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Singapore branches. In view 
of these constant internal wrangles, it is not surprising that 
frequently the British authorities chose to ignore the Indians and the 
MIC - as in the formation of the Cabinet in 1951 and its expansion 
in 1955. It should also be noted that no Indian representatives were 
included in the Baling Talks nor in the Alliance delegation to the 
Independence Conference in 1956.
The political divisiveness of the Indian community remains 
perhaps its most notable characteristic in the period under study.
It can be explained in essence, of course, in terms of the ethnic, 
class and ideological distinctions within the Indian community noted 
at length earlier. One further point can be added here. It is 
possible that the Indian community enjoyed the 'luxury' of internal 
political wrangling because, at heart, it knew that even united, it 
was too small to exert any strong influence on Malayan politics.
The Chinese community was, in essence, no less divided than the 
Indian - by for example, speech group, occupation and place of
26l,
birth. But the Chinese community was sufficiently large to ensure
that, once united, it could demand a major position in the Malayan
political scene. Even with the disaffection of numerous Chinese into
the MCP, the community remained sufficiently united under the MCA to
be accorded almost equal status with the UMNO in the Independent 
(1)Government. The Indians could never aspire to such a position and 
hence the potential rewards of unity were not sufficiently large to 
force the community to settle its internal rivalries.
It could also be argued that the Indian community's minority 
status encouraged it to engage with non-communal parties in the l$?40s 
and early 1950s, though, as noted earlier, this preference for non- 
communal politics also reflected the influence of the Indian National 
Congress. Thus, for example, P. Sarma, Devan Nair and 'Jacko'
Thumboo had become involved in the Malayan Democratic Union, V. David 
and D.S. Ramanathan in the Pan-Malayan Labour Party, and G. Woodhull,
Jamit Gingh, Devan Nair and J. Puthuchear.y had worked in the Singapore 
Peoples Action Party. The participation of these Indian trade 
unionists was sought not simply because they were able leaders, but 
also because their racial origins partly counter-balanced the 
influence of predominantly Chinese membership. In th^case of the 
Pan-Malayan Labour Party, they also provided a 'respectable' moderate 
socialist influence in a party being invaded by Chinese-educated 
militants. The Indian community was also heavily involved in the 
Peoples Progressive Party, and, of course, Onn's Independence of 
Malaya Party and Party Negara. The dispersal of Indian political 
figures among various, often opposing, non-communal parties inevitably 
weakened the leadership of the community. Not only did it prevent the 
community from marshalling its political energies in pursuit of 
interests directly relevant to Indians, but it also submerged those 
energies in parties with an increasing Chinese character. Indeed
This is not to deny that the Chinese community did not suffer 
serious political divisions. But Chinese dissidents were never 
sufficiently powerful to threaten the stability of the MCA and 
its moderate leadership.
Indian leadership of so called *noh-communal' parties was often little more 
than a cloak for Chinese communal interests. Notable here was the 
Peoples Progressive Party led by the Seenivasagam brothers, with its 
determination to secure extreme Chinese demands.
Howevef it must be recognized that the Indian community faced a 
serious dilemma. For ideological reasons it was strongly committed to 
non-communalism; moreover, whilst there remained a possibility that a 
viable non-communal party would emerge in Malaya to wrest independence 
from the British (and in the late 19*+0s and early 1950s, it appeared 
that Dato Onn could secure that role), then there was a clear practical 
justification for the Indian involvement in non-communal parties. On 
the other hand, were politics to be organized along strictly communal 
lines, then, as noted earlier, the Indian attachment to non-communalism 
implied electoral extinction. By 1954 it was clear that Malayan 
politics would henceforth be conducted along communal lines. The 
success of the UMNO-MCA Alliance and the defeat of the Independence of 
Malaya Party at the polls from 1952 was the first clear indication of 
this. The publication of the Federal Elections Committee Report in 
March 1954, which showed that the Indians would be in a minority in 
every constituency, merely confirmed Indian fears of political 
obscurity. The immediate response of the community was to demand reserved 
seats. The demand was rejected by the Government and the Malay Rulers, 
but this rejection forced the Indian community into a final reappraisal 
of its precarious political position. The result was the decision, 
taken reluctantly, to abandon its strict adherence to non-communalism 
and, recognizing political realities, to join the UMNO-MCA in the Alliance. 
This reassessment by the MIC of its position was considerably eased by 
its growing disillusionment with Dato Onn who, by 1954, was adopting an 
increasingly extreme pro-Malay stance.
The political vulnerability of the Indian community did not 
disappear when the MIC formally joined the Alliance in April 1955- 
As a minority community, again being in a minority in all constituencies, 
the electoral potential of the MIC was relatively small, and as a result 
the Alliance was extremely reluctant to allocate seats to the Indians. 
This seriously annoyed the MIC branches, particularly those in Bungsar- 
Brickfields, Penang and Province Wellesley, where either strong local 
MIC candidates were ignored by the Alliance hierarchy, or more seriously, 
unpopular and unsuitable candidates were imposed on them. The anger 
within the MIC branches often reached the point where the branch 
actively supported candidates who stood in opposition to the Alliance; 
in Bungsar the Alliance candidate was defeated.
Moreover it is clear that from 1955 there was insufficient 
agreement between the MIC and its Alliance partners on essential issues 
to secure anything more than a token political alignment. On the 
questions of language, citizenship, Malay special rights and whether 
Malaya should be a secular state, there were profound disagreements 
between the partners. The MIC leadership was, on most issues, prepared 
to compromise: for example it agreed to accept English and Malay
as the only national languages. But whilst the leadership compromised, 
the membership rebelled. Tamil chauvinists demanded that Tamil be 
included as a national language, and that a multi-lingual Legislative 
Council be established. Similarly, MIC branches expressed concern over 
the issue of Malay special rights, which appeared to threaten Indian 
Employment opportunities in the government service. Finally, Indian 
merchants and Chettiars, eager to retain dual citizenship, vigorously 
opposed the acceptance by the MIC leadership of single citizenship.
These divisions were exacerbated by a continuous and bitter conflict 
between Sambgjithan and Devaser.
In short, though the MIC may have had little option but to joip. 
the Alliance in 1954, partnership with the powerful UMNO and MCA could 
not overcome the inherent political weaknesses of the party, or indeed 
of the Indian community as a whole. Indeed it could be argued that 
it exacerbated them. It should be noted for example, that from 1955, 
large numbers of influential MIC members, disillusioned with the Party's 
compromising stance, defected from the organization and joined the Pan™ 
Malayan Labour Party and the Peoples Progressive Party. It is a 
final measure of the Congress's weakness that its leader when the 
Alliance assumed power in 1957 was the ineffectual and rather spineless 
Sambanthan. The dominating political personalities of the Indian 
community could find no place in the administration of the newly 
Independent Malaya.
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Azad Hind
Azad Hind Fauj
Azad Hind Sangh
Bande Mataram
Brahmin
Chalo Delhi
Chettiar
Coolie
Deepavali
Dravida
Hartal
Jawi
Jawi-Pe rnakan
Jernal
Kampong
Kangany
Kavadi
Kesatuan
Khaddar
Melayu
Mentri-Besar 
Merdeka 
Min Yuen 
Netaji
Free India.
Indian National Army.
Indian Independence League.
Hail to the Mother-land.
Priestly Caste.
Forward to Delhi.
Moneylending Caste.
Labourer.
Festival of Lights.
Dravidian.
Economic Boycott.
The Malay (modified Arabic) Script.
Local-born Muslim of mixed Indian-Malay 
descent•
Journal.
Village.
Overseer of Indian labour.
A large wooden decorated arch carried as 
an act of penance during Hindu festivals.
Union, Association.
Homespun Gotton Material.
Malay.
Chief Minister.
Freedom.
Masses Organization.
Leader.
Panchayat
Parti
Penghulu
Ponggol
Raayat
Sultan
Thondar Padai 
Toddy
Towkay
Ulama
Council of Five.
Party.
Headman of a village with some administrative 
and judicial authority.
Harvest Festival.
People.
Ruler.
Youth Corps, Social-service league.
an intoxicating brew derived from the 
coco-nut palm.
Wealthy businessman.
Priest, person learned in religion.
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A. National Archives, Kuala Lumpur.
The major source of unpublished primary materials for this study is 
located in the National Archives in Kuala Lumpur. Though these 
materials have as yet not been comprehensively catalogued they are 
provisionally divided as follows:
1. British Military Administration Files, 19^5-19^6• These files are
further divided into the following categories:
a) Administration
b) Chinese Affairs
c) Civil Affairs
d) Economic Affairs
e) Immigration and Emigration
f) Indian Affairs
g) Labour
h) Lands
i) Malay Affairs
o) Police
k) Regional
1) Publicity, Propaganda and Press Intelligence
m) Security and Intelligence
In addition there are a series of files which contain correspondence 
between the British Military Administration Headquarters in Singapore and 
the British Military Administration in Kuala Lumpur. Virtually all the 
British Military Administration Files are open to scholars.
2. Malayan Union Files, 19^6-19^8.
These are divided into the following sections:
a) Information
b) Labour
c) Public Relations
d) Secretariat
There is also a series of Malayan Union Files marked 'Secret and 
Confidential'. These files, which are open to scholars, contain 
valuable information on such issues as labour relations, subversion 
and reports on Malayan leaders as well as fortnightly intelligence 
reports from the Malayan Security Service.
3. Federal Secretariat Files, 19^8-19^9*
Relatively few of these files are open, principally because they 
have not been even provisionally catalogued. Moreover, when the research 
for this study was carried out in 197^ the National Archives were 
permitted to release documents only up to 19^9*
Separate files for a number of major departments cover the period 
19^ 6-19^ 9.
km The Files of the Resident Commissioner, Selangor, Perak and Kedah.
These contain miscellaneous correspondence between the State 
Resident Commissioner and Kuala Lumpur.
5. Information Department Files. These are particularly useful for 
'Press Intelligence' reports and for clippings of minority newspapers, 
particularly Chinese and left-wing newspapers for the period 19^3-19^8*
6. Labour Department Files 19^5-19^3• These files include reports by 
the Commissioner for Labour and reports from State and District 
Commissioners of Labour. They are a fundamental source for an 
understanding of industrial relations in the period under study.
7. Chinese Affairs Secretariat Files 19^5-19^9*
8. Adviser for Education Files 19^3-19^9*
9. Prime Minister's Department Files 19^5-19^9* These are mainly top 
secret files and contain vital information on Sino-Malay relations, 
Malayan security matters and confidential reports on 'subversive' 
activities.
B. As well as the records in the National Archives, there are sources
of unpublished primary materials at the Registry of Societies, Kuala
Lumpur and the Rubber Growers Association, Kuala Lumpur.
1. Registrar of Societies Files held at the Registry of Societies,
Kuala Lumpur.
These files contain detailed reports and correspondence on the 
various associations in the Federation, from their establishment to 
the present day. They contain information on the objectives of 
these organisations, office-bearers, membership and their annual 
reports.
2. The United Planters Association of Malaya Files.
These are held at the offices of the Rubber Growers Association,
Kuala Lumpur. These papers include minutes of meetings, circulars and 
monthly reports.
G. Private Papers.
1. Papers of the Malayan Indian Congress. These are at present in the 
possession of s. Govindaraj, General Secretary of the MIG from 
19^8-1952. They contain a wide variety of documents relating to 
the party, including minutes of meetings at all levels and the 
private correspondence of MIC leaders.
2. Thivy Papers. These are held in the Library of the University of 
Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. They are an essential source for the Indian 
National Army and for early postwar Malayan Indian politics.
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3* Tamil Reform Association Papers. These were in the possession of 
the late G. Sarangapany, President of the Association, who died in 
197^* They are now deposited at the Association’s premises in 
Singapore. These materials relate to the activities of the 
association in Singapore and its branches in the Federation for 
the period 19^6-1959*
*f. Pan-Malayan Dravidian Federation Papers. These are held in the 
office of the Party in Kuala Lumpur.
5* Personal statement of S.C. Goho submitted to the INA Historical 
Committee, Netaji Research Bureau, Calcutta, n.d# S.C. Goho was 
a member of the Council of Action and President of the Singapore 
branch of the Indian Independence League.
6. Tan Cheng Lock Papers*
These are divided between the National Archives in Kuala Lumpur 
and the Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore.
7. Leong Yew Koh Papers.
These are held at the National Archives, Kuala Lumpur. Leong Yew Koh 
was Secretary-General of the MCA, later Governor of Malacca and 
then Minister of Justice and Leader of the Malayan Senate.
8. UMNO Papers, National Archives, Kuala Lumpur. These are exceptionally 
valuable for a study of the UMNO and its relations with the MCA. 
Occasional papers relate to correspondence between the UMNO and the 
MIC.
9* Alliance Papers.
These are held at the Alliance Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. They 
are vital for a study of MIC relations with the Alliance in the period 
after 195^.
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10. Pagden Papers, National Archives, Kuala Lumpur. Squadron-Leader
Hugh Pagden was Adviser on Chinese Affairs, 19*+5-19*+6. These Papers 
contain useful material on the MCP and the Emergency for the 
period 19*+5-1950. Access is limited.
The collections of Private Papers in the United Kingdom, including 
the Creech Jones Papers, the MacMichael Papers (both held at Rhodes House, 
Oxford) and the Maxwell Papers (held at the Royal Commonwealth Society, 
London) were briefly examined. However they were of little value for a 
study on political change in the Malayan Indian community, though of 
course they are essential sources for students of British policy in 
post-war Malaya.
D. Colonial Office Records, Public Record Office, London. Three series 
were used for this study.
C0273* Straits Settlements, Original Correspondence, 19*+0-19*+5*
These were of very limited value in this context.
C0717, Malay States, Original Corresxiondence, 19*+l-19*+5* These
too were of very limited importance.
WO32, War Office Records. These files contain some useful
information on early postwar reconstruction in Malaya.
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Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of Policy on Euture Constitution 
Cmd 672*+ of 19*+5-19*+6.
Malayan Union and Singapore: Summary Proposed Constitutional Arrangements, 
Cmd 67*+9 of 19*+6.
Federation of Malaya: Summary of Revised Constitutional Proposals,
Cmd 7171 of 19*+7*
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1945-1957 (Hansard), London.
B.
Malaya (Council Proceedings, Gazettes, Annual Reports).
Proceedings of the Federal Council, 1933, Kuala Lumpur, 1933-
Proceedings of the British Military Administration Advisory Council,
Malaya, November 1945 - March 1946, Malaya, 1946.
Proceedings of the Malayan Union Advisory Council, Malaya, 1946-1948,
Kuala Lumpur, above dates.
Proceedings of the Federal Legislative Council, 1948-1957, Kuala Lumpur, 
above dates.
Proceedings of the Singapore Legislative Council, 1948-1955, Singapore, 
above dates.
Proceedings of the Singapore Legislative Assembly, 1955-1957* Singapore, 
above dates.
Malayan Union Annual Reports, 1946, 1947, Kuala Lumpur, above dates.
Federation of Malaya Annual Reports, 1948-1957, Kuala Lumpur, above dates.
Federation of Malaya, Annual Reports on Education, 1948-1957, Kuala Lumpur, 
above dates.
The Colony of Singapore Annual Reports, 1946-1957, Singapore, above dates.
BMA Gazette, 1945-1946, Kuala Lumpur, 1946.
Malayan Union Government Gazette, 1946-1948, Kuala Lumpur, above dates.
Federation of Malaya Government Gazette, 1948-1957, Kuala Lumpur, 
above dates.
C.
Special Reports, Council Papers and Miscellaneous Government
Publications.
Sir Harold MacMichael,
Report on a Mission to Malaya, October 1945 - January 1946,
London, 1946.
Major-General H.R. Hone,
Report on the British Military Administration of Malaya,
September 1945 to March 1946, Kuala Lumpur, 1946.
Constitutional Proposals for Malaya: Rep&rt of the Working Committee 
appointed by a Conference of His Excellency the Governor of the 
Malayan Union, Their Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States and 
the Representatives of the United Malays National Organization,
19 December 1946, Kuala Lumpur, 1947*
Constitutional Proposals for Malaya: Report of the Consultative Committee 
together with proceedings of six public meetings, a summary of 
representations made and letters and memoranda considered by the 
Committee, Kuala Lumpur, 21 March 1947*
Constitutional Proposals for Malaya: Second Report of the Working 
Committee appointed by a Conference of His Excellency the Governor 
of the Malayan Union, Their Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States 
and the Representatives of the UMNO, 24 April 1947, Kuala Lumpur, 1947 
Federation of Malaya: Summary of Revised Constitutional Proposals
accepted by His Majesty's Government, 24 July 1947, Kuala Lumpur, 1947 
The Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, reprinted 1952 with Amendments, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1952.
Malayan Union Ordinances, 1946-1948, Kuala Lumpur, above dates.
Federation of Malaya Ordinances 1948-1957, Kuala Lumpur, above dates.
The Findings of the Board of Inquiry into the Kedah Incidents,
Kuala Lumpur, August 1947 (mimeographed).
Malaya, Report of a Commission of Enquiry appointed by His Excellency 
the Governor of the Malayan Union to Enquire into and Report on the 
circumstances of the Conflict on Dublin Estate, South Kedah, on the 
28th day of April 1947, in which the Police Opened Fire, Federation
of Malaya, 1948.
Report of the Commission on University Education in Malaya by
Carr-Saunders, Kuala Lumpur, 1949*
Federation of Malaya, Central Advisory Committee on Education, First 
Report, Council Paper No.29 of 195°, Kuala Lumpur, 1950*
Federation of Malaya, Memorandum Relating to the Proposal for the
Introduction of a System Under Which Departments of Government will 
be Grouped and Placed Under Members Who Will Be Responsible Therefore 
to the High Commissioner and Certain of Such Members will be appointed 
From Among Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council, Council 
Paper No. 49 of 1950, Kuala Lumpur, January 1951*
Report of the Committee on Malay Education, by L.J-. Barnes, Kuala Lumpur, 
1950.
Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malayans. The Report of a 
Mission invited by the Federation Government to Study the Problem 
of the Education of the Chinese in Malaya, by Fenn and Wu, Kuala 
Lumpur, June 1951*
Report of the Central Committee on Education on the Barnes and the 
Fenn Wu Reports on Education, Kuala Lumpur, 1951*
Report of the Singapore Riots Inquiry Commission 1951 together with a 
despatch from the Governor of Singapore to the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, Singapore, 1951*
Report on Introduction of Elections in the Municipality of George Town, 
Penang, 1951, by G. Hawkins, Kuala Lumpur, 1953*
Federation of Malaya, Department of Information, Communist Terrorism in 
Malaya: The Emergency, June 1948 - June 1952, Kuala Lumpur, 1952.
Report of the Select Committee Appointed on the 20th Day of September 
1951* to Recommend Legislation to cover all Aspects of Educational
Policy for the Federation of Malayat Council Paper Wo. 70 of 1952,
Kuala Lumpur, 1952.
The Education Ordinance, 1952, Council Paper Wo. 63 of 1952, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1952.
Detention and Deportation during the Emergency in the Federation of 
Malaya, Council Paper Wo. Zk of 1953* Kuala Lumpur, 1953*
First Annual Report of the Member for Education on the Education
Ordinance, 1952, Council Paper Wo. 29 of 195**i Kuala Lumpur, 195*+* 
Educational Policy, Council Paper No. 6? of 195*+, Kuala Lumpur, 195*+* 
Report of the Constituency Delineation Commission, Council Paper No. 36 
of 195*+» Kuala Lumpur, 195*+.
Report of the Committee appointed to examine the question of Elections 
to the Federal Legislative Council, Council Paper No. 20 of 195*+»
Kuala Lumpur, 195***
Introduction of Elections to the Federal Legislative Council, Council 
Paper No. 21 of 195*+» Kuala Lumpur, 195**- 
Memorandum on the introduction of Elections to the Federal Legislative 
Council, issued by command of His Excellency the High Commissioner,
26 May 195*+» Kuala Lumpur, 195*+*
Report on the First Election of Members to the Legislative Council of 
the Federation of Malaya, by T.E. Smith, Kuala Lumpur, 1955*
Report of the Education Committee, 1956, by Dato Abdul Razak, Council 
Paper No. 21 of 1956, Kuala Lumpur, 1958.
Self-Government for the Federation of Malaya, Report of the Constitutional 
Conference, London, January - February 1956.
Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission,
Appendices IX, III and IV, Kuala Lumpur, 1957.
Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957 
(Reid Report), Kuala Lumpur, 1957.
Federation of Malaya Constitutional Proposals 1957, Kuala Lumpur, 1957- 
M.V. del Tufo, Malaya, A Report on the 19*+7 Census of Population, 
London, 19*+9«
Federation of Malaya, The 1957 Census - A Preliminary Report Based on
'First Count Total*Returns, Kuala Lumpur, 1957.
The 1957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya, Report Nos. 1 - 
Kuala Lumpur, Department of Statistics, i960.
Federation of Malaya, Daily Press Summary, Vernacular Papers, Kuala
Lumpur, Department of Information.
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A. English Language.
The Democrat, Kuala Lumpur, March - May 19*+6, January - April 19*+7. 
Indian Daily Mail, Singapore, April 19*+6 - November 1957.
Malay Mail, Kuala Lumpur, January 19*+6 - July 1965*
Malayan Daily News, Kuala Lumpur, January 19*+6 - July 19*+7»
February - September 1951*
Malayan Monitor, London, September - December 19*+8, December 1950, 
June 1953, July 195*+.
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Malayan Post, Kuala Lumpur, January 19^ *6.
Malayan Standard, Kuala Lumpur, April - June 19^6*
Malaya Tribune, Kuala Lumpur, December 19^5 - June 1951*
Singapore ffree Press, Singapore, April 19^7 - April 1992,
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Warta Negara (Jawi), Penang, November 19*15 - January 19*17.
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